GitHub Action for arity

August 6, 2026 ยท View on GitHub

CI

A GitHub Action that installs arity and runs formatting and lint checks in CI.

The action installs prebuilt release binaries and supports GitHub-hosted runners for Linux, macOS, and Windows on both x64 and ARM64. Downloaded binaries are verified against their published SHA256 checksum and build provenance attestation, and cached between runs.

Usage

Basic

name: arity

on:
  pull_request:
  push:
    branches: [main]

jobs:
  arity:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
      - uses: jolars/arity-action@v1

Pin arity version

- uses: jolars/arity-action@v1
  with:
    version: v0.8.0

Format only

- uses: jolars/arity-action@v1
  with:
    lint: "false"

Lint only

- uses: jolars/arity-action@v1
  with:
    format: "false"

Run only on a specific path

- uses: jolars/arity-action@v1
  with:
    path: R/

Use a custom config

- uses: jolars/arity-action@v1
  with:
    config: arity.toml

Inputs

InputDescriptionDefault
pathFile or directory to check.
versionarity version to install (latest or vX.Y.Z)latest
formatRun arity format --checktrue
quietSuppress the format --check diff (list only)false
lintRun arity linttrue
configOptional path to an arity.toml config file""
verify-checksumVerify the downloaded asset against its SHA256true

Outputs

OutputDescription
versionInstalled arity CLI version

Checksum verification

When verify-checksum is true (the default), the action downloads the .sha256 sidecar published alongside each release asset and verifies the archive before installing. Releases that predate checksum publishing have no sidecar; for those the action prints a warning and installs without verification rather than failing.

Checksums guard against corrupted or truncated downloads; they are not a substitute for release signing.

Build provenance

Arity release archives carry a build provenance attestation, signed via Sigstore and tied to the workflow that built them. Unlike a checksum, this cannot be forged by an attacker who only controls the release assets. When the gh CLI is available, this action verifies it before installing; a failing attestation aborts the install, while a missing one (older releases) or a missing gh warns and continues.

To verify by hand:

gh attestation verify arity-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz \
  --repo jolars/arity

Add --signer-workflow jolars/arity/.github/workflows/packages.yml to also pin the exact workflow that must have produced the artifact.

Versioning

This action uses semantic versioning based on action API changes:

  • Major: breaking changes to action inputs/outputs/behavior
  • Minor: backward-compatible features
  • Patch: fixes and internal improvements

Use @v1 for stable major updates, or pin exact tags like @v1.2.3.