GitHub Action for arity
August 6, 2026 ยท View on GitHub
A GitHub Action that installs arity and runs formatting and lint checks in CI.
The action installs prebuilt release binaries and supports GitHub-hosted runners for Linux, macOS, and Windows on both x64 and ARM64. Downloaded binaries are verified against their published SHA256 checksum and build provenance attestation, and cached between runs.
Usage
Basic
name: arity
on:
pull_request:
push:
branches: [main]
jobs:
arity:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: jolars/arity-action@v1
Pin arity version
- uses: jolars/arity-action@v1
with:
version: v0.8.0
Format only
- uses: jolars/arity-action@v1
with:
lint: "false"
Lint only
- uses: jolars/arity-action@v1
with:
format: "false"
Run only on a specific path
- uses: jolars/arity-action@v1
with:
path: R/
Use a custom config
- uses: jolars/arity-action@v1
with:
config: arity.toml
Inputs
| Input | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|
path | File or directory to check | . |
version | arity version to install (latest or vX.Y.Z) | latest |
format | Run arity format --check | true |
quiet | Suppress the format --check diff (list only) | false |
lint | Run arity lint | true |
config | Optional path to an arity.toml config file | "" |
verify-checksum | Verify the downloaded asset against its SHA256 | true |
Outputs
| Output | Description |
|---|---|
version | Installed arity CLI version |
Checksum verification
When verify-checksum is true (the default), the action downloads the
.sha256 sidecar published alongside each release asset and verifies the
archive before installing. Releases that predate checksum publishing have no
sidecar; for those the action prints a warning and installs without
verification rather than failing.
Checksums guard against corrupted or truncated downloads; they are not a substitute for release signing.
Build provenance
Arity release archives carry a build provenance
attestation,
signed via Sigstore and tied to the workflow that built them. Unlike a
checksum, this cannot be forged by an attacker who only controls the release
assets. When the gh CLI is available, this action verifies it before
installing; a failing attestation aborts the install, while a missing one
(older releases) or a missing gh warns and continues.
To verify by hand:
gh attestation verify arity-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz \
--repo jolars/arity
Add --signer-workflow jolars/arity/.github/workflows/packages.yml to also
pin the exact workflow that must have produced the artifact.
Versioning
This action uses semantic versioning based on action API changes:
- Major: breaking changes to action inputs/outputs/behavior
- Minor: backward-compatible features
- Patch: fixes and internal improvements
Use @v1 for stable major updates, or pin exact tags like @v1.2.3.