vgi-rpc Wire Protocol Specification
August 12, 2026 · View on GitHub
Wire protocol version: 1 Status: Normative Audience: Cross-language implementors (Go, Rust, TypeScript, C++, etc.) Reflects: vgi-rpc 0.42.1
This document specifies the vgi-rpc wire protocol at byte level. A conforming implementation can interoperate with the Python reference without reading Python source code. The protocol is transport-agnostic; specific transport bindings (pipe, HTTP, shared memory) are described in later sections.
1. Overview & Conventions
vgi-rpc is an RPC framework where:
- Serialization uses Apache Arrow IPC Streaming Format.
- All integers are little-endian unless stated otherwise.
- All metadata strings are UTF-8 encoded.
- Wire protocol version:
"1"(the single ASCII byte0x31). - Metadata keys and values in Arrow IPC custom metadata are byte strings. Keys in the
vgi_rpc.*namespace are framework-reserved.
Terminology
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| IPC stream | A complete Arrow IPC streaming-format message sequence: schema message, zero or more record batch messages, terminated by an EOS marker. |
| Batch | An Arrow RecordBatch — zero or more rows conforming to a schema. |
| Custom metadata | Per-batch KeyValueMetadata attached to individual record batches within an IPC stream (distinct from schema-level metadata). |
| Zero-row batch | A batch with num_rows == 0. Used for log messages, error signals, pointer batches, and stream-completion markers. |
| Data batch | A batch with num_rows > 0, or a zero-row batch that lacks log/error metadata keys (e.g., void return). |
2. Arrow IPC Framing
Each logical message exchange uses one or more IPC streams written sequentially on the same byte stream (pipe, TCP socket, HTTP body, etc.).
An IPC stream consists of:
- Schema message — describes the columns and their Arrow types.
- Zero or more RecordBatch messages — each optionally carrying per-batch custom metadata.
- EOS marker — the 8-byte sequence
0xFF 0xFF 0xFF 0xFF 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00(continuation token0xFFFFFFFFfollowed by 4 zero bytes for metadata length).
Multiple IPC streams are written sequentially on the same underlying byte stream. Each reader opens one stream, reads until EOS, and stops. The next reader picks up immediately after the EOS marker.
Refer to the Apache Arrow IPC specification for the byte-level encoding of schema messages, record batch messages, dictionary messages, and the encapsulated message format.
3. Metadata Key Reference
All framework-reserved metadata keys, their wire-format byte representations, where they appear, and their semantics:
Request metadata (on the request batch's custom metadata)
| Key (bytes) | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
vgi_rpc.method | UTF-8 method name | Target RPC method to invoke. Required. |
vgi_rpc.request_version | "1" (ASCII 0x31) | Wire protocol version. Required. |
vgi_rpc.protocol_version | Canonical semver MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH | Application protocol surface version. Required when the peer Protocol declares one, absent otherwise. See Section 13. |
vgi_rpc.request_id | UTF-8 string (16-char hex) | Per-request correlation ID. Optional; if absent, the server generates a new 16-char hex ID. |
vgi_rpc.cancel | "1" — presence is the signal | Client-initiated stream cancellation, on a stream input batch. See Section 9. Optional. |
traceparent | W3C Trace Context string | OpenTelemetry trace propagation. Optional. |
tracestate | W3C Trace Context string | OpenTelemetry trace state. Optional. |
vgi_rpc.shm_segment_name | UTF-8 OS name | Shared memory segment name (session-level). Optional. |
vgi_rpc.shm_segment_size | Decimal integer string | Shared memory segment total size in bytes. Optional. |
vgi_rpc.transport.shm | "true" / "false" | Client's shared-memory capability, on the __transport_options__ request. See Section 15. Optional. |
HTTP stream continuation requests additionally carry
vgi_rpc.stream_state#b64 and vgi_rpc.call_state#b64 — see the stream-state
table below.
Response / log / error metadata (on response batch custom metadata)
| Key (bytes) | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
vgi_rpc.log_level | One of: EXCEPTION, ERROR, WARN, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE | Severity level. Present on log and error batches. |
vgi_rpc.log_message | UTF-8 string | Human-readable message text. |
vgi_rpc.log_extra | JSON string | Additional structured data. Optional. |
vgi_rpc.error_kind | UTF-8 token (open set) | Stable machine-readable error category on EXCEPTION batches. See Section 8. Optional. |
vgi_rpc.server_id | UTF-8 string (12-char hex) | Server instance identifier for distributed tracing. |
vgi_rpc.request_id | UTF-8 string | Echoed request correlation ID. |
vgi_rpc.transport.shm | "true" / "false" | Server's shared-memory capability, on the __transport_options__ response. See Section 15. |
Stream state (HTTP transport)
| Key (bytes) | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
vgi_rpc.stream_state#b64 | Base64-encoded binary (signed token) | Serialized stream state for stateless HTTP exchanges — the per-turn cursor when the server splits its state. The #b64 suffix signals that the value is base64-encoded binary data. |
vgi_rpc.call_state#b64 | Base64-encoded binary (signed token) | Optional. The stream's call state — the half fixed for the life of the call. Minted once by /init, never re-issued, and echoed by the client on every subsequent request. Absent from servers that keep everything in the cursor. |
Shared memory pointer batch metadata
| Key (bytes) | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
vgi_rpc.shm_offset | Decimal integer string | Absolute byte offset in the SHM segment. |
vgi_rpc.shm_length | Decimal integer string | Number of bytes of the serialized batch. |
vgi_rpc.shm_source | UTF-8 SHM segment name | Provenance indicator on resolved batches (diagnostics). |
External storage pointer batch metadata
| Key (bytes) | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
vgi_rpc.location | UTF-8 URL | URL to fetch the externalized batch data. |
vgi_rpc.location.sha256 | UTF-8 hex string | SHA-256 of the uploaded payload before compression. Optional; when present the reader MUST verify it after fetching. |
vgi_rpc.location.fetch_ms | Decimal float string (e.g. "42.3") | Fetch duration in milliseconds (diagnostics, on resolved batches). |
vgi_rpc.location.source | UTF-8 URL | Original fetch URL (diagnostics, on resolved batches). |
Introspection batch metadata (on __describe__ response batch custom_metadata)
| Key (bytes) | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
vgi_rpc.protocol_name | UTF-8 string | Protocol class name. |
vgi_rpc.request_version | "1" | Wire protocol version. |
vgi_rpc.describe_version | "4" | Introspection format version. |
vgi_rpc.protocol_hash | UTF-8 hex string | SHA-256 digest over the canonical describe payload. |
vgi_rpc.protocol_version | Canonical semver | Application protocol surface version. Present only when the Protocol declares one. |
vgi_rpc.server_id | UTF-8 string | Server instance identifier. |
4. Type Mapping
RPC method parameters and return values are serialized as Arrow columns. The following table defines the canonical mapping from abstract types to Arrow types. Cross-language implementations MUST use these Arrow types for interoperability.
| Abstract type | Arrow type | Serialization notes |
|---|---|---|
string | utf8 | UTF-8 encoded. |
bytes / binary | binary | Raw byte sequence. |
int / integer | int64 | 64-bit signed integer. |
float / double | float64 | IEEE 754 double precision. |
bool | bool | — |
list[T] | list(T) | Recursive. |
dict[K, V] / map | map(K, V) | Serialized as list of (key, value) tuples. Deserialized back to map/dict. |
frozenset[T] / set[T] | list(T) | Serialized as list (order undefined). Deserialized back to set. |
enum | dictionary(int16, utf8) | Serialized as the enum member name (string). Deserialized by name lookup. |
optional[T] / T? | Same as T, but with nullable = true on the Arrow field. | null represents the absent value. |
dataclass (nested) | binary | Serialized as a complete Arrow IPC stream (schema + 1-row batch + EOS) in a binary column. See note below. |
Nested dataclass type context: This
binarymapping applies at the RPC method parameter/return level — each dataclass parameter or return value is a binary blob containing a serialized IPC stream. Within that IPC stream, the dataclass's own Arrow schema uses the same type mapping for primitive fields (string→utf8, int→int64, etc.), but sub-dataclass fields use Arrowstructtype (notbinary), since they are embedded inline rather than serialized as separate IPC streams.
Serialization transforms
When writing a value to an Arrow column:
- Enum → write the member's name as a UTF-8 string (not its value).
- dict → convert to a list of
(key, value)tuples, then write asmap(K, V). - frozenset/set → convert to a list, then write as
list(T). - Nested dataclass → serialize to Arrow IPC bytes, write as
binary.
When reading:
- Enum → look up the string by member name (
Enum["NAME"]). Name-based lookup is the normative wire format. (The Python reference implementation also supports a value-based fallback internally for nested dataclass fields, but cross-language implementations need only implement name-based lookup.) - map → convert list of tuples back to dict.
- list (when target is set) → convert to frozenset/set.
- binary (when target is dataclass) → deserialize from Arrow IPC bytes.
5. Request Batch Format
Every RPC request is a single IPC stream containing exactly one batch with one row:
IPC Stream:
Schema message:
- One field per method parameter, named after the parameter
- Field types per the type mapping (Section 4)
- Optional parameters have nullable = true
RecordBatch message:
- Exactly 1 row
- custom_metadata:
vgi_rpc.method = "<method_name>" (REQUIRED)
vgi_rpc.request_version = "1" (REQUIRED)
vgi_rpc.shm_segment_name = "<name>" (optional, SHM transport)
vgi_rpc.shm_segment_size = "<size>" (optional, SHM transport)
traceparent = "<W3C trace context>" (optional)
tracestate = "<W3C trace state>" (optional)
EOS marker
For methods with no parameters, the schema has zero fields and the batch has one row with zero columns.
Row count validation: The server only enforces
num_rows == 1when the schema has one or more fields. For zero-field (parameterless) methods, the server accepts batches with any row count (including 0). Conforming clients SHOULD send 1 row for consistency.
Worked example
Given an RPC method add(a: float, b: float) -> float:
Schema:
Field 0: name="a", type=float64, nullable=false
Field 1: name="b", type=float64, nullable=false
Batch (1 row, calling add(a=1.0, b=2.0)):
Column "a": [1.0]
Column "b": [2.0]
custom_metadata: {
"vgi_rpc.method": "add",
"vgi_rpc.request_version": "1"
}
Default values: When a parameter has a default and the caller omits it, the client merges the default into the kwargs before serialization. The server sees a complete row in all cases.
6. Response Format (Unary)
A unary response is a single IPC stream on the result schema:
IPC Stream:
Schema message:
- For methods returning a value: single field named "result"
- For void methods (-> None): zero fields (empty schema)
0..N log batches (zero-row, with log metadata — see Section 8)
1 result or error batch:
- Result: 1-row batch with the return value in column "result"
- Void: 0-row batch on empty schema
- Error: 0-row batch with EXCEPTION-level log metadata (see Section 8)
EOS marker
Log batches MUST appear before the result/error batch. They share the same schema as the result batch (the zero-row log batches conform to the response stream's schema).
Void return
When the method has no return value (-> None), the response schema is
empty (pa.schema([])) and the result batch has zero rows and zero columns.
7. Batch Classification Algorithm
When receiving any batch from a response stream, classify it using this decision tree:
receive(batch, custom_metadata):
IF custom_metadata is NULL:
→ DATA batch
IF batch.num_rows > 0:
→ DATA batch
// At this point: num_rows == 0 AND custom_metadata exists
IF custom_metadata contains "vgi_rpc.log_level"
AND custom_metadata contains "vgi_rpc.log_message":
level = custom_metadata["vgi_rpc.log_level"]
IF level == "EXCEPTION":
→ ERROR batch → raise RpcError (see Section 8)
ELSE:
→ LOG batch → deliver to on_log callback
IF custom_metadata contains "vgi_rpc.location":
→ EXTERNAL POINTER batch → resolve via URL fetch (see Section 12)
IF custom_metadata contains "vgi_rpc.shm_offset":
→ SHM POINTER batch → resolve via shared memory (see Section 11)
IF custom_metadata contains "vgi_rpc.stream_state#b64":
→ STATE TOKEN batch → stream continuation (see Section 10)
// Zero-row batch with unrecognized metadata
→ DATA batch (e.g., void return, stream-finish marker)
Note: Log-level keys take priority. A zero-row batch that has both
vgi_rpc.log_levelandvgi_rpc.shm_offset(orvgi_rpc.location) is classified as a log batch, not a pointer. This is by design — pointer detection explicitly excludes batches with log-level keys. A batch cannot be both an external pointer and an SHM pointer simultaneously, so the check order between those two does not matter functionally.
8. Log & Error Batch Format
Log batches
A log batch is a zero-row batch on the response stream's schema, with the following custom metadata keys:
| Key | Required | Value |
|---|---|---|
vgi_rpc.log_level | Yes | One of: EXCEPTION, ERROR, WARN, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE |
vgi_rpc.log_message | Yes | Human-readable message text (UTF-8) |
vgi_rpc.log_extra | No | JSON object with additional structured data |
vgi_rpc.error_kind | No | Stable error category; EXCEPTION batches only (see below) |
vgi_rpc.server_id | No | Server instance identifier |
vgi_rpc.request_id | No | Request correlation ID |
Error batches (EXCEPTION level)
When vgi_rpc.log_level is "EXCEPTION", the batch represents a server-side
error. The client MUST raise/throw an error with the following fields
extracted from the metadata:
- error_type:
log_extra.exception_type(string) or the level string"EXCEPTION"as fallback. - error_message:
vgi_rpc.log_messagevalue. - remote_traceback:
log_extra.traceback(string) or empty string. - request_id:
vgi_rpc.request_idvalue or empty string. - error_kind:
vgi_rpc.error_kindvalue, when present.
Error kinds
vgi_rpc.error_kind carries a stable identifier for errors a client is
expected to branch on, so callers pattern-match a token instead of
substring-searching a human-readable message. It is emitted as a top-level
metadata key, mirroring log_extra.error_kind — a reader may take either, but
the top-level key means the JSON blob need not be parsed to dispatch.
The set is open: a client MUST treat an unrecognised value as an unclassified error rather than rejecting the batch. Well-known values:
| Value | Meaning |
|---|---|
method_not_implemented | The server has no handler for the requested method (old server vs. new client, or a method that was removed). The intended signal for capability detection with fallback. |
protocol_version_mismatch | The client's vgi_rpc.protocol_version is incompatible with the server's (see Section 13). |
session_lost | An HTTP sticky-session token could not be honoured — expired, evicted, misrouted, or presented under a different principal (see Section 17). |
server_draining | The server is shutting down and refuses new sticky-session opens. |
A batch carrying error_kind is otherwise an ordinary EXCEPTION batch: the
key adds classification and removes nothing. Implementations that do not emit
it remain conformant; clients simply lose the ability to branch.
log_extra JSON structure for EXCEPTION
{
"exception_type": "ValueError",
"exception_message": "invalid input",
"traceback": "Traceback (most recent call last):\n ...",
"frames": [
{
"file": "/path/to/module.py",
"line": 42,
"function": "my_method",
"code": "raise ValueError('invalid input')"
}
],
"cause": "Traceback ... (optional, from __cause__)",
"context": "Traceback ... (optional, from __context__)"
}
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
exception_type | string | Exception class name. |
exception_message | string | str(exception). |
traceback | string | Formatted traceback. Truncated at 16,000 characters with "\n… <traceback truncated>" suffix. |
frames | array of objects | Last 5 stack frames (most recent at end). |
frames[].file | string | Source file path. |
frames[].line | integer | Line number. |
frames[].function | string | Function/method name. |
frames[].code | string or null | Source code at that line. |
cause | string (optional) | Formatted __cause__ traceback. Truncated at 16,000 chars. |
context | string (optional) | Formatted __context__ traceback (only when not suppressed). Truncated at 16,000 chars. |
Non-exception log batches
For levels other than EXCEPTION, the log_extra JSON structure is
freeform — it contains whatever key-value pairs the server method attached.
Clients should deliver these to the on_log callback without attempting to
parse them as error structures.
9. Stream Protocol (Pipe / Subprocess Transport)
Streaming methods use a multi-phase exchange over a bidirectional byte stream (two pipes: client→server and server→client).
Phase 1: Request parameters
Identical to a unary request (Section 5):
Client → Server: IPC stream (params_schema, 1 request row, EOS)
Phase 1.5: Optional header stream
Only present when the stream method declares a header type. Sent by the server immediately after reading the request, before the main data exchange.
Server → Client: IPC stream (header_schema, 0..N log batches, 1 header row, EOS)
The header is a single-row batch containing serialized header data. If the method does not declare a header type, this phase is skipped entirely.
If the server encounters an error during method initialization, it writes an
error stream (with EXCEPTION-level metadata) on the empty schema in place
of the header stream. The empty schema is used because the header schema may
not be available when the error occurs (e.g., the method raised before
returning a Stream object). Clients MUST be prepared to receive an
empty-schema error stream where a header stream was expected.
Phase 2: Lockstep data exchange
Both directions use a single long-lived IPC stream each:
Client → Server: IPC stream (input_schema, batch₁, batch₂, ..., EOS)
Server → Client: IPC stream (output_schema, [log*+data]₁, [log*+data]₂, ..., EOS)
The exchange is lockstep: the client writes one input batch, then reads the server's response (zero or more log batches followed by exactly one data batch). This repeats until termination.
Producer streams
- Input schema: empty (
pa.schema([])) — the client sends zero-row "tick" batches as timing signals. - Output: the server produces one data batch per tick.
- Termination: the server signals completion by not writing a data batch
after the final log batches — the output IPC stream reaches EOS. The
client detects this as
StopIteration. - Client-initiated close: the client closes its input IPC stream (writes EOS). The server detects this as end of input and stops producing.
Client Server
| |
|--- tick (0-row, empty) ------->|
|<------ log* + data batch₁ ----|
|--- tick (0-row, empty) ------->|
|<------ log* + data batch₂ ----|
|--- tick (0-row, empty) ------->|
|<------ log* + [EOS] ----------| (server called finish())
|--- [EOS] --------------------->|
Exchange streams
- Input schema: a real schema matching the exchange input type.
- Output: the server produces one data batch per input batch.
- Termination: the client closes its input stream (EOS). The server drains remaining input and closes the output stream.
Client Server
| |
|--- input batch₁ ------------->|
|<------ log* + output batch₁ --|
|--- input batch₂ ------------->|
|<------ log* + output batch₂ --|
|--- [EOS] --------------------->|
|<------ [EOS] -----------------|
Client-initiated cancellation
Either stream kind may be terminated early by the client with an explicit cancel batch, distinct from simply closing the input stream:
- num_rows: 0
- Schema: the stream's input schema (the empty schema for producers).
- Custom metadata:
vgi_rpc.cancel— the reference sets the value"1", but presence of the key is the signal; a reader MUST NOT depend on the value.
On receipt the server MUST NOT invoke process() / produce() for that turn.
It invokes the stream state's optional on_cancel hook — a failure in the hook
is swallowed, never surfaced to the client — and then ends the stream cleanly
by closing the output stream. A cancel is not an error: no EXCEPTION batch is
written, and the exchange terminates normally.
Cancellation is best-effort on the client side: transport errors while sending
the cancel are swallowed, since the session is being abandoned regardless. After
cancelling, the session is closed — subsequent exchange() / tick() calls
fail locally.
The same key applies over HTTP, where it rides on the /exchange request batch
alongside the state tokens (Section 10). Because a
cancel is not a method dispatch, the server suppresses dispatch hooks for it;
the access log still records the call, marked cancelled.
Error during streaming
If the server encounters an error during process(), it writes an
EXCEPTION-level log batch on the output stream, then the output stream
reaches EOS. The client reads the error batch, raises RpcError, and
the session is closed.
10. HTTP Transport
The HTTP transport maps the pipe-based protocol to stateless HTTP request/response pairs. Streaming state is serialized into signed tokens passed between exchanges.
Content type
All requests and responses use:
Content-Type: application/vnd.apache.arrow.stream
The server MUST reject requests with any other Content-Type with HTTP 415 (Unsupported Media Type).
Endpoints
Given a configurable URL prefix (default /vgi):
RPC surface — Arrow IPC in, Arrow IPC out:
| Endpoint | HTTP Method | Description |
|---|---|---|
{prefix}/{method} | POST | Unary RPC call |
{prefix}/{method}/init | POST | Stream initialization (producer and exchange) |
{prefix}/{method}/exchange | POST | Stream continuation / exchange / cancel |
{prefix}/__describe__ | POST | Introspection (unary; a synthetic method on the generic route) |
{prefix}/__upload_url__/init | POST | Upload URL generation (only when an upload-URL provider is configured) |
Framework endpoints — not Arrow IPC:
| Endpoint | HTTP Method | Description |
|---|---|---|
{prefix}/health | GET, HEAD, OPTIONS | Health check + capability discovery. JSON body on GET; capability headers on all three. |
{prefix}/__session__ | DELETE | Sticky-session teardown (only when sticky sessions are enabled). See Section 17. |
{prefix}/__introspect_token__ | POST | Token introspection (JSON). See Section 16. Always routed; definitively refuses when disabled. |
Optional, human- and IdP-facing — present by default in the reference but
carrying no wire contract; a port may omit them entirely:
GET {prefix} (landing page), GET {prefix}/describe (HTML introspection
page), /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource (OAuth resource metadata), and
{prefix}/_oauth/{callback,logout,token} (OAuth PKCE browser flow).
Capability discovery
Capability headers are stamped on every response, so a client that has
already made a call needs no separate probe. The dedicated discovery target is
{prefix}/health, because it is present in every implementation and exempt
from authentication; OPTIONS is the cheapest verb for it (HEAD and GET
carry the same headers). There is no Arrow IPC body on any of them.
Note for implementors migrating from an earlier draft of this document: the discovery endpoint is
{prefix}/health, not{prefix}/__capabilities__. The reference client has never probed the latter.
| Header | Type | Emitted | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
VGI-Max-Request-Bytes | Integer | when configured | Maximum request body size the server accepts inline. Exceeding it is 413 (see Section 13). |
VGI-Max-Response-Bytes | Integer | when configured | HTTP body cap. Soft for producer streams (covered by continuation tokens), hard elsewhere. |
VGI-Max-Externalized-Response-Bytes | Integer | when configured | Cap on total bytes uploaded to external storage during one response. Always hard. |
VGI-Externalization-Enabled | "true" / "false" | always | Whether a storage backend is wired up, i.e. whether the client should expect pointer batches at all. |
VGI-Supported-Encodings | Comma-separated codec tokens | always | Content codings this server will produce. See Content-encoding negotiation. |
VGI-Upload-URL-Support | "true" | when enabled | The upload-URL endpoint is available. |
VGI-Max-Upload-Bytes | Integer | when enabled + configured | Maximum upload size for externalized batches. |
VGI-Proxy-Proof-Required | "true" | when required | This worker rejects requests lacking a valid proxy proof. |
VGI-Sticky-Enabled | "true" | when enabled | Sticky sessions are available. |
VGI-Sticky-Default-TTL | Integer seconds | when sticky enabled | TTL applied when a method opens a session without specifying one. |
VGI-Sticky-Echo-Headers | Comma-separated header names | when configured | Headers the client must replay for the life of a session. |
VGI-Token-Introspection | "true" | when enabled | The token-introspection route is live. |
A capability header that is absent means "not configured / not supported",
with one deliberate exception: an absent VGI-Supported-Encodings means a
server predating the header, for which a client assumes {zstd}. A
present but empty value is that server positively stating it speaks no
compression — the two are not interchangeable.
The server MAY include Cache-Control: max-age=N on the discovery response;
a client that honours it should refresh on expiry.
Upload URL generation
When the server has an upload_url_provider configured, the
POST {prefix}/__upload_url__/init endpoint generates pre-signed
upload/download URL pairs for client-side externalization.
Request: Standard unary request with vgi_rpc.method = "__upload_url__".
| Parameter | Arrow type | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
count | int64 | 1 | Number of URL pairs to generate (1–100). |
Response schema:
| Column | Arrow type | Nullable | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
upload_url | utf8 | No | Pre-signed URL for uploading batch data. |
download_url | utf8 | No | Pre-signed URL the server uses to fetch the uploaded data. |
expires_at | timestamp("us", tz="UTC") | No | Expiration time of the pre-signed URLs. |
The response has one row per requested URL pair.
Request headers
| Header | Description |
|---|---|
Content-Type | MUST be application/vnd.apache.arrow.stream |
X-Request-ID | Optional. Correlation ID echoed on response. If absent, server generates one. |
Content-Encoding | Optional. Coding applied to the request body. An unsupported coding is 415. |
Accept-Encoding | Optional. Codings the client accepts on the response. |
X-VGI-Accept-Encoding | Optional. Same, but takes precedence — see Content-encoding negotiation. |
VGI-Proxy-Proof | Optional. Per-request HMAC proof that the request arrived through a trusted proxy. See Proxy Proof. |
VGI-Session-Accept | Optional. "true" opts the client in to sticky sessions. See Section 17. |
VGI-Session | Optional. Resumes an existing sticky session. |
Response headers
Every response carries the capability headers from Capability discovery above. In addition:
| Header | Emitted | Description |
|---|---|---|
X-Request-ID | always | Echoed or generated request correlation ID. |
X-VGI-RPC-Error | on server-side errors | "true" marks a 200 response whose Arrow IPC body carries an EXCEPTION batch. See Section 13. |
Content-Encoding | when the response body is compressed | The coding applied. |
X-VGI-Content-Encoding | instead of the above | Used when the client negotiated via X-VGI-Accept-Encoding. |
VGI-Auth-Reason | on 401 only | Machine-readable reason code from the closed set in docs/unauthorized-spec.md. |
VGI-Auth-Proxy-Required | on 401 only, when applicable | "true" when this service's auth depends on headers a reverse proxy must inject. Derived from server configuration, so it is identical on every 401 and discloses nothing about the individual request. |
VGI-Session | when a session was opened | The token the client echoes on subsequent requests. |
VGI-Session-Close | when a session was closed | "true" tells the client to drop its captured token. |
VGI-Echo-<name> | on a session-opening response, when configured | Instructs the client to send <name>: <value> on every subsequent request in the session. |
Servers that enable CORS expose WWW-Authenticate, X-Request-ID,
X-VGI-Content-Encoding, X-VGI-RPC-Error, VGI-Auth-Reason, and every
advertised capability header, so a browser client can read them cross-origin.
Content-encoding negotiation
Request and response compression are independent: a server may decode a compressed request while producing only uncompressed responses.
Codec tokens are the usual HTTP ones — zstd, gzip, and identity.
identity is the no-op transform, not a compressor: it exists so a client can
explicitly ask for an uncompressed response, which is otherwise only
reachable by accident when nothing it offers happens to be producible. It is
deliberately excluded from VGI-Supported-Encodings, since every
implementation can always do it and advertising it carries no information.
Requests. A client may compress the request body and name the coding in
Content-Encoding. A server that does not support the named coding MUST
answer 415, not fall through to identity — the body would otherwise reach
the Arrow reader as garbage. A body that names a supported coding but fails to
decompress is 400. Implementations MUST bound decompression output to
prevent a decompression-bomb DoS.
Responses. The client offers codings in Accept-Encoding and/or
X-VGI-Accept-Encoding. The server picks the first offered coding it can
produce, honouring client preference order, with X-VGI-Accept-Encoding
taking precedence over the generic header — both in choosing the codec and in
deciding which response header to stamp. If the first match is identity, the
server MUST honour that and send an uncompressed body rather than continuing
down the list. No overlap means an uncompressed body.
The custom header exists because general-purpose HTTP clients inject their own
Accept-Encoding (frequently listing gzip before zstd) that a caller
cannot suppress, which silently overrides the order vgi-rpc states. The
difference is not cosmetic — for large Arrow bodies gzip compression measured
roughly an order of magnitude slower than zstd end-to-end.
The chosen coding is stamped on Content-Encoding, or on
X-VGI-Content-Encoding when the client negotiated through the custom header.
Nothing is stamped for identity: an untransformed body is just a body.
Unary call (HTTP)
POST {prefix}/{method}
Request body: IPC stream (params_schema, 1 request row, EOS)
Response body: IPC stream (result_schema, 0..N log batches, 1 result/error batch, EOS)
HTTP 200: Success — and also server-side errors, which carry
X-VGI-RPC-Error: true plus an EXCEPTION batch in the body
HTTP 400: Protocol error (bad IPC, missing metadata, param validation failure)
HTTP 401: Authentication failure (JSON envelope or HTML page, NOT Arrow IPC)
HTTP 404: Unknown method
HTTP 413: Request body exceeds VGI-Max-Request-Bytes
HTTP 415: Wrong Content-Type, or an unsupported Content-Encoding
See Section 13 for the full mapping, including why
a server implementation error surfaces as 200 rather than 500.
The method name in the URL path MUST match the vgi_rpc.method value in
the request batch's custom metadata. A mismatch is a 400 error.
Stream initialization (HTTP)
POST {prefix}/{method}/init
Request body: IPC stream (params_schema, 1 request row, EOS)
The response depends on whether the stream is a producer or exchange stream:
Producer stream init response
The response body contains the complete producer output:
Response body:
[IPC stream: header_schema, 0..N log batches, 1 header row, EOS] (if header declared)
[IPC stream: output_schema, (log* + data)*, EOS]
All produced data batches are included inline. If the response body would
exceed max_response_bytes (the operator-configured HTTP body cap), the
server stops producing and appends a continuation batch: a zero-row
batch with vgi_rpc.stream_state#b64 in its custom metadata. The client
then follows up with /exchange requests carrying that token. For
producer streams the wire cap is soft — continuation tokens cover the
overshoot. The companion cap max_externalized_response_bytes governs
external-channel uploads independently and is hard: a producer that
would exceed it surfaces an RpcError rather than continuing.
Exchange stream init response
Response body:
[IPC stream: header_schema, 0..N log batches, 1 header row, EOS] (if header declared)
[IPC stream: output_schema, 0..N log batches, 1 zero-row batch with state token, EOS]
The zero-row batch carries the signed state token in
vgi_rpc.stream_state#b64 custom metadata.
A server MUST split a stream's state in two, by lifetime. The half that is
fixed for the life of the call — the init request and the resolved
input/output schemas — is sealed into a separate call token under
vgi_rpc.call_state#b64, carried on this same zero-row batch;
vgi_rpc.stream_state#b64 then holds only the per-turn cursor.
The split is required, not an optimisation. Packing both halves into one token makes every continuation re-serialize, re-seal, re-open and re-parse a payload that cannot have changed — for a typical stream, the overwhelming majority of the token. Splitting also lets each half be compressed on its own lifetime, and lets a server cache the resolved call so a warm process skips opening the call token altogether. A server that keeps everything in the cursor forces every peer and intermediary onto the expensive path permanently, and is not conformant.
The call token is minted once, by /init, and is never re-issued — a
continuation response carries only a cursor. /init MUST emit both keys on
the same zero-row sentinel, for producer and exchange streams alike, and MUST
do so even when the method declares no call state of its own: the token still
carries the frozen schemas and the call id that binds the pair.
Stream exchange (HTTP)
POST {prefix}/{method}/exchange
Request body: IPC stream (input_schema, 1 input batch with state token in metadata, EOS)
Response body: IPC stream (output_schema, 0..N log batches, 1 data batch with updated state token, EOS)
The request batch's custom metadata MUST contain vgi_rpc.stream_state#b64
with the current state token (base64-encoded).
The request MUST also echo vgi_rpc.call_state#b64, unchanged, on every
subsequent request — continuations, exchanges, and cancels alike. A server
may resolve the call from a per-process cache, so a client that omits the
token still works while that cache is warm; it fails as soon as the cache is
not — a restarted worker, an evicted entry, or a request balanced onto a node
that never saw the /init. Since the cursor names a call the server minted
but no longer carries its payload, the client's copy is the only one such a
node has. A server MUST reject a continuation it cannot resolve with
400 Bad Request rather than guessing.
The same obligation extends to intermediaries: a proxy that forwards a continuation must carry both tokens, not just the cursor.
Resolution order (normative)
A server MUST resolve the two tokens in this order:
- Open and authenticate the cursor token first. Its AEAD tag covers the
call_id; its AAD covers the caller's(domain, principal). - Only then use that now-authenticated
call_idto look up any cached resolved call. - On a cache miss, open the client-supplied call token and require its
embedded
call_idto equal the one the cursor named.
The ordering is a security property, not an implementation detail. A client
cannot name a call_id the server did not mint for it, so a cache hit can
never hand back another principal's call state. A server that opens the
client-supplied call token first, or that keys a cache on any value the
client controls directly, has a cross-principal disclosure bug even though
every functional test still passes.
For producer continuation, the input is a zero-row batch on empty schema with the state token. The response may contain multiple data batches and may end with another continuation token.
For exchange, the input carries real data plus the state token. The response data batch carries an updated state token for the next exchange.
To cancel, the client sends a zero-row input batch carrying
vgi_rpc.cancel alongside both tokens (Section 9).
The server ends the stream without dispatching the method.
The client MUST strip vgi_rpc.stream_state#b64 and vgi_rpc.call_state#b64
from the batch metadata before exposing it to application code.
State token binary format
Both tokens are opaque AEAD-sealed blobs, base64-encoded for UTF-8 safe metadata storage. The envelope is XChaCha20-Poly1305 (libsodium IETF variant) — confidential (state is not visible to anything between client and server) and authenticated (any tampering, including cross-principal replay, fails decryption).
The two carry independent version lines, because they change for independent reasons. After base64-decoding, both share this envelope:
Offset Size Field
0 1 version: uint8 (cursor token: 5; call token: 1)
1 24 nonce: random per-token (XChaCha20-Poly1305 NPUB)
25 ... ciphertext: AEAD(sealed_payload, AAD) — includes the
16-byte Poly1305 tag at the end
Compression happens inside the seal (normative)
sealed_payload is not the framed plaintext directly. It is:
Offset Size Field
0 1 codec: uint8 — self-describing codec tag
(reference: 0x00 raw, 0x01 zstd)
1 ... the framed plaintext below, compressed per `codec`
The order matters and is the point of the exercise: compress, then encrypt. Once a token is sealed it is ciphertext, so the HTTP body codec can no longer find any redundancy in it — measured, zstd over a sealed token recovers only the slack base64 added (to ~76–80%) and never the state's own structure. Compressing inside the seal reaches the real redundancy: a 7,800-byte call state packs to 1,872, turning a 10,820-byte token into 2,552.
This is the second half of what the lifetime split buys. Splitting lets each half be compressed and cached on its own lifetime; a server that packs everything into one token pays full freight on every turn even if it compresses.
The requirements on a server are:
- It MUST compress the payload inside the seal whenever the compressed form is smaller than the raw one. Compressing outside the seal is not an alternative — it accomplishes nothing.
- It MUST prefix a self-describing codec tag, so the reader never guesses, and MUST emit the raw tag and skip compression when compression does not pay. A small token must never grow.
- It MUST bound the decompressed size (the reference caps output at 64 MiB). The payload is authenticated before it is decompressed, so this guards against a framework bug rather than an attacker, but an unbounded decompress on a request path is not worth having.
- It MUST reject an unknown codec tag, or a payload that fails to
decompress, as the same uniform
400 Bad Requestas every other token failure — both mean a token this server did not mint.
The codec is the port's choice: zstd where the runtime has it, deflate or gzip where it does not. Tag values are per-port, since a token never round-trips across ports. The reference uses zstd level 3 for both token kinds — the same speed as level 1 at these payload sizes and slightly smaller, where the levels that compress materially better (9, 19) cost 8× and 84× the CPU for a few hundred bytes.
Because token internals are opaque by design, none of this is observable from outside and the shared conformance suite cannot check it. Each port should assert it in a language-local test over its own seal/open path — that compression engages on a large payload, that a tiny payload stays raw, and that a corrupt or unknown-codec payload surfaces as a 400.
Cursor token plaintext (encrypted, never on the wire) — v5 carries only the advancing state plus the call id binding it to its call token. Everything the pre-split v4 token also carried (both schemas, the stream id) moved into the call token:
Offset Size Field
0 8 created_at: uint64 LE (seconds since Unix epoch)
8 16 call_id: the call token this cursor belongs to
24 4 state_len: uint32 LE
28 N state_bytes: serialized StreamState
Call token plaintext — v1, minted once at /init:
Offset Size Field
0 8 created_at: uint64 LE (seconds since Unix epoch)
8 16 call_id: random, minted at /init
24 4 call_len: uint32 LE
28 N call_state_bytes: serialized call state (empty when the
method declares none)
... 4 type_len: uint32 LE
... M call_state_type: UTF-8 class name, or empty
... 4 schema_len: uint32 LE
... P schema_bytes: serialized output pa.Schema
... 4 input_schema_len: uint32 LE
... Q input_schema_bytes: serialized input pa.Schema
... 4 stream_id_len: uint32 LE
... R stream_id_bytes: UTF-8 chain-correlation id
call_state_type is carried because a stream method may return a union of
state classes whose members declare different call-state types. A reader MUST
resolve that name against the set the method itself declares, and reject an
unrecognised one — never look up a class by a client-supplied name.
The AEAD AAD (authenticated, not encrypted) is:
cursor token: b"vgi_rpc.state.v4\x00" || identity_tail
call token: b"vgi_rpc.call.v1\x00" || identity_tail
where identity_tail is b"\x01" || domain || b"\x00" || principal for
authenticated requests and the literal b"\x00anonymous" otherwise. The
prefixes differ deliberately, so a call token and a cursor token are not
interchangeable even for the same principal: presenting one where the other
is expected fails the tag check rather than decoding into a payload the
reader would misinterpret.
As elsewhere, the plaintext framing above is the reference implementation's;
a port may choose its own encoding for what goes inside each token, and its
own compression codec (see the porting guide). What is normative is that
there are two tokens, split by lifetime, bound by an authenticated call_id,
and that each is compressed inside its seal under a self-describing codec
tag.
This binds every token to its issuing identity: a token sealed for one
principal cannot be opened with another principal's AAD even if both
share the master token_key.
version: Format selector. Not part of the AAD; mismatches are rejected before doing crypto work, but tampering with the byte to point at a different algorithm still fails the subsequent decrypt because the server uses the format-fixed algorithm constants.created_at: Token creation time as seconds since the Unix epoch. Used by the server to enforce a configurable TTL (token_ttl). Whentoken_ttl > 0, tokens older thantoken_ttlseconds are rejected with HTTP 400 ("State token expired"). Settoken_ttlto0to disable expiry checking. The default TTL is 3600 seconds (1 hour).state_bytes: The stream state dataclass serialized as a complete Arrow IPC stream (schema + 1-row batch + EOS).schema_bytes: The output Arrow schema serialized viapa.Schema.serialize().input_schema_bytes: The input Arrow schema serialized viapa.Schema.serialize(). For producer streams, this is the serialized empty schema.
Verification order: The version byte is checked first (cheap
rejection), then the AEAD decrypt is attempted. Any authenticity
failure (bad key, bad AAD, tampered nonce or ciphertext) surfaces as a
uniform HTTP 400 "State token signature verification failed". TTL
enforcement only runs after authenticity is established — the timestamp
is inside the ciphertext, so it cannot be tampered with independently.
Authentication (HTTP)
When the server has an authenticate callback configured:
- The callback receives the HTTP request and returns an
AuthContext. - On failure (
ValueErrororPermissionError), the server returns HTTP 401. The body is NOT Arrow IPC — no method has been resolved yet, so no output schema is available. Its shape is the standardized envelope ofdocs/unauthorized-spec.md: a JSON object carrying areasoncode from a closed set, mirrored on aVGI-Auth-Reasonheader, or the styled HTML page when the request'sAcceptasks fortext/html. - Other exceptions from the callback propagate as HTTP 500.
- Clients MUST detect 401 responses before attempting to parse Arrow IPC.
Proxy proof (optional)
A worker may additionally require that a request arrived through a trusted proxy. The proxy mints a
per-request HMAC-SHA256 proof in a VGI-Proxy-Proof header; the worker verifies it against a shared
per-worker secret.
- It is a precondition ANDed with the
authenticatecallback above, never an alternative credential — the caller'sAuthorizationheader is untouched and still carries the end user. - Failure maps to the same HTTP 401 as any other authenticate failure, carrying the
proxy_requiredreason code. The body MUST NOT echo the verifier's reason or the claimed key id — every proof outcome collapses onto that one code. OPTIONS,/.well-known/, and{prefix}/healthare exempt in all modes, so load-balancer probes and capability discovery keep working.- A worker requiring proofs advertises
VGI-Proxy-Proof-Required: trueon every response. - Opt-in: an unconfigured worker reads no header, emits none, and is byte-identical to a worker built before the feature existed.
The token format, canonical MAC input, verifier algorithm, reason codes, and rotation procedure are normative in the Proxy Proof Specification.
11. Shared Memory (SHM) Transport
The shared memory side-channel enables zero-copy batch transfer between co-located processes. It is used alongside a pipe transport — the pipe carries control messages and small batches; large batches are written to shared memory and replaced with pointer batches on the pipe.
Negotiation prerequisite. Over the pipe / subprocess / AF-UNIX transports, SHM MUST be negotiated via
__transport_options__(Section 15) before use: a client only advertises a segment (and writes SHM pointer batches) to a server that has confirmedvgi_rpc.transport.shm = "true". A server that cannot do SHM (non-POSIX host, missing runtime support, or a server predating the method) reports"false"(or errors), and the client falls back to the inline pipe transport. (HTTP servers advertise the same capability via theOPTIONS {prefix}/__capabilities__endpoint in Section 10.)
Segment header format
The shared memory segment begins with a 64 KiB (65,536 byte) header, followed by a data region. All integers are little-endian.
Offset Size Field
0 4 magic: bytes "VGIS" (0x56 0x47 0x49 0x53)
4 4 version: uint32 = 1
8 8 data_size: uint64 (segment size minus 65536)
16 4 num_allocs: uint32 (number of active allocations)
20 4 padding: uint32 = 0
24 N*16 allocations: array of (offset: uint64, length: uint64)
sorted by offset, where N = num_allocs
- Maximum allocations:
(65536 - 24) / 16 = 4094. - Offsets are absolute — measured from the start of the shared memory segment (not from the data region start).
- Data region starts at byte offset 65,536 (immediately after the header).
Allocation strategy
The allocator uses a first-fit strategy with implicit coalescing:
- Scan the sorted allocation list for the first gap that fits the requested size.
- Gaps are computed as: before the first allocation (from offset 65536), between consecutive allocations, and after the last allocation (to segment end).
- New allocations are inserted to maintain sorted order.
- Freeing an allocation removes its entry; adjacent free space coalesces implicitly since only occupied regions are tracked.
Batch serialization in SHM
For non-dictionary-encoded batches: A complete Arrow IPC stream (schema + record batch + EOS) is written directly into the allocated SHM region.
For dictionary-encoded batches: The IPC stream is written to a temporary buffer, then the schema message and EOS marker are stripped — only the dictionary messages and record batch message are stored in SHM.
Dictionary batch reconstruction (reader side):
To deserialize a dictionary-encoded batch from SHM:
- Serialize the pointer batch's schema into a schema message by creating a temporary IPC stream writer (which emits a schema message + EOS), then strip the trailing 8-byte EOS marker. This yields the schema message bytes.
- Concatenate:
schema_message_bytes+shm_stored_bytes+EOS_marker(8 bytes:0xFF 0xFF 0xFF 0xFF 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00). - Open the concatenated buffer as a standard Arrow IPC stream and read the batch.
Non-dictionary batches do not need this reconstruction — they are stored as complete IPC streams and can be read directly.
SHM pointer batch
A batch stored in shared memory is replaced on the pipe with a pointer batch:
- num_rows: 0
- Schema: Same as the original batch's schema.
- Custom metadata:
vgi_rpc.shm_offset: Absolute byte offset in the segment (decimal string).vgi_rpc.shm_length: Number of bytes written (decimal string).
SHM segment identity in request metadata
When a client owns a shared memory segment, it advertises the segment in the request batch's custom metadata:
vgi_rpc.shm_segment_name: OS name of the shared memory segment.vgi_rpc.shm_segment_size: Total segment size in bytes (decimal string).
The server dynamically attaches to the segment (read-only, untracked by the resource tracker) for the duration of the request.
Resolution algorithm
resolve_shm_batch(batch, custom_metadata, shm_segment):
IF shm_segment is NULL:
return (batch, custom_metadata, null)
IF batch.num_rows != 0:
return (batch, custom_metadata, null)
IF custom_metadata is NULL:
return (batch, custom_metadata, null)
IF "vgi_rpc.shm_offset" NOT IN custom_metadata:
return (batch, custom_metadata, null)
IF "vgi_rpc.log_level" IN custom_metadata:
return (batch, custom_metadata, null) // log batch, not pointer
offset = int(custom_metadata["vgi_rpc.shm_offset"])
length = int(custom_metadata["vgi_rpc.shm_length"])
buffer = shm_segment.read(offset, length)
resolved_batch = deserialize_ipc_stream(buffer, batch.schema)
// Strip pointer keys, add provenance
resolved_metadata = remove_keys(custom_metadata, "vgi_rpc.shm_offset", "vgi_rpc.shm_length")
resolved_metadata["vgi_rpc.shm_source"] = shm_segment.name
release_fn = () => shm_segment.free(offset)
return (resolved_batch, resolved_metadata, release_fn)
12. External Storage Pointer Batches
When batches exceed a configurable size threshold, they can be externalized to remote storage (e.g., S3, GCS) and replaced with pointer batches.
Pointer batch format
- num_rows: 0
- Schema: Same as the original batch's schema.
- Custom metadata:
vgi_rpc.location: URL to fetch the batch data (typically a pre-signed URL).vgi_rpc.location.sha256: Optional. SHA-256 hex digest of the payload before compression.
- Must NOT contain
vgi_rpc.log_level(to distinguish from log batches).
Externalization (writing)
When a data batch's total buffer size exceeds the threshold:
- Serialize all batches from the current output cycle (log batches + data batch) as a single IPC stream.
- Compute the SHA-256 of those bytes, before any compression.
- Optionally compress with zstd.
- Upload to external storage via the
ExternalStorage.upload()interface. - Replace the entire cycle with a single zero-row pointer batch containing
vgi_rpc.location(andvgi_rpc.location.sha256when the digest was computed).
Integrity
vgi_rpc.location.sha256 is optional on the wire — a pointer batch without it
is valid, which keeps readers compatible with writers that predate the key.
When the key is present, a reader MUST verify the digest against the fetched
payload (decompressed, if a coding was applied) and MUST fail the resolution
on mismatch rather than handing the batch to application code.
Resolution (reading)
resolve_external_location(batch, custom_metadata, config):
IF config is NULL:
return (batch, custom_metadata)
IF NOT is_external_pointer(batch, custom_metadata):
return (batch, custom_metadata)
url = custom_metadata["vgi_rpc.location"]
// Validate URL (default: HTTPS only)
config.url_validator(url)
// Fetch with retries
// Default: max 3 total attempts (max_retries=2, capped at 2)
// Retry delay: 0.5s fixed between attempts
// Retryable errors: network/OS errors, Arrow parse errors, HTTP client errors
data = fetch_url(url, config.fetch_config)
// Decompress if needed (zstd)
// Open as IPC stream, dispatch log batches, extract data batch
reader = open_ipc_stream(data)
FOR each batch in reader:
IF is_log_or_error(batch):
deliver to on_log callback
CONTINUE
IF has "vgi_rpc.location":
ERROR: redirect loop detected
data_batch = batch
// Validate schema match
IF data_batch.schema != expected_schema:
ERROR: schema mismatch
// Add fetch provenance metadata
resolved_metadata["vgi_rpc.location.fetch_ms"] = elapsed_ms
resolved_metadata["vgi_rpc.location.source"] = url
return (data_batch, resolved_metadata)
Stream externalization
For stream methods, the server may externalize an entire output cycle (log batches + data batch) as one IPC stream. The pointer batch replaces the entire cycle. On resolution, the client reads back all batches, dispatches log batches, and returns the data batch.
13. Version Negotiation & Error Handling
Version checking
Every request batch MUST carry vgi_rpc.request_version in its custom
metadata with the value "1".
| Condition | Error |
|---|---|
vgi_rpc.request_version missing | VersionError — server writes an error stream on the empty schema. |
vgi_rpc.request_version != "1" | VersionError — server writes an error stream on the empty schema. |
vgi_rpc.protocol_version missing or mismatched (when enforced) | ProtocolVersionError — see below. |
vgi_rpc.method missing | RpcError (ProtocolError) — server writes an error stream. |
| Unknown method name | RpcError (AttributeError) — error stream includes available method names. |
| Request batch has wrong row count (not 1, on non-empty schema) | RpcError (ProtocolError). |
| Non-optional parameter is null | TypeError — error stream on the method's result schema. |
Protocol version negotiation
vgi_rpc.request_version versions the framing in this document, and has
been "1" throughout. vgi_rpc.protocol_version is a second, independent
line: it versions the application's RPC surface — the set of methods, their
parameters, and their schemas — so a client and worker built against different
releases of a service fail with a directional message instead of a schema
error deep inside a call.
It is opt-in by declaration. A Protocol that declares a version (in the
Python reference, a protocol_version: ClassVar[str] on the Protocol class)
turns the check on for both peers; a Protocol that declares none disables it
entirely, and the key never appears on the wire.
- Format: canonical semver
MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH— non-negative integers, no leading zeros, no prereleases and no build metadata.1.0.0-rc1and1.0.0+build3are malformed, not merely unusual. - Client obligation: when the bound Protocol declares a version, the client MUST send it on every request batch.
- Server obligation: when its own Protocol declares a version, the server MUST check the client's at the dispatch boundary — before parameter deserialization, so a mismatch cannot be mistaken for a schema problem.
- Comparison rule: exact major and minor match. Patch is ignored, so a
1.4.0client and a1.4.9server interoperate. __describe__is exempt. It is the diagnostic path a version-mismatched client uses to discover what the server actually speaks, so gating it would make the mismatch undiagnosable.
Every failure — absent key, undecodable bytes, malformed semver, or a genuine
major/minor difference — raises ProtocolVersionError, a subclass of
VersionError, and is written as an ordinary error stream carrying
error_kind = "protocol_version_mismatch". The message MUST state both
versions and which side to upgrade; a bare "mismatch" leaves the reader to
guess, which is the whole failure this key exists to prevent.
The server also emits its protocol_version in the __describe__ response
metadata, so a client can read it without triggering a failure.
Relationship to
protocol_hash: the hash (Section 14) is a byte-stable fingerprint of the Python describe payload, useful as a drift detector within one runtime. It is not guaranteed identical across Arrow implementations, so it is not a cross-language contract.protocol_versionis.
Error stream format
Protocol-level errors are written as a complete IPC stream on the appropriate schema (empty schema for version/method errors, result schema for parameter validation errors):
IPC Stream (error):
Schema message (empty or result schema)
1 zero-row batch with EXCEPTION-level log metadata
EOS marker
HTTP status code mapping
Two distinct classes of failure are deliberately not conflated. A transport
or protocol failure — the request never became a valid RPC call — carries a
4xx status. An application failure — the method was dispatched and raised —
is reported in band, as a 200 whose Arrow IPC body carries an EXCEPTION
batch.
| Error condition | HTTP status |
|---|---|
| Bad IPC, missing metadata, request-version mismatch, param validation | 400 Bad Request |
protocol_version mismatch | 400 Bad Request |
| Expired, tampered, or unresolvable state token | 400 Bad Request |
| Request body fails to decompress | 400 Bad Request |
| Authentication failure (including proxy proof) | 401 Unauthorized |
| Unknown method | 404 Not Found |
Request body exceeds VGI-Max-Request-Bytes | 413 Payload Too Large |
Wrong Content-Type, or unsupported Content-Encoding | 415 Unsupported Media Type |
| Any error raised by the method implementation | 200 OK + X-VGI-RPC-Error: true |
| Response overshoots a hard response cap | 200 OK + X-VGI-RPC-Error: true |
Why implementation errors are 200
A server implementation error never reaches the client as 500. The server
translates it to 200 and marks it with X-VGI-RPC-Error: true, because
intermediaries and HTTP client libraries routinely discard or replace response
bodies on 5xx — and the body is precisely where the typed error lives. A 500
would strip the exception type, message, traceback, and error_kind and leave
the caller with a bare status code.
Clients MUST therefore treat 200 as "a response arrived", not "the call
succeeded", and classify by inspecting the body — the batch-classification
algorithm in Section 7 already does this,
so X-VGI-RPC-Error is a fast path and a diagnostic aid, not a second source
of truth. A client that branches only on status code will silently treat
failures as successes.
This also means the status code no longer varies with the class of exception
the method raised: a TypeError from inside a method body is 200 like any
other. Caller-supplied shape errors are validated before dispatch, and so
remain 400.
Note: For 400 and 413 responses the body is still a valid Arrow IPC stream containing an error batch. The exceptions are 401 (JSON or HTML, per
docs/unauthorized-spec.md), 415 (framework default response), and the non-Arrow framework endpoints in Section 16 and Section 17.
14. Introspection (__describe__)
The __describe__ method is a built-in synthetic unary method that returns
machine-readable metadata about all methods exposed by the server. It is
optional for implementors.
Request
Standard unary request with:
vgi_rpc.method="__describe__"- Empty params schema (zero fields, one row)
Response
A single IPC stream with one row per method. The response batch carries custom metadata:
vgi_rpc.protocol_name— Protocol class namevgi_rpc.request_version— Wire protocol version ("1")vgi_rpc.describe_version— Introspection format version ("4")vgi_rpc.protocol_hash— SHA-256 hex digest over the canonical describe payloadvgi_rpc.server_id— Server instance identifier
Response batch schema
The schema is deliberately language-neutral (describe_version "4"). Python-flavoured
fields present in earlier versions (doc, param_types_json, param_defaults_json,
param_docs_json) were dropped in v4 — human-readable type names, defaults, and
docstrings live in the Protocol source class, not on the wire.
| Column | Arrow type | Nullable | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
name | utf8 | No | Method name |
method_type | utf8 | No | "unary" or "stream" |
has_return | bool | No | Whether the unary method returns a value |
params_schema_ipc | binary | No | Serialized pa.Schema for request parameters |
result_schema_ipc | binary | No | Serialized pa.Schema for unary response |
has_header | bool | No | Whether the stream method has a header type |
header_schema_ipc | binary | Yes | Serialized pa.Schema for the header (null if no header) |
is_exchange | bool | Yes | For streams: true = exchange (bidi), false = producer; null for unary |
The params_schema_ipc, result_schema_ipc, and header_schema_ipc
columns contain Arrow schemas serialized via pa.Schema.serialize().
15. Transport Capability Negotiation (__transport_options__)
__transport_options__ is a built-in synthetic unary method (parallel to
__describe__) through which a client and server discover each other's
transport capabilities — chiefly whether the shared-memory side-channel
(Section 11) may be used. It is the pipe / subprocess / AF-UNIX analogue of the
HTTP OPTIONS {prefix}/__capabilities__ endpoint (Section 10).
It is mandatory before SHM is used: a client that has SHM available MUST NOT
write SHM pointer batches (or advertise a segment) to a server unless that server
has confirmed SHM support via this method. A server that cannot attach SHM (e.g.
a non-POSIX host, or a runtime without the required FFM support) reports
shm = "false" and the client falls back to inline transport. A server that does
not implement the method at all returns a method_not_implemented error (or any
error), which the client treats as "no SHM".
Capabilities are negotiated once per worker and may be cached for the life of the worker process (they are process-level, not per-connection), so there is no per-call overhead.
Request
Standard unary request with:
vgi_rpc.method="__transport_options__"- Empty params schema (zero fields, one row)
- The client's own capabilities as request metadata under the
vgi_rpc.transport.*namespace (e.g.vgi_rpc.transport.shm = "true")
Response
An IPC stream with an empty batch (zero fields). Capabilities ride as the
response batch's custom_metadata under the vgi_rpc.transport.* namespace:
| Key | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
vgi_rpc.transport.shm | "true" / "false" | Whether the server can use the SHM side-channel |
vgi_rpc.server_id | UTF-8 | Server instance identifier |
vgi_rpc.request_version | "1" | Wire protocol version |
The capability set is open-ended: keys are matched by the vgi_rpc.transport.
prefix and unknown keys are ignored, so future capabilities (e.g. compression,
AEAD) can be added without a protocol-version bump. A feature is used only when
both peers advertise it.
Negotiation rule
shm_enabled = client.advertises("vgi_rpc.transport.shm" == "true")
AND server.advertises("vgi_rpc.transport.shm" == "true")
A server that has not attached a segment but still receives an inbound SHM pointer batch (a negotiation violation) MUST fail loudly rather than silently treat the zero-row pointer as empty input.
16. Token Introspection (POST {prefix}/__introspect_token__)
HTTP-only. Optional. Absent unless explicitly enabled.
Resolves an opaque bearer credential to a principal, for a reverse proxy that terminates the only public listener and must know which principal a credential authenticates as before it can authorize. Not part of the Arrow RPC surface: it is JSON in and JSON out, because its consumer is an authorization layer, not an Arrow client.
Request
POST {prefix}/__introspect_token__
Authorization: Bearer <introspector credential>
Content-Type: application/json
{"token": "<opaque subject credential>"}
The body carries exactly one key. Implementations MUST cap it — the only legitimate content is one credential, and the generic request-size cap would otherwise admit megabytes into a JSON parse.
Response
| Status | Meaning | Caller behaviour |
|---|---|---|
200 | Resolved. Body below. | Cache for ttl_seconds. |
401 / 403 / 404 | Definitive — refused, or did not resolve. | MAY negative-cache. |
5xx, transport failure | Transient — could not answer. | MUST NOT cache; retry. |
{"principal": "alice@example.com", "token_name": "laptop", "ttl_seconds": 300}
Exactly three keys. A claims field MUST NEVER be returned — see the porting guide for why this is the constraint the whole feature rests on. ttl_seconds MUST be finite and positive; NaN silently disables a caller's cache and turns every request into a round trip.
The definitive/transient split is normative. A caller's negative cache depends on it: cache an outage and a worker restart takes the fleet down for the cache's lifetime; retry a rejection and the worker is hammered. A worker that has not enabled introspection MUST still answer definitively — 404 in the reference — rather than letting the path fall through to a generic route whose status a caller reads as transient.
Guards
Normative for any implementation that enables the route:
- The route is absent (or definitively refusing) unless explicitly enabled.
- An introspector-principal allowlist with no permissive default. Authentication is not the same capability as introspection.
- JWS-shaped subjects are rejected without being resolved.
- Uniform rejection: unknown, expired and malformed are byte-identical answers.
- The credential appears in no response, error message, log record, or span. Digest it (SHA-256) for diagnostics.
VGI-Token-Introspection: trueon/healthwhen enabled, absent otherwise.
Conformance group: TestTokenIntrospection (optional fixture) and TestTokenIntrospectionOffMode (ungated).
17. Sticky Sessions (HTTP, optional)
HTTP-only. Optional. Opt-in on both sides.
Sticky sessions let a method bind a handle-bearing object — an open database cursor, a loaded model, a file handle, an in-progress generation — to the worker process that created it, keyed by a short-lived AEAD-sealed token the client echoes on subsequent requests. The state lives in process memory; it is never serialized onto the wire.
The other transports are single-process, so sticky is meaningless there: a runtime that exposes the session API at all MUST raise on a non-HTTP transport rather than silently no-op. When neither side opts in, the wire is byte-identical to a framework built before the feature existed.
The full normative contract — token envelope, principal binding, TTL and
eviction, drain semantics, concurrency, and the TestSticky conformance
group — is docs/sticky-sessions-spec.md. What
follows is the wire surface only.
Request headers
| Header | Required | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
VGI-Session-Accept: true | when a method may open a session | Client opt-in. A server MUST refuse to open a session for a request lacking it — otherwise it leaks sessions to clients that are not tracking them. |
VGI-Session: <token> | when resuming | The token minted on a prior response. |
Response headers
| Header | Emitted | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
VGI-Session: <token> | when a session was opened this request | Token for the client to echo. Base64url, no padding. |
VGI-Session-Close: true | when the session was closed this request | Client drops its captured token and any echo headers. |
VGI-Echo-<name>: <value> | once, on the session-opening response | Client MUST strip the VGI-Echo- prefix and send <name>: <value> on every subsequent request in the session. Used for client-driven routing on platforms that steer by header. |
Capability headers (VGI-Sticky-Enabled, VGI-Sticky-Default-TTL,
VGI-Sticky-Echo-Headers) are listed under
Capability discovery.
Teardown endpoint
DELETE {prefix}/__session__
VGI-Session: <token>
Idempotent and best-effort. 204 No Content when the entry was found and
evicted; 200 OK on any failure — missing header, malformed token,
identity mismatch, registry miss. The two are deliberately not
distinguishable, so a stolen token cannot be used to probe whether a session
exists.
Failure surfacing
A token that cannot be honoured — expired, evicted, routed to a worker that
never saw it, or presented under a different principal — surfaces as an
ordinary EXCEPTION batch with error_kind = "session_lost". A session open
refused because the server is shutting down surfaces as server_draining.
Neither is retried transparently by the framework: the client is told, and
decides whether to reopen or fail.
Appendix A: IPC Stream EOS Marker
The end-of-stream marker is the 8-byte sequence:
0xFF 0xFF 0xFF 0xFF (continuation token = -1 as int32 LE)
0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 (metadata length = 0)
This signals to the IPC stream reader that no more messages follow.
Appendix B: Empty Schema
The "empty schema" referenced throughout this specification is an Arrow
schema with zero fields: pa.schema([]). When serialized, it produces a
small fixed-size blob. Batches on the empty schema have zero columns.
Appendix C: Empty Schema Serialized Form
The empty schema (pa.schema([])) serializes to a fixed 56-byte blob via
pa.Schema.serialize(). This is useful for cross-language implementations
that need to produce or compare serialized empty schemas (e.g., for the
input_schema_bytes field in state tokens for producer streams):
ff ff ff ff 30 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 0a 00
0c 00 06 00 05 00 08 00 0a 00 00 00 00 01 04 00
0c 00 00 00 08 00 08 00 00 00 04 00 08 00 00 00
04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
This is a Flatbuffers-encoded Arrow Schema message with zero fields. Implementations MAY hard-code this constant rather than generating it at runtime. The serialized form is stable across Arrow versions.
Appendix D: Request Metadata Location
A common implementation question: the vgi_rpc.method key appears in the
request batch's custom metadata (per-batch metadata), not in the
schema-level metadata. This is by design — schema-level metadata is part of
the IPC stream schema message and cannot vary between batches, while
custom metadata is per-batch and can carry request-specific values.
vgi_rpc.request_version is also in batch custom metadata.