api/

Direct WebSocket API server for non-Telegram clients.

Purpose

Provides transport-independent access to the same orchestrator/session system used by Telegram.

• E2E encrypted WebSocket session (NaCl Box)
• authenticated file download/upload endpoints
• shared session model (SessionKey) with optional channel isolation

Files

• api/crypto.py: E2E session (E2ESession)
• api/server.py: WebSocket + HTTP handlers, auth, streaming dispatch, file endpoints

Config (config.api)

Field	Default	Description
enabled	false	start API server
host	0.0.0.0	bind address
port	8741	API port
token	""	auth token (generated when enabling/first start fallback)
chat_id	0	default chat scope (0 -> fallback to first allowed_user_ids, else 1)
allow_public	false	suppress tailscale warning

Auth and E2E handshake

Endpoint: ws://<host>:<port>/ws

Client first frame (plaintext):

{"type":"auth","token":"...","e2e_pk":"...","chat_id":123,"channel_id":77}

Required:

• type=auth
• valid token
• valid e2e_pk (base64 Curve25519 public key)

Optional session scope:

• chat_id: positive int
• channel_id: positive int (mapped to SessionKey.topic_id)

Server responds (last plaintext frame):

{"type":"auth_ok","chat_id":123,"channel_id":77,"e2e_pk":"...","providers":[...]}

After auth_ok, all frames are encrypted.

Session identity in API

API uses SessionKey("api", chat_id, topic_id).

• topic_id is populated from channel_id in auth payload
• without channel_id, session is chat-scoped only

This allows multiple API channels to maintain isolated contexts under one chat_id.

Encrypted message flow

Client message:

{"type":"message","text":"..."}

Server streaming events:

• text_delta
• tool_activity
• system_status
• final result (text, stream_fallback, optional files)

Abort:

• client sends {"type":"abort"} or text message /stop
• server returns abort_ok with kill count

Current scope nuance:

• API abort is currently chat-scoped, not channel-scoped, because the abort path kills active work by chat_id

HTTP endpoints

• GET /health (no auth)
• GET /files?path=... (Bearer token + allowed-root checks)
• POST /upload (Bearer token + multipart)

Upload target:

• ~/.ductor/workspace/api_files/YYYY-MM-DD/...

File safety model

GET /files path checks use file_access mapping:

• all -> unrestricted
• home -> home-root limited
• workspace -> ~/.ductor/workspace limited

MIME and file-tag parsing share helpers from ductor_bot/files/.

Error model

Auth-phase errors are plaintext (auth_timeout, auth_required, auth_failed). Session-phase errors are encrypted (decrypt_failed, empty, unknown_type, no_handler, internal_error).

Wiring

orchestrator/lifecycle.start_api_server(...) wires:

• message handler -> Orchestrator.handle_message_streaming
• abort handler -> Orchestrator.abort
• file context (allowed roots, upload dir, workspace)
• provider metadata and active state getter