SAF-MCP: Secure Agentic Framework for Model Context Protocol

September 2, 2026 · View on GitHub

SIG-SAF-MCPDetails
Mailing Listopenssf-sig-safe-mcp@lists.openssf.org
SIG LeadsSarah Evans; Frederick Kautz
MaintainersBishnu Bista; Sarah Evans; Frederick Kautz
Meeting Time1:00 PM PT (PST/PDT) Bi-Weekly
SlackOpenSSF #sig-safe-mcp

About SAF-MCP

The Secure Agentic Framework (SAF) documents adversary behavior in agentic systems. SAF-MCP is the project and MCP profile: the same permanent technique IDs can also be scoped to SAF Core, Code-Agent, RAG and Memory, Financial-Agent, and Model-Lifecycle profiles. Framework Model v2 defines the admission, lifecycle, relationship, and release rules.

Key Features

  • Atomic, Permanent Techniques: IDs represent distinct adversary behaviors and remain permanent even when an entry is consolidated or deprecated.
  • Profile-Based Scope: SAF separates general agentic mechanisms from MCP and other domain-specific profiles without duplicating technique IDs.
  • Typed Relationships: Technique links distinguish specializations, prerequisites, sequence, overlap, alternatives, and replacements.
  • MITRE ATT&CK Alignment: Where defensible, SAF techniques link to relevant MITRE ATT&CK behaviors to support threat modeling, detection engineering, and cross-framework analysis. These mappings do not establish compliance.
  • Evidence-Led Releases: Evidence, taxonomy, and operational gates require traceable claims, coherent placement, and tested or explicitly bounded detection.
  • Operational Coverage Registry: The generated detection coverage matrix separates technique linkage, observation modality, validation maturity, and external rule ownership.
  • Actionable Mitigations: Each technique includes detailed mitigation strategies and detection rules to help defenders protect their MCP deployments.

How to Use This Framework

  1. Security Teams: Select the profiles that match your agentic deployment, then use the catalog below to build a threat model
  2. Developers: Review techniques relevant to the agents, models, data paths, and tools you operate and implement the linked mitigations
  3. Compliance Officers: Map SAF-MCP techniques to your existing security controls via MITRE ATT&CK linkages
  4. Red Teams: Reference attack techniques for security testing of MCP deployments

TTP Reference Table

The generated catalog below is the public projection of the canonical Framework Model v2 registry.

SAF Tactics

SAF uses 14 ATT&CK-aligned adversary objectives. The canonical machine-readable catalog is research/framework-model.yml; its admission and lifecycle rules are defined in Framework Model v2.

Tactic IDTacticActive TechniquesDescription
ATK-TA0043Reconnaissance0The adversary is gathering information to plan future agentic operations.
ATK-TA0042Resource Development1The adversary is establishing resources to support agentic operations.
ATK-TA0001Initial Access9The adversary is trying to enter an agentic environment.
ATK-TA0002Execution8The adversary is trying to cause code, tools, or model-mediated actions to run.
ATK-TA0003Persistence6The adversary is trying to retain influence or access across agent sessions or restarts.
ATK-TA0004Privilege Escalation8The adversary is trying to exercise authority beyond the initiating principal or task.
ATK-TA0005Defense Evasion8The adversary is trying to avoid prevention, review, or detection.
ATK-TA0006Credential Access7The adversary is trying to obtain authentication material or delegated authority.
ATK-TA0007Discovery6The adversary is trying to understand an agentic environment after gaining access.
ATK-TA0008Lateral Movement7The adversary is trying to move between tools, agents, services, or trust domains.
ATK-TA0009Collection5The adversary is gathering data of interest through an agentic system.
ATK-TA0011Command and Control4The adversary is maintaining a control or feedback path through an agentic system.
ATK-TA0010Exfiltration6The adversary is removing data through an agentic system or connected service.
ATK-TA0040Impact7The adversary is manipulating, interrupting, or destroying systems, assets, or decisions.

SAF Profiles

Profiles scope an atomic technique without changing its permanent ID. A technique may appear in more than one profile.

ProfileActive TechniquesScope
SAF Core31Mechanisms that materially depend on model-mediated decisions, delegated action, dynamic context, memory, or agent coordination.
MCP Profile76Mechanisms expressed through Model Context Protocol hosts, clients, servers, tools, resources, prompts, sampling, authorization, or transports.
Code-Agent Profile12Mechanisms specific to coding assistants, developer workstations, repositories, build systems, shells, and file-oriented agents.
RAG and Memory Profile5Mechanisms involving retrieval indexes, embeddings, persistent context, shared memory, or retrieval-augmented generation.
Financial-Agent Profile2Mechanisms involving delegated payment, trading, blockchain, or other financial authority.
Model-Lifecycle Profile1Mechanisms involving training, adaptation, evaluation, registration, promotion, or deployment of model artifacts.

Active Technique Catalog

Techniques are listed under every applicable tactic; counts therefore represent tactic mappings, not unique IDs.

TacticTechniqueNameProfilesDescription
ReconnaissanceNo active techniques currently admitted.
Resource DevelopmentSAF-T2107AI Model Poisoning via MCP Tool Training Data ContaminationMCP Profile, Model-Lifecycle ProfileThis technique covers adversary-controlled MCP tool results that cross from live tool execution into a corpus used to update model weights, causing the derived model to learn attacker-influenced behavior.
Initial AccessSAF-T1001Tool Poisoning AttackSAF Core, MCP ProfileSAF-T1001 covers attacker-controlled instructions or policy embedded in an MCP tool definition—principally its natural-language description or parameter schema—that crosses from a server-controlled discovery response into the host/model planning context and causes tool selection or arguments contrary to the user's intent.
Initial AccessSAF-T1002Supply Chain CompromiseMCP ProfileThis technique covers an adversary altering a component or release path that consumers reasonably treat as the authentic upstream, then causing an MCP or agentic deployment to install, load, import, update, or execute the altered artifact.
Initial AccessSAF-T1003Malicious MCP-Server DistributionMCP ProfileIn scope are initial malicious publication, delivery of a malicious release through a package or MCP registry, marketplace, release location, direct configuration, or remote endpoint, and continued availability through a private mirror or cache after public takedown.
Initial AccessSAF-T1004Server Impersonation / Name-CollisionMCP ProfileThe frozen technique contract covers wrong-server selection caused by an ambiguous, colliding, lookalike, self-asserted, or insufficiently authenticated server identity.
Initial AccessSAF-T1005Exposed Endpoint ExploitMCP ProfileExposed Endpoint Exploit covers an untrusted network client or browser origin reaching an MCP endpoint, proxy, or management endpoint whose exposure and missing or bypassed access controls permit an unauthorized capability invocation.
Initial AccessSAF-T1006User-Social-Engineering InstallMCP ProfileThis technique covers deception that causes a user to initiate or approve an attacker-controlled local MCP server installation, configuration, trust decision, or first launch, crossing the user-to-local-runtime boundary.
Initial AccessSAF-T1007OAuth Authorization PhishingMCP ProfileThis technique covers forwarding an MCP-generated third-party OAuth authorization URL to a different user so that the victim completes authorization while the MCP server binds the resulting tokens to the attacker's initiating session.
Initial AccessSAF-T1008Cross-Server Tool ShadowingSAF Core, MCP ProfileTool shadowing is cross-server descriptor interference: text supplied for an attacker-controlled tool changes how an agent selects, configures, or invokes a distinct tool from a trusted server.
Initial AccessSAF-T1009Authorization Server Mix-upMCP ProfileThis technique covers an attacker-controlled or compromised authorization server causing a multi-authorization-server MCP client to misattribute a browser-delivered response from an honest issuer and send the resulting code or token to the attacker-controlled server.
ExecutionSAF-T1101Command InjectionMCP Profile, Code-Agent ProfileThe defining security boundary lies between untrusted MCP-derived data or configuration and a shell, interpreter, or direct process-launch API used by a host, client, server, proxy, or tool.
ExecutionSAF-T1102Prompt Injection (Multiple Vectors)SAF Core, MCP ProfilePrompt Injection (Multiple Vectors) covers attacker-controlled natural-language or multimodal instructions that enter model context and cause the model to treat untrusted content as authoritative directions.
ExecutionSAF-T1103Fake Tool Invocation (Function Spoofing)MCP ProfileThis technique covers execution caused by treating an attacker-originated tool-call record, or an attacker-influenced callable identity, as if it were an authorized call from the trusted agent workflow.
ExecutionSAF-T1105Path Traversal via File ToolMCP Profile, Code-Agent ProfileThis technique covers an MCP or agent file-capable tool when attacker-influenced path data resolves beyond the configured file scope, or bypasses a no-access mode, and the tool attempts a filesystem operation.
ExecutionSAF-T1106Autonomous Loop ExploitSAF Core, MCP ProfileThe security boundary is the handoff from untrusted or attacker-influenced content into an autonomous orchestrator's continuation decision.
ExecutionSAF-T1110Multimodal Prompt Injection via Images/AudioSAF Core, MCP ProfileThis technique covers attacker-controlled instructions carried by image or audio data that a multimodal model treats as executable guidance, crossing the boundary between untrusted media and trusted agent decisions.
ExecutionSAF-T1111AI Agent CLI WeaponizationSAF Core, Code-Agent ProfileThis technique covers an adversary deliberately operating an AI coding-agent command-line interface as the execution and orchestration layer for malicious actions against real targets, crossing from model-mediated tasking into commands or tools that act on target systems.
ExecutionSAF-T1112Sampling Request AbuseSAF Core, MCP ProfileThis technique applies only where an MCP client supports server-initiated sampling/createMessage, accepts the request, and lacks sufficient approval, context, or budget controls.
PersistenceSAF-T1201Post-Approval Tool MutationMCP ProfileThis technique covers a time-of-check/time-of-use trust reversal in which an MCP server, provider, or update channel first presents a benign tool definition, gains approval, and later changes the same approved tool's metadata or delivered implementation so the host consumes materially different behavior without renewed authorization.
PersistenceSAF-T1202OAuth Token PersistenceMCP ProfileThis technique covers an adversary using an attacker-controlled OAuth refresh token to obtain replacement access tokens for an MCP protected resource, preserving the existing client, subject, scope, and resource grant across access-token lifetimes.
PersistenceSAF-T1203Backdoored Server BinaryMCP Profile, Code-Agent ProfileThis technique covers post-approval or post-deployment replacement, patching, or infection of a configured MCP server executable or a support binary it directly loads.
PersistenceSAF-T1204Context Memory ImplantSAF Core, MCP Profile, RAG and Memory ProfileThis technique covers an adversary causing selected content to be written into an agent's persistent context memory so that retrieval in a later session influences reasoning, a response, planning, or a tool decision.
PersistenceSAF-T1206Credential Implant in ConfigMCP Profile, Code-Agent ProfileThis technique covers an adversary writing or replacing a credential, credential reference, or client-registration identity in persistent MCP or agent configuration so later connections authenticate with an attacker-selected identity.
PersistenceSAF-T1207Hijack Update MechanismMCP ProfileSAF-T1207 covers an adversary causing the normal update path of an already trusted MCP or agentic component to accept and activate an attacker-selected replacement, preserving adversary-controlled code across restarts.
Privilege EscalationSAF-T1008Cross-Server Tool ShadowingSAF Core, MCP ProfileTool shadowing is cross-server descriptor interference: text supplied for an attacker-controlled tool changes how an agent selects, configures, or invokes a distinct tool from a trusted server.
Privilege EscalationSAF-T1009Authorization Server Mix-upMCP ProfileThis technique covers an attacker-controlled or compromised authorization server causing a multi-authorization-server MCP client to misattribute a browser-delivered response from an honest issuer and send the resulting code or token to the attacker-controlled server.
Privilege EscalationSAF-T1302Agentic Confused DeputySAF Core, MCP ProfileAgentic Confused Deputy covers a low-trust requestor or untrusted input causing an agent to exercise a legitimate tool, service identity, or approved process with authority unavailable to that principal because requestor authorization, scope binding, or action-bound approval is absent or ineffective.
Privilege EscalationSAF-T1303Sandbox Escape via Server ExecMCP Profile, Code-Agent ProfileThis technique covers attacker-controlled MCP configuration or tool input reaching a server-side process launcher and escaping the caller's intended sandbox or authorization boundary into a more-privileged service, container, or host context.
Privilege EscalationSAF-T1304Credential Relay ChainMCP ProfileCredential Relay Chain covers an MCP or agent intermediary causing a credential to cross a resource, principal, or hop boundary without independent issuance and validation for the current caller and target, so the receiving component authorizes greater access than the caller otherwise has.
Privilege EscalationSAF-T1305Host OS Priv-Esc (RCE)MCP Profile, Code-Agent ProfileThis technique covers exploitation of an MCP host-side client, proxy, inspector, or server flaw that changes an attacker's authority from MCP-level or low-privileged interaction to arbitrary host operating-system code execution in the vulnerable process account.
Privilege EscalationSAF-T1307Confused Deputy AttackMCP ProfileThis technique covers an attacker causing an MCP or agentic intermediary to use authority, identity, network reach, or execution capability unavailable to the attacker because the intermediary fails to preserve or enforce the initiating principal's identity, resource, authorization intent, or approved delegation.
Privilege EscalationSAF-T1308Token Scope SubstitutionMCP ProfileToken Scope Substitution is the use of a valid token, authorization code, or refresh grant under an audience, resource, or operation-scope context that was not bound to the original authorization.
Defense EvasionSAF-T1401Line JumpingMCP ProfileLine Jumping covers an attacker causing an MCP tool, prompt, or resource under attacker influence to win a host, proxy, or registry resolution decision ahead of a trusted competing object.
Defense EvasionSAF-T1402Instruction SteganographySAF Core, MCP ProfileInstruction Steganography is the concealment of an adversarial instruction inside a representation whose operational meaning is hidden from an ordinary reviewer but recoverable by an agent or model after the carrier crosses an untrusted-content boundary.
Defense EvasionSAF-T1403Consent-Fatigue ExploitMCP ProfileConsent-Fatigue Exploit covers an adversary causing materially equivalent agent or MCP approval requests to recur until a user accepts one, crossing the human authorization boundary that gates a tool call, privilege elevation, or data disclosure.
Defense EvasionSAF-T1404Response TamperingMCP ProfileResponse Tampering covers modification, substitution, or misrouting after an MCP operation emits a response and before a host, model, or downstream application consumes it as authentic.
Defense EvasionSAF-T1405Tool Obfuscation/RenamingMCP ProfileTool Obfuscation/Renaming covers attacker control of a tool's machine name, human-facing title, or description so that an MCP host, model, operator, or name-based control confuses the tool with an expected capability, prefers it over a competitor, or overlooks a material identity change.
Defense EvasionSAF-T1406Metadata ManipulationMCP ProfileMetadata Manipulation covers adversary-controlled changes to MCP or agentic object descriptors that cause a client, host, model, reviewer, policy engine, inventory, or monitor to treat the object as safer, more trusted, or more appropriate than it is.
Defense EvasionSAF-T1407Server Proxy MasqueradeMCP ProfileServer Proxy Masquerade covers an attacker-controlled MCP endpoint that appears to be an approved server or protected resource while it relays, is positioned to relay, or reuses MCP or OAuth exchanges associated with a legitimate service.
Defense EvasionSAF-T1408OAuth Protocol DowngradeMCP ProfileOAuth Protocol Downgrade covers attacker-influenced weakening of PKCE from S256 to plain or from PKCE to no challenge during an HTTP-based MCP authorization flow, when the client or authorization server accepts that weaker state and defeats the intended code binding.
Credential AccessSAF-T1501Full-Schema Poisoning (FSP)SAF Core, MCP ProfileFSP covers a structurally valid MCP tool definition whose coordinated adversarial semantics occupy at least two model-visible definition paths, including a schema-resident path, and influence tool planning before execution.
Credential AccessSAF-T1502File-Based Credential HarvestMCP Profile, Code-Agent ProfileThis technique covers an MCP or agentic component using filesystem visibility to locate and read a credential-bearing ordinary file, placing its contents into a tool result, model context, or adversary-directed workflow.
Credential AccessSAF-T1503Env-Var ScrapingMCP Profile, Code-Agent ProfileEnv-Var Scraping covers a malicious or compromised local stdio MCP server enumerating the variable names and values visible inside its own launched process.
Credential AccessSAF-T1504Token Theft via API ResponseMCP ProfileThis technique covers an adversary obtaining a reusable access, bearer, refresh, or session token because an MCP tool or agentic API response delivers that token to a recipient not authorized to possess it.
Credential AccessSAF-T1505In-Memory Secret ExtractionSAF Core, MCP Profile, RAG and Memory ProfileIn-Memory Secret Extraction is the unauthorized acquisition of authentication material or another secret from live process-wide environment or runtime state held by an MCP host, agent runtime, or server.
Credential AccessSAF-T1506Infrastructure Token TheftMCP ProfileThe technique applies when an MCP, agent, gateway, tool, plugin, or adjacent workload can reach a token-bearing source such as a process environment, projected service-account volume, or cloud metadata service and transfers the resulting credential outside its intended trust boundary.
Credential AccessSAF-T1507Authorization Code InterceptionMCP ProfileAuthorization Code Interception covers an adversary obtaining an OAuth authorization code from the redirect-to-client path used by an HTTP MCP authorization flow, then redeeming or attempting to redeem it when transaction binding or validation is absent or defeated.
DiscoverySAF-T1601MCP Server EnumerationMCP ProfileMCP Server Enumeration is the adversarial inventory of the MCP servers available to a compromised or misused host context, using host configuration, connection establishment, or MCP discovery metadata to identify and characterize the server set.
DiscoverySAF-T1602Tool EnumerationMCP ProfileTool Enumeration is an actor's use of tools/list, including pagination, to obtain the tool definitions an MCP server makes available to that requesting principal.
DiscoverySAF-T1603System Prompt DisclosureSAF Core, MCP ProfileThis technique covers unauthorized recovery of the whole or a substantial portion of hidden system, developer, or agent instructions across the boundary separating privileged instruction context from an untrusted requester, remote peer, or tool-mediated recipient.
DiscoverySAF-T1604Server Version EnumerationMCP ProfileSAF-T1604 covers a client collecting implementation or supported-protocol versions from a reached MCP server or its HTTP serving layer.
DiscoverySAF-T1605Capability MappingMCP ProfileCapability Mapping covers an adversary using its current MCP request identity to enumerate advertised server features and correlate the returned metadata into a map for follow-on selection.
DiscoverySAF-T1606Directory Listing via File ToolMCP Profile, Code-Agent ProfileSAF-T1606 covers a model, client, or actor invoking a file-capable MCP tool to obtain names, entry types, sizes, counts, matching paths, or directory structure from the filesystem namespace available to the server.
Lateral MovementSAF-T1204Context Memory ImplantSAF Core, MCP Profile, RAG and Memory ProfileThis technique covers an adversary causing selected content to be written into an agent's persistent context memory so that retrieval in a later session influences reasoning, a response, planning, or a tool decision.
Lateral MovementSAF-T1701Cross-Tool ContaminationSAF Core, MCP ProfileThis technique requires a source-tool result influenced by an adversary, a later call to a distinct tool or server in the same execution context, and a causal link between the untrusted result and that later call.
Lateral MovementSAF-T1703Tool-Chaining PivotSAF Core, MCP ProfileIn scope, an upstream tool description, result, retrieved object, or server-supplied instruction influences a later call to a distinct tool, server, connector, application, or security domain; the later call is unsupported by user intent and uses authority already available to the agent.
Lateral MovementSAF-T1704Compromised-Server PivotSAF Core, MCP ProfileThis technique begins after the adversary controls the behavior or responses of an MCP server and ends when that influence causes the connected host to cross into a different trust domain with host-held authority.
Lateral MovementSAF-T1705Cross-Agent Instruction InjectionSAF Core, MCP ProfileCross-Agent Instruction Injection is the transfer of attacker-authored instructions from an attacker-influenced agent context into a distinct receiving agent, where the receiver treats the peer's output as task content, evidence, or authority and changes behavior or invokes a capability.
Lateral MovementSAF-T1706OAuth Token Pivot ReplayMCP ProfileThis technique covers an adversary presenting a captured OAuth bearer access token from an MCP or agent-connected component to a reachable protected resource, where acceptance moves the adversary across that resource boundary as the token subject.
Lateral MovementSAF-T1707CSRF Token RelayMCP ProfileA valid, attacker-obtained state value is accepted from a different browser or session, and the callback completes an attacker-originated authorization flow or misbinds an account.
CollectionSAF-T1801Automated Data HarvestingSAF Core, MCP ProfileAutomated Data Harvesting is the adversarial use of an agentic system to enumerate, retrieve, and aggregate a broader set of data through MCP resources or data-reading tools than the user's bounded task requires.
CollectionSAF-T1802File CollectionMCP Profile, Code-Agent ProfileFile Collection covers obtaining file content through an MCP resource or tool, including use of an intended collection capability and retrieval that exceeds the actor's approved path, authorization, or approval boundary.
CollectionSAF-T1803Database DumpMCP ProfileDatabase Dump covers an MCP-connected or agentic database capability being directed or abused to create, stream, or assemble a broad reusable copy of database contents beyond the operator's intended task.
CollectionSAF-T1804API Data HarvestSAF Core, MCP ProfileAPI Data Harvest covers repeated MCP resource reads or data-query tool calls that enumerate collections or retrieve API- or database-backed records beyond the breadth, fields, rows, or volume justified by the immediate user task.
CollectionSAF-T1805Context Snapshot CaptureSAF Core, MCP Profile, RAG and Memory ProfileContext Snapshot Capture is the unauthorized read, export, or serialization of point-in-time active agent execution state across the state owner's or tenant's authorization boundary.
Command and ControlSAF-T1901Outbound Webhook C2SAF Core, MCP ProfileThe security boundary is the point where a model-controlled tool or agent scheduler turns invocation context into outbound HTTP traffic and then makes a response available to the agent or downstream automation.
Command and ControlSAF-T1902Response-Borne Covert ChannelSAF Core, MCP ProfileSAF-T1902 covers an adversary concealing control data, collected data, or a callback trigger inside an MCP or agent response so that a cooperating receiver obtains it through response processing, rendering, or relay outside the intended review path.
Command and ControlSAF-T1903Malicious Server Control ChannelMCP ProfileThis technique covers a malicious or trojanized MCP server, or a server-adjacent integration presented as one, that uses its execution placement to establish or service a bidirectional operator channel for receiving commands and returning results.
Command and ControlSAF-T1904Chat-Based BackchannelSAF Core, MCP ProfileChat-Based Backchannel covers a repeatable bidirectional operator-control path in which an external chat identity or conversation can supply actionable input to a tool-capable agent and receive returned status or results outside the authorized control plane.
ExfiltrationSAF-T1902Response-Borne Covert ChannelSAF Core, MCP ProfileSAF-T1902 covers an adversary concealing control data, collected data, or a callback trigger inside an MCP or agent response so that a cooperating receiver obtains it through response processing, rendering, or relay outside the intended review path.
ExfiltrationSAF-T1910Covert Channel ExfiltrationSAF Core, MCP ProfileCovert Channel Exfiltration covers an adversary causing an MCP-enabled or agentic host to place sensitive context in an apparently legitimate tool argument, application message, URL, or downstream service side effect so that the data crosses to an unintended external party while its disclosure purpose is obscured.
ExfiltrationSAF-T1911Parameter ExfiltrationSAF Core, MCP ProfileParameter Exfiltration is the unauthorized transmission of sensitive data by placing it in the argument values of an MCP tool call.
ExfiltrationSAF-T1913HTTP POST ExfilMCP ProfileHTTP POST Exfil is the transfer of sensitive data from an MCP host or client to an adversary-controlled remote MCP server by placing that data in tools/call arguments carried in a Streamable HTTP POST body.
ExfiltrationSAF-T1914Tool-to-Tool ExfilSAF Core, MCP ProfileTool-to-Tool Exfil covers an agentic host carrying confidential data returned by one source tool into a distinct outbound-capable sink tool or server under adversary-influenced instructions, causing or attempting unauthorized disclosure.
ExfiltrationSAF-T1915Cross-Chain Laundering via Bridges/DEXsFinancial-Agent ProfileThis technique covers an adversary using an agent with delegated financial-tool authority to compose a bridge action and a decentralized-exchange swap into a multi-chain sequence intended to layer illicit proceeds.
ImpactSAF-T2101Data DestructionMCP ProfileData Destruction is an adversary-directed MCP or agent action whose immediate objective is deleting stored data or irreversibly corrupting an addressable resource through a tool or delegated service authority.
ImpactSAF-T2102Service DisruptionMCP ProfileThe defining boundary is crossed when attacker-controlled activity at an MCP or agent interface causes measurable loss of availability, capacity, or task continuity beyond the attacker's own work.
ImpactSAF-T2103Code SabotageSAF Core, MCP Profile, Code-Agent ProfileCode Sabotage is an adversary-directed use of an agentic coding path to make unauthorized, behavior-changing edits to repository source, tests, build logic, or security configuration, with an immediate integrity or availability objective.
ImpactSAF-T2104Fraudulent TransactionsSAF Core, MCP Profile, Financial-Agent ProfileThis technique covers an adversary causing a tool-enabled agent to initiate, commit, or materially alter a value-bearing transaction beyond the user's or organization's current authorization.
ImpactSAF-T2105Disinformation OutputSAF Core, MCP ProfileIn scope are deliberately misleading generated assertions, fabricated identities or provenance, simulated consensus, and attacker-directed false answers produced through manipulated retrieval context.
ImpactSAF-T2106Context Memory Poisoning via Vector Store ContaminationSAF Core, MCP Profile, RAG and Memory ProfileContext memory poisoning via vector store contamination occurs when an adversary crosses a write or collection-ownership boundary to place attacker-controlled records in persistent retrieval memory, and a later semantically matched retrieval incorporates those records into an agent's context.
ImpactSAF-T3001RAG Backdoor AttackSAF Core, MCP Profile, RAG and Memory ProfileThis technique covers durable corpus insertion, trigger-conditioned retrieval, and downstream generation of the selected response with an unchanged retriever and generator.

Deprecated Compatibility IDs

Deprecated IDs remain permanent and navigable for provenance. Use their active replacements for new mappings.

Deprecated IDHistorical NameReplacement
SAF-T1104Over-Privileged Tool AbuseSAF-T1302 — Agentic Confused Deputy
SAF-T1109Debugging Tool ExploitationSAF-T1005 — Exposed Endpoint Exploit
SAF-T1101 — Command Injection
SAF-T1205Persistent Tool RedefinitionSAF-T1201 — Post-Approval Tool Mutation
SAF-T1301Cross-Server Tool ShadowingSAF-T1008 — Cross-Server Tool Shadowing
SAF-T1306Rogue Authorization ServerSAF-T1009 — Authorization Server Mix-up
SAF-T1309Privileged Tool Invocation via Prompt ManipulationSAF-T1102 — Prompt Injection (Multiple Vectors)
SAF-T1302 — Agentic Confused Deputy
SAF-T1702Shared-Memory PoisoningSAF-T1204 — Context Memory Implant
SAF-T1912Stego Response ExfilSAF-T1902 — Response-Borne Covert Channel

Catalog Statistics

  • Tactics: 14
  • Registered technique IDs: 86
  • Active techniques: 78
  • Deprecated compatibility IDs: 8
  • Active technique-to-tactic mappings: 82
TacticActive Technique Mappings
Reconnaissance0
Resource Development1
Initial Access9
Execution8
Persistence6
Privilege Escalation8
Defense Evasion8
Credential Access7
Discovery6
Lateral Movement7
Collection5
Command and Control4
Exfiltration6
Impact7

Usage Guidelines

  • Use technique IDs (e.g., SAF-T1001) for consistent reference across documentation
  • Select SAF Core and the domain profiles that match your deployment
  • Map active techniques to your specific agentic environment for risk assessment
  • Preserve deprecated IDs when consuming historical mappings, but use their listed replacements for new work
  • Regular review as new techniques emerge in the rapidly evolving MCP threat landscape

License

This project uses a multi-license structure based on the type of content:

  • Techniques and general documentation are licensed under CC BY 4.0
  • Mitigations (mitigations/ and MITIGATIONS.md): new contributions are licensed under the Community Specification License 1.0; mitigation content contributed on or before 2026-06-10 remains under CC BY 4.0 until the original contributors sign off on relicensing or the content is rewritten
  • Code (scripts, detection rules, and software) is licensed under Apache 2.0

See LICENSE for full details, mitigations/SCOPE.md for the mitigation specification's scope, and mitigations/NOTICES.md for Community Specification License notices.

Governance

The mitigations specification is developed as a Community Specification Working Group under the Community Specification Governance Policy 1.0. See CONTRIBUTING.md for how to contribute.


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