Iran Regime Change Forecast (10/04/2026)
April 10, 2026 · View on GitHub
Question: What is the probability of forced regime change in Iran -- defined as the IRGC being removed from power and replaced by a non-autocratic form of government that formally recognises Israel and renounces the intention to eliminate it -- within 1 week, 1 month, and 1 year?
Headline Forecast

| Horizon | Probability | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| +1 week (17 Apr) | <1% | High |
| +1 month (10 May) | 1-3% | High |
| +1 year (10 Apr 2027) | 4-9% | Moderate |
Forced regime change in Iran remains highly unlikely across all time horizons. Despite unprecedented military degradation (85% of defense industrial base destroyed), 92% public dissatisfaction, and active diplomatic/covert pressure, the IRGC maintains institutional cohesion and internal control. The most probable pathway to regime change involves cascading failures across military humiliation, economic collapse, and elite fracture, requiring 9-18 months to materialise.
Stack
This forecast was generated by the Geopol Forecaster pipeline, a two-stage system inspired by:
- Snowglobe (IQTLabs) -- Stage A actor simulation pattern (control/player loop with referee)
- LLM Council (Karpathy) -- Stage B multi-lens council protocol (parallel query, blind peer review, chairman synthesis)
Orchestration via LangGraph with SQLite checkpointing. Grounding via Tavily search + RSS/ISW feeds. Vector memory via Pinecone (integrated index). All LLM calls routed through OpenRouter.
Experiment Design
Stage A -- Actor Simulation
- Actors: 10 core (Khamenei, Netanyahu, Trump, IRGC, Hezbollah, CENTCOM, Mossad, IDF, Russia, MBS)
- Timesteps: 3 (+1 week, +1 month, +1 year)
- MC runs: 1
- Actor temperature: 0.8 (exploratory)
- Referee temperature: 0.4 (consistent)
- Information hygiene: Actors see only referee-authored world state; no raw news, no other actors' private reasoning
Stage B -- Council Protocol
- Lenses: 6 (Neutral, Pessimistic, Optimistic, Blindsides, Probabilistic, Historical)
- Protocol: 3-stage (parallel query at 0.6 temp -> blind peer review at 0.4 -> chairman synthesis at 0.5)
- Chairman max tokens: 12,000
Grounding
- Tavily: 6 expanded queries, advanced depth, top 5 results each
- RSS: Times of Israel, Jerusalem Post, ISW, CTP (48h window)
Model & Runtime
- Model: Claude Sonnet 4.5 via OpenRouter (all roles)
- Date: 10/04/2026
Simulation-Council Convergence

The simulation (Stage A) independently estimated a 12% probability of regime change success at the 1-year horizon -- higher than the council's 4-9% range. This divergence is informative: the simulation models mechanisms (covert support, economic pressure, military operations) but may overestimate their effectiveness absent internal IRGC fracture, which fresh data experts assess has not materialised.
Per-Lens Probability Table
| Lens | +1 week | +1 month | +1 year |
|---|---|---|---|
| Neutral | <1% | ~2% | ~8% |
| Pessimistic | <1% | ~1.5% | ~5% |
| Optimistic | ~1% | ~5% | ~15% |
| Blindsides | ~2% | ~8% | ~20% |
| Probabilistic | <0.5% | ~1.5% | ~6% |
| Historical | <1% | ~2% | ~8% |
| Chairman | <1% | 1-3% | 4-9% |
| Simulation | ~0.5% | ~3% | ~12% |

The Blindsides and Optimistic lenses are outliers at +1 year (15-20%), modelling low-probability cascading scenarios. The chairman's 4-9% range weights toward the consensus cluster (Neutral, Probabilistic, Historical) while acknowledging the tail risk.
Key Predictions

Key Findings
-
IRGC institutional resilience exceeds external military degradation. Despite 85% of the defense industrial base being destroyed, the IRGC maintains control through economic entrenchment (40%+ of economy), ideological selection, and internal security apparatus.
-
Opposition fragmentation is the binding constraint. 92% public dissatisfaction does not equal organised capacity for regime-threatening action. No parallel governance structures, unified leadership, or military coordination are visible.
-
Nuclear escalation continues regardless. 60-75% probability of Iran achieving 90% uranium enrichment at Fordow within a month, using multi-site hedging to survive Israeli interdiction.
-
The ceasefire is fragile and likely temporary. 40-55% probability of collapse within a month. Pakistan talks create a pause, not a resolution.
-
The definition bar is extremely high. Not just IRGC removal, but replacement with a government recognising Israel and renouncing eliminationism -- this requires a generational political transformation, not merely a coup.
-
Historical precedent is unfavourable. The IRGC has survived the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), the 2009 Green Movement, the 2019 protests, and the 2022 Mahsa Amini uprising. External military pressure historically consolidates authoritarian regimes rather than toppling them.
Repository Contents
Iran-Regime-Change-Forecast-1004/
├── README.md
├── report/
│ ├── chairman_report.md # Final synthesised forecast
│ ├── stage1_answers.md # 6 individual lens answers
│ ├── stage2_reviews.md # Blind peer reviews
│ ├── fresh_data.json # Frozen Tavily + RSS news seed
│ └── simulation.json # Full Stage A transcript
├── code_snapshot/ # Frozen pipeline code at run time
│ ├── graph.py # LangGraph pipeline orchestrator
│ ├── pipeline.py # Backward-compat shim
│ ├── config.py # Model & simulation parameters
│ ├── llm.py # OpenRouter async client
│ ├── schemas.py # Pydantic schemas
│ ├── base_context.py # Static conflict background
│ ├── pinecone_store.py # Pinecone RAG integration
│ ├── actors/ # Actor personas & roster
│ ├── simulation/ # Stage A engine
│ ├── council/ # Stage B protocol & lenses
│ ├── news/ # Tavily + RSS grounding
│ ├── render/ # Typst -> PDF rendering
│ └── pyproject.toml
├── graphics/
│ ├── convergence_all_lenses.png
│ ├── chairman_forecast.png
│ ├── key_predictions.png
│ └── 1yr_lens_spread.png
└── generate_graphics.py
Note: code_snapshot/ is a frozen snapshot of the pipeline at run time. For the latest code, see the parent repository.
Full Source
danielrosehill/Geopol-Forecaster
Author
Daniel Rosehill -- danielrosehill.com
License
CC BY 4.0