Home Assistant Community App: Tor

August 21, 2026 · View on GitHub

This Tor app allows you to access your Home Assistant instance as an Onion site, through Tor's Hidden Service feature. With this feature enabled, you do not need to open your firewall ports or set up HTTPS to enable secure remote access.

This is useful if you want to have:

  • Access your Home Assistant instance remotely without opening a firewall port or setting up a VPN.
  • Don’t want to or know how to get an SSL/TLS certificate and HTTPS configuration setup.
  • Want to block attackers from even being able to access/scan your port and server at all.
  • Want to block anyone from knowing your home IP address and seeing your traffic to your Home Assistant.

The app also offers the possibility to open a SOCKS proxy into the Tor network. Allowing you to access Tor from any of your (SOCKS supporting) applications through your Home Assistant installation.

Installation

The installation of this app is pretty straightforward and not different in comparison to installing any other Home Assistant app.

  1. Click the Home Assistant My button below to open the app on your Home Assistant instance.

    Open this app in your Home Assistant instance.

  2. Click the "Install" button to install the app.

  3. Start the "Tor" app

  4. Check the logs of the "Tor" app to see if everything went well. The log will also display your Tor .onion address.

Configuration

Note: Remember to restart the app when the configuration is changed.

Example app configuration:

log_level: info
socks: true
http_tunnel: false
hidden_services: true
stealth: true
client_names:
  - haremote1
  - haremote2
ports:
  - auto
bridges: []

Note: This is just an example, don't copy and paste it! Create your own!

Option: log_level

The log_level option controls the level of log output by the app and can be changed to be more or less verbose, which might be useful when you are dealing with an unknown issue. Possible values are:

  • trace: Show every detail, like all called internal functions.
  • debug: Shows detailed debug information.
  • info: Normal (usually) interesting events.
  • warning: Exceptional occurrences that are not errors.
  • error: Runtime errors that do not require immediate action.
  • fatal: Something went terribly wrong. App becomes unusable.

Please note that each level automatically includes log messages from a more severe level, e.g., debug also shows info messages. By default, the log_level is set to info, which is the recommended setting unless you are troubleshooting.

These log levels also affect the log levels of the Tor program.

Option: socks

Setting this option to true opens port 9050 to listen for connections from SOCKS-speaking applications. Enabling this feature allows you to use other applications on your network to use the Tor network.

Note: The SOCKS protocol is unencrypted and (as we use it) unauthenticated, so exposing it in this way could leak your information to anybody watching your network, and allow anybody to use your computer as an open proxy.

Option: http_tunnel

Setting this option to true opens port 9080 to listen for connections from HTTP-speaking applications. Enabling this feature allows you to use other applications on your network to access the Tor network via the HTTP proxy.

Option: hidden_services

The hidden_services option allows you to enable Tor's Hidden Service feature in this app. You can offer a web server, SSH server, etc., without revealing your IP address to its users. In fact, because you do not use any public address, you can run a hidden service from behind your firewall.

Option: stealth

The “stealth” entry above ensures traffic to and from your Home Assistant instance over Tor is hidden even from other nodes on the Tor network.

Using a traditional Hidden Service, a hidden server publishes in the Tor network how to begin communication with it (not its real location). Tor uses a complex middle nodes link setup for bidirectional route anonymization; the server and client know nothing about the endpoint's location. A client asks the network how to reach a Hidden Service with this info.

This option puts the Tor Hidden Service in the authorized client mode. The hidden server publishes encrypted instructions on how to begin the communication, a client with the right key can decipher this info. If you are an authorized client, you can only locate the Hidden Service path and then try to establish a connection if you have this key.

Enabling stealth can prevent a DDOS because if the client does not have the key, it can not find the path to the server. It does, however, require configuration of the client as well.

Option: client_names

This option is required as soon as you enable the stealth option.

Only clients that are listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names are 1 to 16 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for clients without authorization anymore.

Clients need to place the generated .auth_private file in their Tor ClientOnionAuthDir directory. See the Tor client access setup section below for details.

Option: ports

Configures hosts and ports to publish via a Tor Hidden Service. You can list multiple hosts and ports to publish.

For example:

ports:
  - "homeassistant:8123:80"
  - 22

For normal Home Assistant access, auto can be used instead of configuring its HTTP port manually:

ports:
  - "auto"

At startup, auto gets the active Home Assistant Core port from Supervisor. It publishes Home Assistant on Onion port 80 and, when the detected Core port is not 80, also publishes that same port number. Manual mappings for other services can still be used alongside auto.

When updating from an earlier version, existing saved ports values are preserved. Replace the previous Home Assistant mappings with auto rather than adding auto alongside them. Other manual mappings can be kept unchanged:

# Before
ports:
  - "8123"
  - "8123:80"
  - 22

# After
ports:
  - "auto"
  - 22

The accepted syntax of this configuration is:

  • automatic Home Assistant mapping "auto"
  • hostname:local_port:published_port "homeassistant:8123:8080"
  • local_ip:local_port:published_port "192.168.1.60:8123:8080"
  • hostname:local_port "homeassistant:8123"
  • local_port:published_port "8123:8080"
  • local_port "8123"

If you do not define a published port, the local port will be used. If you do not define a hostname or IP address homeassistant will be used.

Option: bridges

Ensure the option value is clear to avoid unintended use of transport plugins and bridges.

Bridges are Tor relays that help you circumvent censorship. Access to bridges is provided by supported transport plugins:

OBFS

Because bridge addresses are not public, you will need to request them yourself. You have a few options:

  • Visit Tor project and follow the instructions, or
  • Email bridges@torproject.org from a Gmail, or Riseup email address
  • Send a message to @GetBridgesBot on Telegram. Tap on 'Start' or write /start or /bridges in the chat.

For example:

bridges:
  - >-
    obfs4 123.45.67.89:443 EFC6A00EE6272355C023862378AC77F935F091E4
    cert=KkdWiWlfetJG9SFrzX8g1teBbgxtsc0zPiN5VLxqNNH+iudVW48CoH/XVXPQntbivXIqZA
    iat-mode=0

Webtunnel

Visit Tor project and follow the instructions

For example:

bridges:
  - >-
    webtunnel 192.0.2.3:1
    DEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEF
    url=https://akbwadp9lc5fyyz0cj4d76z643pxgbfh6oyc-167-71-71-157.sslip.io/5m9yq0j4ghkz0fz7qmuw58cvbjon0ebnrsp0
    ver=0.0.1

Snowflake

For more information on what Snowflake is, see what is Snowflake?. Example:

bridges:
  - >-
    snowflake 192.0.2.3:80 2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72
    fingerprint=2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72
    url=https://snowflake-broker.torproject.net/
    ampcache=https://cdn.ampproject.org/
    front=www.google.com
    ice=stun:stun.l.google.com:19302,stun:stun.antisip.com:3478,stun:stun.bluesip.net:3478,stun:stun.dus.net:3478,stun:stun.epygi.com:3478,stun:stun.sonetel.com:3478,stun:stun.uls.co.za:3478,stun:stun.voipgate.com:3478,stun:stun.voys.nl:3478
    utls-imitate=hellorandomizedalpn

Tor client access setup

Using this app, you can access your Home Assistant instance over Tor from your laptop or mobile device, using Tor Browser and other software.

However, with the stealth option enabled, the client needs extra configuration to be able to connect.

The app generates a key pair for each configured client. The private key file is stored at /ssl/tor/hidden_service/clients/<clientname>.auth_private and contains a line in this format:

<address-without-.onion>:descriptor:x25519:<private-key>

Copy this file to a directory on your client device and configure Tor to use it by adding the following to your torrc:

ClientOnionAuthDir /path/to/authorized_clients

Restart Tor or Tor Browser after adding the file, then browse to the .onion address to connect to your Home Assistant instance.

For Tor Browser on Windows, Mac or Linux, place the .auth_private file in the authorized_clients folder inside the Tor Browser data directory. Newer versions of Tor Browser also offer a GUI for managing client authorization under the connection settings.

For Android, use Tor Browser for Android, which has built-in support for .onion sites. You can also use Orbot in VPN mode together with another browser to route your traffic through Tor.

For iOS, Onion Browser supports accessing .onion sites.

You can also use Firefox to access .onion domains by routing it through the SOCKS proxy this app provides (requires socks: true, port 9050). Configure a SOCKS5 proxy in Firefox pointing to your Home Assistant host on port 9050. In about:config, also set network.proxy.socks_remote_dns to true so that .onion hostnames are resolved through Tor rather than your local DNS.

Resetting your onion address

Each time the app starts for the first time, Tor generates a key pair for your hidden service. The onion address is derived from that key pair and remains the same across restarts for as long as the keys exist.

If you want to obtain a fresh onion address (for example, because the current address is no longer reachable), you need to delete the hidden service keys. These are stored on the the /ssl/tor/ directory.

To reset:

  1. Stop the Tor app.
  2. Delete the contents of the /ssl/tor/hidden_service/ directory.
  3. Start the Tor app again. New keys and a new onion address will be generated automatically.

Note: If stealth mode is enabled, the old .auth_private client key files will also be gone. You will need to redistribute the newly generated keys to all authorized clients.

Changelog & Releases

This repository keeps a change log using GitHub's releases functionality.

Releases are based on Semantic Versioning, and use the format of MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH. In a nutshell, the version will be incremented based on the following:

  • MAJOR: Incompatible or major changes.
  • MINOR: Backwards-compatible new features and enhancements.
  • PATCH: Backwards-compatible bugfixes and package updates.

Support

Got questions?

You have several options to get them answered:

You could also open an issue here GitHub.

Authors & contributors

The original setup of this repository is by Franck Nijhof.

For a full list of all authors and contributors, check the contributor's page.

License

MIT License

Copyright (c) 2017-2026 Franck Nijhof

Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:

The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.

THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.