OIDC SSO
July 31, 2026 · View on GitHub
LibreDB Studio supports vendor-agnostic OpenID Connect (OIDC) authentication. This document is split into two parts: a Setup Guide for operators configuring SSO against a provider, and an Architecture & Internals reference for contributors working on the auth subsystem.
LibreDB Studio uses the Authorization Code Flow with PKCE (S256). After OIDC authentication, a local JWT session is created — the rest of the app (middleware, hooks, protected routes, RBAC) works identically to local email/password login.
Browser → /api/auth/oidc/login → OIDC Discovery → PKCE + state → redirect to provider
Browser → Authenticate at provider → /api/auth/oidc/callback?code=xxx&state=xxx
Server → Validate state → Exchange code → Extract claims → Map role → Create JWT session
Browser → Redirect to app (/ or /admin based on role)
Table of Contents
Part 1 — Setup Guide
This part covers configuring SSO for popular identity providers. Most readers only need this part. Contributors working on the auth code should also read Part 2 — Architecture & Internals.
Quick Start
1. Set Environment Variables
NEXT_PUBLIC_AUTH_PROVIDER=oidc
OIDC_ISSUER=https://your-provider.com
OIDC_CLIENT_ID=your_client_id
OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=your_client_secret
2. Configure Your Provider
Set these URLs in your identity provider:
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Allowed Callback URL | https://your-domain.com/api/auth/oidc/callback |
| Allowed Logout URL | https://your-domain.com/login |
| Allowed Web Origins | https://your-domain.com |
For local development, use http://localhost:3000 instead.
3. Start the App
bun dev
Navigate to /login and click "Login with SSO".
Provider-Specific Setup
Auth0
-
Create Application in Auth0 Dashboard → Applications → Create Application → Regular Web Application
-
Settings:
Allowed Callback URLs: http://localhost:3000/api/auth/oidc/callback Allowed Logout URLs: http://localhost:3000/login Allowed Web Origins: http://localhost:3000 -
Environment Variables:
NEXT_PUBLIC_AUTH_PROVIDER=oidc OIDC_ISSUER=https://your-tenant.auth0.com OIDC_CLIENT_ID=your_client_id OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=your_client_secret -
Role Mapping (Optional):
Create a Post Login Action in Auth0 to add roles to the ID token:
// Auth0 Action: Add roles to ID token exports.onExecutePostLogin = async (event, api) => { const namespace = 'https://libredb.org'; const roles = event.authorization?.roles || []; api.idToken.setCustomClaim(`${namespace}/roles`, roles); };Then configure:
OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=https://libredb.org/roles OIDC_ADMIN_ROLES=admin
Keycloak
-
Create Client in Keycloak Admin → Clients → Create Client
- Client type: OpenID Connect
- Client authentication: On
-
Settings:
Valid Redirect URIs: http://localhost:3000/api/auth/oidc/callback Valid Post Logout URIs: http://localhost:3000/login Web Origins: http://localhost:3000 -
Environment Variables:
NEXT_PUBLIC_AUTH_PROVIDER=oidc OIDC_ISSUER=https://keycloak.example.com/realms/your-realm OIDC_CLIENT_ID=libredb-studio OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=your_client_secret -
Role Mapping:
Keycloak includes realm roles in the ID token by default:
OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=realm_access.roles OIDC_ADMIN_ROLES=adminThe dot-notation
realm_access.rolesnavigates nested claims:{ "realm_access": { "roles": ["admin", "user"] } }
Okta
-
Create Application in Okta Admin → Applications → Create App Integration → OIDC → Web Application
-
Settings:
Sign-in redirect URI: http://localhost:3000/api/auth/oidc/callback Sign-out redirect URI: http://localhost:3000/login -
Environment Variables:
NEXT_PUBLIC_AUTH_PROVIDER=oidc OIDC_ISSUER=https://your-org.okta.com OIDC_CLIENT_ID=your_client_id OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=your_client_secret -
Role Mapping:
Assign users to groups in Okta, then use the
groupsclaim:OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=groups OIDC_ADMIN_ROLES=admin,Admin,LibreDB-Admin
Azure AD (Microsoft Entra ID)
-
Register Application in Azure Portal → App Registrations → New Registration
- Redirect URI:
http://localhost:3000/api/auth/oidc/callback(Web)
- Redirect URI:
-
Create Client Secret in Certificates & Secrets → New Client Secret
-
Environment Variables:
NEXT_PUBLIC_AUTH_PROVIDER=oidc OIDC_ISSUER=https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant-id}/v2.0 OIDC_CLIENT_ID=your_application_id OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=your_client_secret -
Role Mapping:
Define App Roles in Azure → use the
rolesclaim:OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=roles OIDC_ADMIN_ROLES=Admin,admin
Zitadel
-
Create Project & Application in Zitadel Console → Projects → Create New Project → Add Application (Web)
- Auth Method: PKCE
-
Settings:
Redirect URIs: http://localhost:3000/api/auth/oidc/callback Post Logout URIs: http://localhost:3000/login -
Environment Variables:
NEXT_PUBLIC_AUTH_PROVIDER=oidc OIDC_ISSUER=https://your-instance.zitadel.cloud OIDC_CLIENT_ID=your_client_id OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=your_client_secret -
Role Mapping:
Zitadel includes roles if requested via scopes. Ensure
OIDC_SCOPEincludesurn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles.OIDC_SCOPE=openid profile email urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles OIDC_ADMIN_ROLES=admin
Google Workspace
-
Create OAuth Client in Google Cloud Console → APIs & Services → Credentials → Create OAuth Client ID → Web Application
-
Settings:
Authorized redirect URI: http://localhost:3000/api/auth/oidc/callback -
Environment Variables:
NEXT_PUBLIC_AUTH_PROVIDER=oidc OIDC_ISSUER=https://accounts.google.com OIDC_CLIENT_ID=your_client_id.apps.googleusercontent.com OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=your_client_secretGoogle does not include role claims by default. Without
OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM, all users are mapped to theuserrole.
Configuration Reference
Environment Variables
| Variable | Required | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
NEXT_PUBLIC_AUTH_PROVIDER | No | local | Auth mode: local or oidc |
OIDC_ISSUER | When oidc | — | Issuer URL (must serve /.well-known/openid-configuration) |
OIDC_CLIENT_ID | When oidc | — | OAuth client ID |
OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET | When oidc | — | OAuth client secret |
OIDC_SCOPE | No | openid profile email | OAuth scopes to request |
OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM | No | — | Claim path for role extraction (dot-notation supported) |
OIDC_ADMIN_ROLES | No | admin | Comma-separated values that map to admin role |
Storage configuration (
STORAGE_PROVIDERetc.) is independent of auth. See STORAGE.md.
Role Mapping
The role mapping system:
- Reads the claim specified by
OIDC_ROLE_CLAIMfrom the ID token - Supports dot-notation for nested claims (e.g.,
realm_access.roles) - If the claim value is an array, checks if any element matches
OIDC_ADMIN_ROLES - If the claim value is a string, checks for exact match (case-insensitive)
- If no match or no claim configured, defaults to
userrole
Examples:
// Flat string claim: OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=role
{ "role": "admin" } → admin
// Array claim: OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=roles
{ "roles": ["viewer", "admin"] } → admin
// Nested claim: OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=realm_access.roles
{ "realm_access": { "roles": ["admin"] } } → admin
// No match → defaults to user
{ "roles": ["viewer", "editor"] } → user
For the precise algorithm and provider-by-provider worked examples, see the Role Mapping Engine in Part 2.
Security Features
| Feature | Description |
|---|---|
| PKCE S256 | Proof Key for Code Exchange prevents authorization code interception |
| State Cookie | PKCE state encrypted as JWT with JWT_SECRET, httpOnly, sameSite=lax, 5-min expiry |
| Prompt Login | prompt=login forces re-authentication on every SSO click |
| Provider Logout | Logout clears both local JWT and provider session |
| Discovery Cache | OIDC provider metadata cached for 5 minutes to reduce network calls |
| Nonce Validation | ID token nonce validated to prevent replay attacks |
See the Security Model in Part 2 for the underlying threat model and implementation detail.
Troubleshooting
Login redirects back to /login without error
- Check that your OIDC issuer URL is correct and serves
/.well-known/openid-configuration - Verify
OIDC_CLIENT_IDandOIDC_CLIENT_SECRETmatch your provider configuration - Check server logs for token exchange errors
"Authentication failed" error on login page
- The callback received an error from the provider. Check that the callback URL is registered correctly in your provider
- Ensure the client secret hasn't expired
The
?error=<code>query param distinguishes failure causes. See Error Handling in Part 2 for the full error code table.
Same user auto-logs in on every SSO click
- This is handled automatically — LibreDB Studio sends
prompt=loginto force re-authentication - If the issue persists, check your provider's session settings
Role is always "user" even for admins
- Verify
OIDC_ROLE_CLAIMpoints to the correct claim in your ID token - Use your provider's token debugger to inspect the actual claims returned
- Check
OIDC_ADMIN_ROLESmatches the role value exactly (case-insensitive) - For nested claims, use dot-notation:
realm_access.rolesnotrealm_access/roles
Logout doesn't clear provider session
- Auth0: Ensure
http://localhost:3000/loginis in Allowed Logout URLs - Keycloak: Provider logout is handled via RP-Initiated Logout endpoint
- Other providers: Check if your provider supports end_session_endpoint
Switching Between Auth Modes
You can switch between local and OIDC authentication by changing a single environment variable:
# Local email/password login
NEXT_PUBLIC_AUTH_PROVIDER=local
# OIDC Single Sign-On
NEXT_PUBLIC_AUTH_PROVIDER=oidc
Both modes use the same JWT session after authentication. The middleware, hooks, protected routes, and RBAC all work identically regardless of the auth mode.
Part 2 — Architecture & Internals
Developer reference for the OIDC authentication subsystem in LibreDB Studio. For user-facing setup instructions, see Part 1 — Setup Guide.
Design Philosophy
The OIDC subsystem follows three core principles:
-
Local JWT Session After OIDC — After OIDC authentication, a standard
auth-tokenJWT cookie is created (identical to local login). This means the proxy,useAuthhook, RBAC, and all protected routes are completely unaware of OIDC. Zero coupling. -
Vendor-Agnostic — No provider-specific SDK (no
@auth0/nextjs-auth0, no Keycloak adapter). Usesopenid-clientv6 which implements the OIDC spec generically. Provider differences are handled only in two places: role claim path and logout URL format. -
Single Switch —
NEXT_PUBLIC_AUTH_PROVIDER=local|oidcis the only toggle. The login page conditionally renders, the logout route conditionally returns a redirect URL, and everything else stays the same.
Module Map
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Browser (Client) │
│ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌────────────────────┐ │
│ │ login/page │ │ use-auth.ts │ │ proxy.ts │ │
│ │ (LoginForm) │ │ (hook) │ │ (middleware) │ │
│ └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘ └────────┬───────────┘ │
│ │ │ │ │
└─────────┼──────────────────┼─────────────────────┼──────────────┘
│ │ │
▼ ▼ ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Next.js API Routes │
│ │
│ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ │
│ │ /api/auth/oidc/ │ │ /api/auth/oidc/ │ │ /api/auth/ │ │
│ │ login/route.ts │ │ callback/route.ts │ │ logout/ │ │
│ │ (GET → redirect) │ │ (GET → exchange) │ │ route.ts │ │
│ └────────┬─────────┘ └────────┬──────────┘ └──────┬──────┘ │
│ │ │ │ │
│ └─────────┬───────────┘ │ │
│ ▼ ▼ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ │
│ │ src/lib/oidc.ts│ │ src/lib/auth.ts │ │
│ │ (OIDC module) │──────────────│ (JWT sessions) │ │
│ └────────┬────────┘ └──────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
└────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────┐
│ OIDC Provider │
│ (Auth0, etc.) │
└─────────────────┘
File Responsibilities
| File | Lines | Responsibility |
|---|---|---|
src/lib/oidc.ts | ~230 | Pure OIDC logic: config, discovery, PKCE, token exchange, role mapping, state crypto, logout URL |
src/lib/auth.ts | ~72 | JWT session: signJWT, verifyJWT, login, logout, getSession — shared by both auth modes |
src/app/api/auth/oidc/login/route.ts | ~43 | Login initiation: generate auth URL, set state cookie, redirect |
src/app/api/auth/oidc/callback/route.ts | ~80 | Callback handler: validate state, exchange code, map role, create session |
src/app/api/auth/logout/route.ts | ~21 | Logout: clear JWT cookie, optionally return OIDC provider logout URL |
src/app/login/login-form.tsx | ~320 | Login UI: conditional SSO button vs email/password form (page.tsx is a thin wrapper that reads NEXT_PUBLIC_AUTH_PROVIDER and renders it) |
src/hooks/use-auth.ts | ~52 | Client hook: user state, handleLogout with OIDC redirect support |
src/proxy.ts | ~92 | Middleware: JWT verification, RBAC, route protection (auth-mode agnostic) |
Authentication Flows
OIDC Login Flow (Authorization Code + PKCE)
Browser Next.js Server OIDC Provider
│ │ │
│ 1. Click "Login with SSO" │ │
│──────────────────────────► │ │
│ │ │
│ 2. GET /api/auth/oidc/login │
│ │ 3. discoverProvider() │
│ │──────────────────────────────────►│
│ │◄─ /.well-known/openid-config ───│
│ │ │
│ │ 4. generateAuthUrl() │
│ │ ├─ code_verifier (random) │
│ │ ├─ code_challenge (S256 hash) │
│ │ ├─ state (random) │
│ │ └─ nonce (random) │
│ │ │
│ │ 5. encryptState({ │
│ │ code_verifier, state, nonce │
│ │ }) → signed JWT cookie │
│ │ │
│ 6. Set-Cookie: oidc-state │ │
│◄── 302 → authorize_endpoint│ │
│ ?client_id=xxx │ │
│ &redirect_uri=callback │ │
│ &code_challenge=xxx │ │
│ &state=xxx │ │
│ &nonce=xxx │ │
│ &prompt=login │ │
│ │ │
│ 7. User authenticates │ │
│────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────► │
│◄─── 302 /api/auth/oidc/callback?code=xxx&state=xxx ─────────── │
│ │ │
│ 8. GET /api/auth/oidc/callback │
│──────────────────────────► │ │
│ │ 9. decryptState(cookie) │
│ │ └─ extract code_verifier, │
│ │ state, nonce │
│ │ │
│ │ 10. Validate state matches │
│ │ │
│ │ 11. exchangeCode() │
│ │─────────────────────────────────► │
│ │◄── id_token + access_token ───── │
│ │ │
│ │ 12. Extract claims from id_token │
│ │ 13. mapOIDCRole(claims) │
│ │ └─ admin or user │
│ │ │
│ │ 14. login(role, email) │
│ │ └─ signJWT → auth-token cookie│
│ │ │
│ │ 15. Delete oidc-state cookie │
│ │ │
│ 16. Set-Cookie: auth-token│ │
│◄── 302 → / or /admin ─────│ │
│ │ │
╞════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╡
│ From here: identical to local password login │
│ proxy.ts reads auth-token, useAuth reads /api/auth/me │
╘════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╛
OIDC Logout Flow
Browser Next.js Server OIDC Provider
│ │ │
│ 1. handleLogout() │ │
│ POST /api/auth/logout │ │
│──────────────────────────► │ │
│ │ 2. logout() │
│ │ └─ delete auth-token │
│ │ │
│ │ 3. if OIDC mode: │
│ │ buildLogoutUrl(returnTo)│
│ │ │
│ 4. { success, redirectUrl }│ │
│◄───────────────────────────│ │
│ │ │
│ 5. window.location.href │ │
│ = redirectUrl │ │
│─────────────────────────────────────────────────────► │
│ │ │
│◄─── 302 → /login (returnTo) ─────────────────────────│
│ │ │
Local Login Flow (for comparison)
Browser Next.js Server
│ │
│ POST /api/auth/login │
│ { email, password } │
│──────────────────────────► │
│ │ validate credentials
│ │ login(role, email)
│ │ └─ signJWT → auth-token
│ { success, role } │
│◄───────────────────────────│
│ │
│ router.push(/ or /admin) │
Module Deep Dive
src/lib/oidc.ts
The OIDC module is a pure utility library with no side effects. All functions are stateless except for the discovery cache.
Types
interface OIDCConfig {
issuer: string; // e.g. "https://dev-xxx.auth0.com"
clientId: string;
clientSecret: string;
scope: string; // Default: "openid profile email"
roleClaim: string; // e.g. "realm_access.roles"
adminRoles: string[]; // e.g. ["admin"]
}
interface OIDCState {
code_verifier: string; // PKCE random bytes (base64url)
state: string; // CSRF protection random
nonce: string; // Replay protection random
}
interface OIDCClaims {
sub: string; // Subject identifier
email?: string;
preferred_username?: string; // Used by Keycloak and others; username fallback
[claim: string]: unknown; // Provider-specific claims
}
Function Dependency Graph
getOIDCConfig() ← reads env vars
│
▼
discoverProvider(config?) ← openid-client discovery + 5-min cache
│
├──► generateAuthUrl(config, redirectUri, scope)
│ └─ returns { url, state: OIDCState }
│
└──► exchangeCode(config, callbackUrl, codeVerifier, state, nonce)
└─ returns OIDCClaims | null
mapOIDCRole(claims, roleClaim, adminRoles) ← pure function, no deps
encryptState(data) / decryptState(token) ← jose JWT sign/verify
buildLogoutUrl(returnTo) ← reads getOIDCConfig()
Discovery Cache
// In-memory, module-level singleton
let cachedConfig: client.Configuration | null = null;
let cacheExpiry = 0;
const CACHE_TTL = 5 * 60 * 1000; // 5 minutes
// discoverProvider() checks:
const now = Date.now();
if (cachedConfig && now < cacheExpiry) {
return cachedConfig; // Cache hit
}
// Otherwise: fetch /.well-known/openid-configuration, then set cacheExpiry = now + CACHE_TTL
// resetDiscoveryCache() — exposed for testing
The cache prevents hitting the provider's discovery endpoint on every login. 5-minute TTL balances freshness with performance. The cache is process-level (shared across all requests in the same Next.js server instance).
src/lib/auth.ts
The JWT session layer is completely auth-mode agnostic:
// Same function called by both local login route and OIDC callback:
export async function login(role: Role, username?: string) {
const token = await signJWT({ role, username: username || role });
const cookieStore = await cookies();
cookieStore.set('auth-token', token, {
httpOnly: true,
secure: await shouldMarkCookieSecure(),
sameSite: 'lax',
maxAge: 86400, // 24 hours
path: '/',
});
}
shouldMarkCookieSecure() also decides the flag on the oidc-state cookie, so both cookies of the flow always agree. It resolves in this order:
AUTH_COOKIE_SECUREwhen set (on/true/1vsoff/false/0) — the operator's explicit answer, needed when the browser itself reaches the app over plain HTTP on a non-loopback host (LAN or home server). TLS terminated at an ingress does not need it: the browser still speaks HTTPS.- Off outside production.
- Off for a request that arrived on a loopback host over plain HTTP — WebKitGTK's cookie store discards a
Securecookie delivered over HTTP, which would break the desktop shell (issue #232). A proxy that forwarded HTTPS to loopback still gets the flag, viax-forwarded-proto. - On otherwise.
The optional username parameter was added for OIDC — local login passes the email, while the OIDC callback resolves it through a fallback chain: claims.email || claims.preferred_username || claims.sub || role (so a username is always set regardless of which claims the provider returns).
src/proxy.ts
The proxy (Next.js 16 middleware) has zero OIDC awareness:
// Public routes — includes /api/auth/* which covers OIDC routes
const publicPaths = ['/api/auth', '/_next', '/favicon.ico', '/api/db/health'];
// All auth checks use the same auth-token JWT
const token = request.cookies.get('auth-token')?.value;
const payload = token ? await verifyJWT(token) : null;
OIDC routes (/api/auth/oidc/login, /api/auth/oidc/callback) are automatically public because they match the /api/auth prefix.
State Management
PKCE State Cookie
The OIDC login flow requires carrying three values from the login route to the callback route: code_verifier, state, and nonce. These are stored in a signed JWT cookie:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Cookie: oidc-state │
│ Value: JWT (HS256 signed with JWT_SECRET) │
│ │
│ Payload: { │
│ code_verifier: "dBjftJeZ4CVP...", │
│ state: "xyz123", │
│ nonce: "abc789", │
│ exp: <now + 5 minutes> │
│ } │
│ │
│ Cookie flags: │
│ httpOnly: true │
│ secure: true (production) │
│ sameSite: lax │
│ maxAge: 300 (5 minutes) │
│ path: / │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Why JWT and not a plain cookie?
- The state must be tamper-proof — an attacker shouldn't be able to forge a state cookie
- JWT signing with
JWT_SECRETprovides integrity verification without needing server-side storage - The 5-minute expiry prevents stale state cookies from accumulating
JWT_SECRETis mandatory for OIDC state signing — no development fallback. Secret reading is centralized insrc/lib/config/auth-env.ts. The state signer callsgetJwtSecret({ allowDevFallback: false }), so a missingJWT_SECRETthrows in every environment (unlikeauth.ts, which permits a dev fallback outside production). AJWT_SECRETshorter than 32 characters is rejected everywhere — and rejected earliest of all at boot:src/lib/config/auth-preflight.tsexits the process with code 1 on a standalone start, so the misconfiguration surfaces in the server log instead of only in the first login attempt (issue #227). This is why an OIDC deployment must always set a realJWT_SECRET(zero-config boot generates one automatically).
Lifecycle:
- Created in
/api/auth/oidc/loginviaencryptState() - Read in
/api/auth/oidc/callbackviadecryptState() - Deleted in callback after successful exchange (set maxAge: 0)
Session Cookie
After OIDC (or local) authentication:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Cookie: auth-token │
│ Value: JWT (HS256 signed with JWT_SECRET) │
│ │
│ Payload: { │
│ role: "admin" | "user", │
│ username: "user@example.com", │
│ exp: <now + 24 hours> │
│ } │
│ │
│ Cookie flags: │
│ httpOnly: true │
│ secure: true (production) │
│ sameSite: lax │
│ maxAge: 86400 (24 hours) │
│ path: / │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Security Model
PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange)
Prevents authorization code interception attacks in the callback redirect:
Login route:
code_verifier = random(32 bytes, base64url)
code_challenge = base64url(SHA256(code_verifier))
→ Send code_challenge to provider
→ Store code_verifier in signed cookie
Callback route:
→ Send code_verifier to provider's token endpoint
→ Provider verifies: SHA256(code_verifier) === code_challenge
Even if an attacker intercepts the authorization code in the redirect URL, they cannot exchange it without the code_verifier (stored in an httpOnly cookie on the user's browser).
State Parameter (CSRF Protection)
Login route:
state = random(32 bytes, base64url)
→ Send state to provider in auth URL
→ Store state in signed cookie
Callback route:
→ Verify: URL query state === cookie state
Prevents CSRF attacks where an attacker tricks a user into completing an OAuth flow initiated by the attacker.
Nonce (Replay Protection)
Login route:
nonce = random(32 bytes, base64url)
→ Send nonce to provider in auth URL
→ Store nonce in signed cookie
Callback route:
→ openid-client validates: id_token.nonce === expected nonce
Prevents replay attacks where an intercepted ID token is reused.
prompt=login
// In generateAuthUrl():
parameters.set('prompt', 'login');
Forces the OIDC provider to show the login screen on every SSO click, even if the user has an active session at the provider. This prevents:
- Session fixation (user A clicks SSO but gets user B's session)
- Unintended auto-login (user logs out of LibreDB but still has a provider session)
Cookie Security Summary
| Cookie | HttpOnly | Secure | SameSite | MaxAge | Signed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
oidc-state | Yes | Yes (prod) | Lax | 5 min | JWT (HS256) |
auth-token | Yes | Yes (prod) | Lax | 24 hours | JWT (HS256) |
Role Mapping Engine
The role mapping system converts provider-specific claims into LibreDB's binary role model (admin | user).
Algorithm (mapOIDCRole)
Input: claims object, roleClaim path, adminRoles list
1. If roleClaim is empty → return "user"
2. Navigate claim path (dot-notation):
"realm_access.roles" → claims["realm_access"]["roles"]
3. Get claim value:
a. If Array → check if ANY element matches adminRoles (case-insensitive)
b. If String → check if it matches any adminRole (case-insensitive)
c. Otherwise → return "user"
4. Match found → "admin", no match → "user"
Examples
Provider: Auth0
Claims: { "https://libredb.org/roles": ["admin", "viewer"] }
Config: OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=https://libredb.org/roles
OIDC_ADMIN_ROLES=admin
Result: "admin" ✓ (array contains "admin")
Provider: Keycloak
Claims: { "realm_access": { "roles": ["offline_access", "uma_authorization", "admin"] } }
Config: OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=realm_access.roles
OIDC_ADMIN_ROLES=admin
Result: "admin" ✓ (dot-notation navigates nested object)
Provider: Okta
Claims: { "groups": ["Everyone", "Engineering"] }
Config: OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=groups
OIDC_ADMIN_ROLES=admin,Admin
Result: "user" ✗ (no match in groups array)
Provider: Google
Claims: { "sub": "123", "email": "user@gmail.com" }
Config: OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM= (empty)
Result: "user" (no claim configured, default)
Provider Logout Strategy
Different OIDC providers have different logout endpoint conventions. buildLogoutUrl() handles this:
function buildLogoutUrl(returnTo: string): string | null {
const config = getOIDCConfig();
const issuerUrl = new URL(config.issuer);
const roleClaim = config.roleClaim;
// Auth0: /v2/logout?client_id=xxx&returnTo=xxx
if (issuerUrl.hostname === 'auth0.com' || issuerUrl.hostname.endsWith('.auth0.com')) {
const logoutUrl = new URL('/v2/logout', config.issuer);
logoutUrl.searchParams.set('client_id', config.clientId);
logoutUrl.searchParams.set('returnTo', returnTo);
return logoutUrl.toString();
}
// Zitadel RP-Initiated Logout — detected via the role claim (urn:zitadel:...)
if (roleClaim.includes('zitadel')) {
const logoutUrl = new URL('/oidc/v1/end_session', config.issuer);
logoutUrl.searchParams.set('client_id', config.clientId);
logoutUrl.searchParams.set('post_logout_redirect_uri', returnTo);
return logoutUrl.toString();
}
// Generic OIDC (Keycloak, Okta, Azure AD, etc.):
// /protocol/openid-connect/logout?client_id=xxx&post_logout_redirect_uri=xxx
const logoutUrl = new URL('/protocol/openid-connect/logout', config.issuer);
logoutUrl.searchParams.set('client_id', config.clientId);
logoutUrl.searchParams.set('post_logout_redirect_uri', returnTo);
return logoutUrl.toString();
}
Note: Zitadel is detected by its role-claim URN (
OIDC_ROLE_CLAIMcontainingzitadel), not by hostname — so its/oidc/v1/end_sessionendpoint is selected automatically when you configure Zitadel roles.
Provider Logout Endpoints
What
buildLogoutUrl()actually implements: only Auth0 and Zitadel are special-cased. Every other issuer — including Keycloak, Okta, and Azure AD — falls back to/protocol/openid-connect/logout. The table lists each provider's native logout endpoint; the "Wired?" column shows whether the code routes there today. For Okta/Azure AD the native endpoint differs from the fallback, so RP-initiated logout against those providers may need an explicitbuildLogoutUrl()branch (see Extension Point below).
| Provider | Native Endpoint | Return Param | Wired? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Auth0 | {issuer}/v2/logout | returnTo | ✅ special-cased |
| Zitadel | {issuer}/oidc/v1/end_session (auto-detected via role claim) | post_logout_redirect_uri | ✅ special-cased |
| Keycloak | {issuer}/protocol/openid-connect/logout | post_logout_redirect_uri | ✅ matches generic fallback |
| Okta | RP-Initiated Logout (via discovery) | post_logout_redirect_uri | ⚠️ generic fallback only |
| Azure AD | {issuer}/oauth2/v2.0/logout | post_logout_redirect_uri | ⚠️ generic fallback only |
Extension Point
To add a new provider's logout format, extend buildLogoutUrl() with a new hostname check:
if (issuerUrl.hostname.includes('okta.com')) {
const logoutUrl = new URL('/oauth2/v1/logout', config.issuer);
logoutUrl.searchParams.set('id_token_hint', idToken);
logoutUrl.searchParams.set('post_logout_redirect_uri', returnTo);
return logoutUrl.toString();
}
Error Handling
Callback Error Codes
The callback route redirects to /login?error=<code> on failure:
| Error Code | Cause | When |
|---|---|---|
oidc_state_missing | oidc-state cookie not found | Cookie expired (>5 min) or blocked by browser |
oidc_state_invalid | State decryption failed or state mismatch | Tampered cookie, wrong JWT_SECRET, or CSRF attempt |
oidc_no_claims | Token exchange returned no claims | Provider returned invalid/empty ID token |
oidc_failed | Generic catch-all error | Network error, invalid client credentials, etc. |
oidc_config | OIDC configuration invalid | Missing env vars, unreachable discovery endpoint |
Login Page Error Display
// login/login-form.tsx reads ?error= param
const oidcError = searchParams.get('error');
{oidcError && (
<div className="rounded-md border border-destructive/50 bg-destructive/10 p-3 text-sm text-destructive">
Authentication failed. Please try again.
</div>
)}
Server-Side Error Logging
All routes log errors to console.error before redirecting. In production, these should be captured by your logging infrastructure (e.g., Datadog, Sentry).
Testing Architecture
Test Strategy
The OIDC module is tested at three layers:
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Unit Tests (tests/unit/lib/oidc.test.ts) │
│ Pure functions: mapOIDCRole, getOIDCConfig, │
│ encryptState, decryptState, buildLogoutUrl, │
│ discoverProvider, generateAuthUrl, │
│ exchangeCode, resetDiscoveryCache │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ API Tests (tests/api/auth/) │
│ Route handlers: oidc-login, oidc-callback, │
│ logout (OIDC mode), login (email/password) │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Hook + Component Tests │
│ use-auth (OIDC redirect), LoginPageOIDC │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ E2E Tests (e2e/) │
│ Full browser login flow (local mode only, │
│ OIDC requires real provider) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Mock Strategy
Since openid-client performs real HTTP requests, it must be mocked in tests:
// tests/unit/lib/oidc.test.ts
const mockDiscoveryFn = mock(async () => 'mock-config');
mock.module('openid-client', () => ({
discovery: mockDiscoveryFn,
fetchUserInfo: mock(async () => ({})),
buildEndSessionUrl: mock(() => new URL('https://example.com')),
authorizationCodeGrant: mock(async () => ({ claims: () => mockClaims })),
// ...
}));
// Dynamic import AFTER mocking:
const { discoverProvider, generateAuthUrl, exchangeCode } = await import('@/lib/oidc');
Key testing patterns:
mock.module()before dynamicimport()— ensures the mock is in place when the module loads- Process env manipulation —
process.env.OIDC_ISSUER = 'https://...'inbeforeEach, restore inafterEach - Module-level env reads moved to function body —
const authProvider = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_AUTH_PROVIDERinside the route handler, not at module scope (for testability)
Test File Map
| File | Tests | Coverage Target |
|---|---|---|
tests/unit/lib/oidc.test.ts | ~30 | All oidc.ts functions |
tests/api/auth/oidc-login.test.ts | ~4 | Login route redirect, PKCE state |
tests/api/auth/oidc-callback.test.ts | ~9 | Code exchange, role mapping, errors |
tests/api/auth/logout.test.ts | ~8 | Local + OIDC logout modes |
tests/hooks/use-auth.test.ts | ~12 | Including OIDC redirect test |
tests/components/LoginPageOIDC.test.tsx | ~7 | SSO button, error display |
Extension Points
Adding a New OIDC Provider
No code changes needed if the provider is OIDC-compliant. Just set the env vars. If the provider has a non-standard logout endpoint, add a case in buildLogoutUrl().
Adding SAML 2.0
Future SAML support would follow the same pattern:
- Create
src/lib/saml.ts(config, assertion parsing, attribute mapping) - Create
/api/auth/saml/login/route.tsand/api/auth/saml/callback/route.ts - Call
login(role, email)at the end — same JWT session - Add
NEXT_PUBLIC_AUTH_PROVIDER=samlas a third option - No changes to proxy, hooks, or protected routes
Adding Refresh Token Support
Currently, the local JWT session has a fixed 24-hour expiry. To add OIDC refresh tokens:
- Store
refresh_tokenin an encrypted httpOnly cookie during callback - Create
/api/auth/refresh/route.tsthat usesopenid-clientto refresh - Update
proxy.tsto check token expiry and trigger refresh - No changes to the OIDC login/callback flow
Adding User Profile Display
The OIDC claims contain name, email, picture etc. To display these:
- Extend
UserPayloadinauth.tswith optional profile fields - Include claim values in
signJWT()call during callback - The existing
/api/auth/meendpoint anduseAuthhook will automatically carry the new fields
Decision Log
| Decision | Rationale | Alternatives Considered |
|---|---|---|
openid-client v6 over @auth0/nextjs-auth0 | Vendor-agnostic, same author as jose (already in project), zero extra deps | Auth0 SDK locks to one provider; next-auth adds 15+ deps and complexity |
| Local JWT after OIDC | Zero coupling — proxy, hooks, and routes don't know about OIDC | Forwarding provider tokens requires token refresh logic in middleware |
| PKCE state in JWT cookie | Stateless — no server-side session store needed | Redis/DB session store adds infrastructure dependency |
| 5-minute state cookie TTL | Long enough for slow providers, short enough to limit replay window | Shorter: may fail on slow networks. Longer: increases attack window |
prompt=login always | Prevents confusing auto-login behavior; user expects to choose account | prompt=consent: too aggressive. No prompt: users get stuck with one account |
| Provider-specific logout detection via hostname / role claim | Simple, works for 90% of cases (Auth0 by hostname, Zitadel by role-claim URN, everything else via the generic fallback) | OIDC Discovery end_session_endpoint: not all providers support it; would require async call |
| Module-level discovery cache | Fast (avoids HTTP on every login), simple, process-scoped | Redis cache: overkill for single-instance deployments. No cache: 200-500ms per login |
| Binary role model (admin/user) | Matches existing RBAC, simple to map from any claim format | Fine-grained roles: would require schema changes in JWT, proxy, and all components |