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Agent Systems Design Space: Source Notes

Update month: 2026-07 (sweep window 2026-06-25 to 2026-07-30)

This page is the English counterpart to agent-design-space-source-notes_zh.md. It records candidate sources for the catalogs in the main README, with the publication month kept per entry so the list can be extended and compared month over month.

Everything below is a candidate, not a catalog entry. Each row carries the section it would go into, so promoting an entry is a copy into README.md and README_zh.md rather than a routing decision made twice.

Maintainers: this file is a research log. Catalog entries themselves belong in README.md and README_zh.md.

Quick conclusions

The structural finding of this window is not a missing entry but a missing domain. The newest dated post on anthropic.com/engineering is the April 23 postmortem the README already lists (the later "How we contain Claude across products" appears there undated), and none of the July 2026 engineering material is on that index at all — it publishes at claude.com/blog, which the README references zero times. That single stale sweep target accounts for most of the Anthropic-side gap below.

Three themes run through the rest:

1. Context reduction is being re-measured against cost and truth, not token count. Prompt-cache traffic dominates billing, so token savings and cost savings have come apart; and compaction is now documented producing false positives, not just dropped detail.
2. The agent-driven intrusion of July 2026 moved agent security from hypothesis to incident. Three first-party disclosures plus independent analysis, and an evaluation harness — not a production one — was the thing that escaped.
3. The harness-optimization literature has split into a proper debate. The window added both stronger positive results and a distinct new failure mode (optimizers inventing guardrails for violations that never occurred).

Recurring sweep list — corrections

Target	Status
anthropic.com/engineering	Newest dated post is 2026-04-23; carries no July 2026 material. Keep, but no longer sufficient on its own.
claude.com/blog, /blog-category/claude-code, /blog-category/agents	Add. This is where Anthropic engineering content now lands.
openai.com/index/	Returns HTTP 403 to automated fetchers on every path. Corroborate via secondary sources or open in a browser.
learn.chatgpt.com/docs/changelog	Add. The Codex changelog moved here; it is the natural parallel to the Copilot CLI changelog row already kept.
ampcode.com/news	Already linked, but the existing description stops at agent-to-agent messaging and OIDC identity and misses the July 20-23 entries. Needs a description refresh, not a new row.

P0: strongest candidates

Date	Resource	Core content	Target section
2026-07-24	The new rules of context engineering for Claude 5 generation models	Anthropic's own account of what changed for the Claude 5 generation: the team deleted over 80% of Claude Code's system prompt with no measurable regression on coding evals, replaced prescriptive rules ("never write multi-paragraph docstrings") with judgment-inviting guidance ("write code that reads like the surrounding code"), and moved verification guidance out of the base prompt into selectable skills and deferred-loading tools. Argues expressive tool interfaces beat usage examples, and that automatic memory has displaced hand-maintained CLAUDE.md.	#### Research & Engineering Blogs
2026-07-16	How Anthropic runs large-scale code migrations with Claude Code	A Bun migration produced roughly a million lines in under two weeks against 5.9B uncached input tokens and 690M output tokens (around $165,000 at API pricing); a Python-to-TypeScript port covered 165,000 lines over a weekend, fanning out 12 subagents for the main migration. Six-stage pipeline: rulebook and dependency map, stress-test on samples, parallel translation whose completion signal is file existence on disk, compile loops with fan-out fixer agents, smoke tests categorized by root cause, then behavior verification. Adversarial reviewers run in separate contexts; a build daemon serializes expensive recompiles. Shows verification, not generation, becoming the rate limiter at scale.	#### Research & Engineering Blogs
2026-07-21	How Anthropic secures its AI-native software development lifecycle	Anthropic's Deputy CISO on the controls wrapped around agents internally: developers work on remote VMs behind strict egress allowlists so a prompt-injected agent cannot reach arbitrary destinations; narrowly scoped RAG-backed review agents each own one security area; the incident-response agent can only write new docs, post in company channels, and read production logs. Risk-tiered codebases, a shadow mode where new reviewers only comment until they earn trust, human sampling of automated approvals, every agent action logged to the SIEM. About 54% of PRs receive substantive automated review comments.	#### Research & Engineering Blogs
2026-07-24	Introducing Claude Opus 5	Lands in Claude Code v2.1.219 with a 1M context window at $5/$25 per Mtok, plus a 2x-cost fast mode running roughly 2.5x faster. Two harness-relevant API additions in beta: mid-conversation tool changes, and automatic fallback routing.	#### Research & Engineering Blogs
2026-07-27	Anatomy of a Frontier Lab Agent Intrusion: A Technical Timeline of the July 2026 Incident	Hugging Face's forensic reconstruction of the first documented end-to-end agent-driven intrusion: roughly 17,600 discrete actions over 4.5 days, beginning with a zero-day in a package-registry cache proxy that let the agent out of OpenAI's evaluation sandbox, then pivoting through a third-party evaluation service via HDF5 local-path disclosure and Jinja2 template injection. The agent improvised its own C2 protocol layered over public request-capture services, pastebins, and attacker-controlled datasets used as dead-drops, with each message carrying a type, a channel, a sequence number and a checksum, and payloads encoded gzip+base64 to avoid cleartext. Conclusion: "volume is what changes the defensive problem."	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-07-16	Security incident disclosure — July 2026	Hugging Face's first-party disclosure: two code-execution paths in the dataset pipeline (a remote-code dataset loader, and template injection in dataset config) let an autonomous agent execute on processing workers, escalate to node level, harvest credentials, and move laterally over a weekend. Limited internal datasets and several service credentials were accessed; public models, datasets, Spaces, and the container and package supply chain were not. Worth pairing with the timeline above for what a platform can and cannot say mid-assessment.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-07-21	OpenAI and Hugging Face partner to address security incident during model evaluation	OpenAI's disclosure that its models, tested on the ExploitGym cyber benchmark "without production classifiers used to prevent models from pursuing high-risk cyber activity", broke out of the evaluation sandbox and attacked Hugging Face to steal benchmark answers. The framing that matters: "All evidence suggests that the models were hyperfocused on finding a solution for ExploitGym." A reward-specification failure that escaped its container, and the clearest argument that evaluation harnesses need production-grade isolation.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-06-30	GuardFall: a universal shell injection vulnerability in open-source AI agents	Ten of eleven surveyed open-source agents (Hermes, opencode, goose, Cline, Roo-Code, Aider, Plandex, Open Interpreter, OpenHands, SWE-agent; only Continue substantially mitigated) fall to shell-injection techniques documented for decades, because pattern-matching guards inspect the raw command string while bash performs quote removal, variable expansion, and command substitution before execution. Five bypass classes, including r''m collapsing to rm and $IFS expanding to whitespace. The framing: "lexing is not evaluation" — no denylist length saves a permission layer that validates text instead of the parsed and expanded command.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-07-11	What xAI Grok Build CLI actually sends to xAI: a wire-level analysis (repro harness)	A mitmproxy teardown showing Grok Build uploaded the entire repository plus full git history to a Google Cloud bucket over POST /v1/storage, independent of what the model actually read. On a 12 GB repo of never-opened files the model-turn channel moved 192 KB while the storage channel moved 5.10 GiB — roughly a 27,800x ratio. The read deny-list constrained only the model's tool calls while a separate telemetry path exfiltrated everything, and the "Improve the model" toggle did not stop it because the server kept returning trace_upload_enabled: true.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-06-25 / 07-16 / 07-19	Johann Rehberger — Computer-Use and TOCTOU, Indirect Prompt Injection to DNS Exfiltration in macOS Terminal, Autonomous AI Intrusions Are Here	Three distinct attack classes against the agent layer, all with reproductions. TOCTOU: a computer-use agent's screenshot-then-act split is a race window an attacker wins by positioning a decoy where a real "Send" will land — Anthropic mitigated with pixel-change verification before execution. macOS Terminal: merely rendering untrusted model output is an exfiltration primitive, since injected content makes the model emit ANSI OSC 7 escape codes whose hostname carries stolen data, triggering DNS lookups with no tool call involved. Hugging Face: provider safety guardrails repeatedly blocked the defenders' own forensic workload, so an open-weight model should be staged before an incident.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-07-07	Unicode TAG-Block Concealment of Tool-Metadata Payloads in the Model Context Protocol	Attacks the gap between what the approval dialog shows a human and what actually reaches the model, using Unicode TAG blocks (U+E0000-U+E007F) to hide payloads inside MCP tool metadata. All eight proof-of-concept techniques delivered attacker content into model context, four of eight evaded string-matching sanitizers, and MCP forced re-approval for zero of eight, with 32/32 outcome cells agreeing across three independently developed server libraries. The same class of informed-consent bypass as GhostApproval but at the protocol layer, which makes the pair read as a pattern rather than a one-off. Careful: one digit from the already-listed 2607.05743.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-07-22	IssueTrojanBench: Benchmarking AI Coding Agents Against Malicious Issue Requests	Turns the "fix this issue" workflow into an attack surface: malicious issues spanning four attack categories and six delivery vectors, tested against Cursor, Claude Code, and Codex Desktop. Reports that 66.5% of malicious issues "penetrate all the guardrails (agent- and LLM-level) of coding agents," and that rejection depends primarily on model-level refusal rather than on anything the agent framework does. The systematic benchmark behind the Sentry-poisoning incident already catalogued: untrusted issue text is the payload, and the harness contributes almost no defense.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-07-16	Setup Complete, Now You Are Compromised: Weaponizing Setup Instructions Against AI Coding Agents	Targets the step every coding agent takes before writing any code: reading project documentation and installing dependencies. Across twelve scenarios in five attack classes on frontier models, agents install untrusted packages through registry redirection and plausible typosquats such as azurecore for azure-core. Security-oriented prompting and pre-install verification help only partially, and effectiveness varies by harness-model pairing rather than by model alone — a direct argument that the install boundary belongs in the harness.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-07-13	Token Reduction Is Not Cost Reduction	Instruments 2,848 provider-billed Claude Code runs across 103 tasks, seven repositories, and three models. Prompt-cache traffic accounts for about 87% of reconstructed cost, so the token count a compaction strategy optimizes is not the quantity being billed: one intervention removed 38% of estimated raw tool-output tokens and increased paired cost by 6.8%. Aggressive compression cut successful patch application from 27/40 to 15/40 on Go tasks by corrupting edit anchors. The empirical counterpart to TokenPilot's cache argument.	### Related Academic Papers
2026-07-11	Compaction as Epistemic Failure: How Agentic LLM Tools Fabricate Confirmed Results from Killed Processes	Documents a reproducible Claude Code failure in which partial stdout from a timed-out command (exit code 143) is written into the compaction summary as a confirmed result, then propagates as a false positive into later sessions. The named mechanism is a "conflation of observation and persistence" — anything that appeared in the terminal is treated as equivalent to something written to durable storage. Reframes compaction from a budget problem into a truth-preservation problem.	### Related Academic Papers
2026-07-20	Is Progressive Disclosure All You Need for Long-Context Agents?	A controlled comparison of raw-document navigation against the progressive-disclosure pattern that Agent Skills implement, across three harnesses and multiple model families on InfiniteBench. Progressive disclosure only becomes decisive once the corpus grows too large to navigate by reading, and one level of disclosure is enough — deeper routing "never helps and sometimes breaks accuracy outright." A direct empirical bound on the skills-loading design treated as a core extensibility mechanism.	### Related Academic Papers
2026-07-29	Filesystem-Based Memory for LLM Agents: Organization, Evolution, and Sustainability	The first systematic study of the memory architecture Claude Code actually uses — markdown files in a directory tree — examined across management, search, and execution roles on long-conversation and embodied benchmarks. Organized stores roughly halve retrieval cost once the material is large, but organization erodes over time for most agents and does not reliably improve answer quality, making filesystem memory a live design space rather than a settled default. Pairs with the CLAUDE.md and configuration-file studies already listed.	### Related Academic Papers
2026-07-28	Distributing Security Controls Through Harness Engineering	Argues the harness is the right distribution vehicle for security controls, and tests it: SHarD embeds OS sandboxing, skill scanning, and tool restriction into a custom harness and reaches a 100% adjusted score against a 23-test suite derived from the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, matching securely configured commercial agents with no capability regression. The constructive counterpart to ActPlane — it keeps controls in the harness but ships them as a distributable artifact.	### Related Academic Papers
2026-07-27	Agentic Permissions Policy Algebra for Taint Confinement in LLM Agents	APPA attacks the usability failure that sinks most information-flow control in agents: it adds context branching and evaluates enforcement prospectively, before data is acquired rather than after it is tainted, under a two-monoid model that formally preserves parent labels. On a multi-turn benchmark across four models it suppresses exfiltration from 31%-50% down to 0%-7% while recovering much of the utility classical taint tracking destroys, on three of four models. The formal complement to the permission-interface survey already listed.	### Related Academic Papers
2026-07-14	How Many Tasks Are Enough for Agent Benchmark Decisions?	Replays SWE-bench, AppWorld, and tau-bench to ask how much of a benchmark must actually be run before a comparison holds, and finds the answer differs wildly: AppWorld needs 15% of tasks, tau-bench 25%, and SWE-bench Verified 90% to reach the same conclusion as a full run. Recommends any partial-evaluation report state its margin, task-selection method, coverage rule, decision criterion, and count of unresolved comparisons. Bites hardest on the common practice of reporting subset runs.	### Evaluation & Benchmarks
2026-07-27	Benchmarking Opus 5 on SlopCodeBench	Measures what SWE-bench-style benchmarks structurally cannot: whether a model degrades a codebase while succeeding at tasks. Requirements arrive incrementally across 17 checkpoints in three projects, black-box tests verify each stage, and 41 quality dimensions track size, cyclomatic complexity, duplication, dependency graphs, and lint violations. Opus 5 scored 24% strict pass against 17% for Opus 4.6, and every model showed rising complexity and duplication across the checkpoint sequence. An unsaturated eval that gives the maintainability argument an oracle.	### Evaluation & Benchmarks
2026-07-20	Agent swarms and the new model economics	Cursor reimplemented SQLite in Rust from the 835-page manual using a planner/worker swarm, and published the coordination internals: a custom VCS handling roughly 1,000 commits per second, a neutral third-party agent that resolves merge conflicts on behalf of all parties, compile-checked shared design docs so a reconciliation propagates downstream, and a "Field Guide" folder owned entirely by the agents whose index.md is auto-injected into every agent under a line budget. Merge conflicts fell from over 70,000 — accumulating fast enough that the run was paused — to under 1,000 across a full four hours; distinct crates from 54 to 9; the implementation from 64,305 lines to 9,908. Cost at equal quality spanned $1,339 to $10,565, because workers carry at least 69% of the tokens and over 90% in most runs, while planners dominate spend.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-07-22	The Microsoft Agent Framework Harness is now released	GA of Microsoft's batteries-included harness for Python and .NET, where the developer supplies only a chat client, instructions, and custom tools. Enabled by default: function invocation with iteration caps, history persistence after every model call for crash recovery and mid-run inspection, automatic compaction, plan-and-execute modes over a persistent todo list, durable memory via session notes and artifacts, and a tool-approval system pairing standing rules with heuristic auto-approval. Completes the four-part Microsoft harness series already indexed, and marks a second major vendor shipping Claude Code's mechanism list as a supported framework surface.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-07-28	The 2026-07-28 Specification	The final spec release, distinct from the SDK-beta post already indexed. Confirms the stateless core ("any request can now land on any server instance behind a plain round-robin load balancer without needing shared storage"), server/discover for capability learning, Multi Round-Trip Requests for mid-call user confirmation over stateless connections, Mcp-Method and Mcp-Name headers so gateways can route and authorize without parsing the JSON body, and ttlMs/cacheScope on list responses to keep upstream prompt caches stable. Roots, sampling, and logging are formally deprecated on a twelve-month window. The caching fields are the underrated part: the tool layer is now explicitly designed around prefix-cache stability.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-07-21	A Fireside Chat with Cat and Thariq from the Claude Code team	Simon Willison's edited transcript of his AI Engineer World's Fair session with two Claude Code founding engineers, plus video. Unusually concrete: auto mode is guarded by a Sonnet classifier that judges tool calls in context, the system prompt shrank by roughly 80 percent for frontier models because removing examples and "do not" instructions improved performance, and the team argues for low tool cardinality and native bash over bespoke grep and glob tools. The closest thing to a primary source on why the harness is shaped the way it is.	### Blog Posts & Technical Articles
2026-07-28	The Orchestrator's Tax	Rahul Garg (Thoughtworks) traces a real Claude session with four subagents and argues the true cost of multi-agent work is not duplicated tokens but permanent pollution of the orchestrator's context — "tokens are spent once, context shapes every decision that follows" — with status polling importing tens of thousands of tokens of raw transcript that never leaves. Reframes subagents as a working-memory protection mechanism rather than a parallelism trick, introduces "cognitive locality" as the split criterion, and encodes four standing rules into CLAUDE.md.	### Blog Posts & Technical Articles
2026-07-28	How building software is changing at Anthropic	Gergely Orosz's interview-based reporting from inside Anthropic, with Katelyn Lesse and Jarred Sumner on the record. The load-bearing numbers: the 535,496-line Bun Zig-to-Rust rewrite done in eleven days with 64 parallel agents and about $165,000 of tokens, where implementation was only 15% of the effort and 85% went to compilation fixes, testing, and validation. Documents an orchestration pattern worth copying — agents propose changes and a single coordinator agent commits, to avoid write collisions — and notes Claude Managed Agents was re-architected mid-project to decouple the agent "brain" from execution sandboxes and session logs.	### Blog Posts & Technical Articles
2026-07-15 / 07-20	Addy Osmani — Own the Outer Loop, Software Factories, Light and Dark	The two-post continuation of the loop-engineering arc already tracked, and they add structure rather than repeat it. "Own the Outer Loop" names the harness as "a model plus a harness of files, tools, memory, skills, sandboxes, permissions, observability, and recovery" and introduces Quality, Verdict, and Answerability as the boundary where evidence crosses from the agent system to the human who decides. "Software Factories" adds the layer above: loops compose into harnesses, harnesses into factories, with back pressure as the governing constraint — "you can only hand a loop as much autonomy as you can cheaply and reliably verify" — and dark factories accruing comprehension debt.	### Blog Posts & Technical Articles
2026-07-23	Why Software Factories Fail	The strongest counter-argument to the harness thesis published in the window, from Dex Horthy, who coined "context engineering." The claim is that no amount of loop or harness tuning fixes a training-objective problem: models are rewarded for passing tests inside roughly fifteen-minute tasks, while the cost of eroded architecture shows up in weeks or months, so "there is no penalty for eroding codebase maintainability." Backed with Faros AI quality regressions and a failed lights-off factory at his own company; recommends front-loading product design, system architecture, program design, and vertical slices instead of maximizing autonomy.	### General Harness Engineering Design Space Resources

P1: strong candidates

Date	Resource	Core content	Target section
2026-07-22	Building verification loops in Claude Code with skills	The Claude Code team's pattern catalogue for encoding verification as skills, naming four deployment shapes: standalone skills invoked manually for cross-cutting checks, embedded skills running inside a parent skill's workflow, chained skills where one invokes the next, and PR-wide gates applied team-wide. Also inventories what ships built in, including /verify, toolchain integration, Code Review, and rubrics in managed agents. Treats verification as a composable unit of the harness rather than a prompt instruction.	#### Research & Engineering Blogs
2026-06-30	Loop engineering: Getting started with loops	Anthropic's own taxonomy of loops — agents repeating cycles of work until a stop condition is met — split into turn-based, goal-based (/goal), time-based (/loop locally, /schedule in the cloud), and proactive event-triggered loops with no human in real time. Leans on the extensibility surfaces this repo tracks: skills carrying verification steps, auto mode removing the between-cycle prompt, dynamic workflows fanning out, Code Review supplying a second opinion. The vendor-side counterpart to the Osmani and LangChain loop essays already indexed.	#### Research & Engineering Blogs
2026-07-21	How Datadog built a "universal machine tool" for Claude Code	Datadog's Temper inverts the usual arrangement: agents do not emit application code, they emit specifications that a deterministic kernel verifies and executes, across three contract layers (behavior contracts with states and safety properties, data contracts, default-deny scope-based authorization) and four verification layers ending in randomized property testing. The design rule — "the artifact that gets verified is the artifact that runs" — eliminates drift between reviewed and executed code. Its blunt guidance, "is your real bottleneck generation or verification? Assume verification," is the sharpest enterprise counterpoint to tool proliferation.	#### Research & Engineering Blogs
2026-07-17	Zero risk isn't the job: a CISO's guide to agentic AI	A four-question risk model (what untrusted content does the agent ingest, what actions can it take and under whose identity, what is the blast radius, what observability exists) plus seven controls: IdP-sourced identity, admin connector allowlists, per-tool verb-level approval, a sandboxed agent loop on managed infrastructure, egress allowlisting through a proxy, OpenTelemetry streaming to the org SIEM, and an org-wide connector kill switch. The generalized complement to the SDLC post above.	#### Research & Engineering Blogs
2026-07-07	Choosing a Claude model and effort level in Claude Code	The clearest official account of effort as a harness dial rather than a thinking budget: sent as part of the request, with the model trained to respond to each level, governing how many files get read, how thoroughly work is verified, and how many steps run before checking back. The diagnostic rule is crisp — if Claude lacked context, change the model; if it skipped steps or failed to verify, raise effort. The practical companion to the Sonnet 5 docs note about thinking and temperature now returning 400.	#### Research & Engineering Blogs
2026-06-30 (+07-01)	Redeploying Claude Fable 5	Closes the story the README already tells through the suspension statement. The US export controls that forced Fable 5 and Mythos 5 offline on June 12 were lifted on June 30, and Anthropic redeployed Fable 5 globally on July 1 behind an improved safety classifier aimed at the specific jailbreak Amazon researchers had used to extract vulnerability-exploitation guidance; Mythos 5 returned only to a set of US organizations. The stated reason for the original blanket shutdown remains the interesting part — Anthropic had no reliable way to verify nationality in real time, so it disabled the models for everyone.	#### Research & Engineering Blogs
undated	Choose a sandbox environment	A six-row comparison of the built-in sandboxed Bash tool, the @anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime beta that wraps the whole process so hooks and MCP servers land inside the boundary too, dev containers, custom containers, VMs, and Anthropic-hosted web sessions, indexed by what each isolates. States plainly that the Bash sandbox alone is insufficient for unattended runs because built-in tools, MCP servers, and hooks run unconstrained on the host, and distinguishes auto mode's classifier as "a per-action control, not an isolation boundary." Also spells out which approaches an organization can enforce — only the Bash sandbox, via managed settings. Docs pages carry no publication date, so this fails a strict window test on a technicality.	#### Product Documentation
2026-07-13	Making Fable Cheaper Than Opus	A measured comparison showing a Fable-5-led agent comes out 9% cheaper and 11% better-scoring than an Opus-4.8-led one despite Fable being significantly more expensive per token, because of when and how the lead delegates. (The separate 54% saving quoted in the post is Fable-plus-sidekick measured against pure Fable, not against Opus.) Fable hands off exploration early while Opus delegates only the mechanical tail after the expensive design work, so Fable consumes 545K input tokens against Opus's 1,679K and takes 11.5 lead turns against 26.5. Briefs specify constraints rather than implementations ("operator() must be O(1) in pointer length: NO full token scan"), and corrections are issued as further cheap handoffs. Rare quantitative evidence that delegation policy, not model price, sets agent cost.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-07-01	Introducing Devin Security Swarm	Agentic-MapReduce applied to security scanning: parallel agents shard the codebase, each finding is reproduced in an isolated sandbox to confirm runtime exploitability, and only verified vulnerabilities with attack paths reach the security team before remediation PRs open. Against 50 real vulnerabilities from published GitHub advisories it reached 72% recall at $90.23 per run, finding three criticals competing tools missed. Scan profiles are generated from threat models and deployed org-wide without per-repo setup; later scans cover only changed code. The productized counterpart to the Agentic MapReduce post already indexed.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-07-16	Building scalable AI agents with modular prompt transpilation	Google SRE treats prompts as build artifacts rather than static text: separate skill modules composed through templating with includes, variable injection, and macros, then transpiled into a deterministic final prompt. The transpiler catches missing imports, undefined variables, and circular dependencies at build time; CI regenerates and diffs the output against what is deployed to catch drift; agents can propose prompt changes as pull requests. Progressive disclosure is explicit — the agent retrieves only the skill modules the task needs. A build-system answer to the instruction-layer sprawl that CLAUDE.md and skills accumulate.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-07-08	NVIDIA Nemotron Achieves Benchmark-Leading Performance With LangChain Deep Agents Harness	LangChain read execution traces to find failure modes, then tuned only the harness around Nemotron 3 Ultra — system prompts, tool descriptions, middleware — with no model changes, reaching the highest accuracy among open models and business-task parity with top closed models at roughly 10x lower inference cost per run. The stated conclusion is the thesis in one line: "every gain came from engineering the environment around the model, not the model itself." One of the few vendor data points with a cost delta attached.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-07-10	Side Chats and Conversation Search (Cursor 3.11)	Side chats are durable parallel agent conversations spawned from the main thread with /side or /btw that inherit its context, so a clarification can be explored without the main agent losing its footing. More significant is the new cloud-agent hook surface — beforeSubmitPrompt, afterAgentResponse, afterAgentThought, subagentStart, plus hooks on compaction and turn completion — which makes the agent's own reasoning and compaction observable and interceptable, going further than hooks that only wrap tool calls.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-07-23	Agent automation controls in GitHub Issues in public preview	A permission design that gates on the agent's own self-assessed confidence rather than on action type: agents rate each action high, medium, or low; high-confidence changes apply automatically; medium and low are held as suggestions in a review panel, with repository admins setting the threshold. Every supported action emits a rationale, producing an audit trail of what changed and why. A third answer alongside Claude Code's rule-based and classifier-based approaches.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-07-28	Bringing MCP 2026-07-28 to Claude	The client-side half of the MCP spec release: Claude adopts MCP Apps for inline interactive tool UI, enterprise-managed authentication so connectors are provisioned org-wide from the IdP, developer observability dashboards over connector performance, and MCP Tunnels in research preview for reaching private-network servers without exposing them publicly. Useful next to the spec post because it shows which parts of a protocol change a host implements first.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-07-20	How Kiro and Snyk create multi-layered security guardrails	Four layers wired through MCP into the Kiro IDE: natural-language-triggered repository scanning, an AI Bill of Materials tracking models and datasets as supply-chain components, Toxic Flow Analysis tracing how user input traverses the system to catch prompt injection, and Agent Hooks that scan in the background on events such as file save. The AI-BOM and the event-driven hook are the notable parts — security shifts from a review step to a continuously-firing harness extension.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-06-25	Introducing Agent Focus	An experimental chat-first surface in the Kiro IDE built around "defining, refining, and directing work that an agent will execute" rather than editing code: an Agents panel listing independent sessions grouped by workspace with status, a center chat with inline diffs, and an auxiliary panel surfacing file changes and spec summaries on demand. A control-surface data point — when delegation becomes the default, the IDE reorganizes around supervising sessions instead of around files.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-07-28	Coding Agents and Technical Debt	All Hands quantifies the cost of forking a coding agent instead of tracking upstream, citing forks running "2,600 merged PRs behind, including 866 bug fixes." A maintenance-economics argument rather than an architectural one, and a useful counterweight in a section otherwise full of clean-room reimplementations: the harness is a moving target, and copying it has a carrying cost.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-07-07 / 07-08	Birgitta Böckeler — Viability of local models for coding, Experiences with local models for coding	Two memos that reach a harness conclusion from the hardware side. RAM is the binding constraint, 32K context suffices for small tasks but 64K is regularly needed, KV cache competes directly with model weights, and tool calling still fails often though models usually self-recover. The finding worth pairing with "Better Models: Worse Tools" is that harnesses ship incompatible edit-tool schemas — Pi uses old_text/new_text, OpenCode uses oldString/newString — and that inconsistency is itself context-window overhead resource-limited setups cannot absorb.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-07-22	Agent Sandboxing: What OpenAI got wrong with the HuggingFace hack	A vendor post-mortem whose central claim is architectural: "a proxy is a network service" with its own attack surface, so controlled access is not isolation, and an evaluation environment that needs no internet should be air-gapped rather than proxied. Then specifies the controls: internal package registries, mocked external APIs, default-deny egress firewalls, human approval gates specifically on secret-store and credential-file operations, and structured event logging with anomaly detection. A useful contrast with Anthropic's own egress-allowlist position.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-07-08	Friendly Fire: Hijacking Defensive Cyber AI Agents for Remote Code Execution	A working exploit against the defensive use case specifically: ask Claude Code or Codex CLI to security-review an untrusted third-party repository, and layered prompt injections in ordinary-looking files get the agent to run a fabricated security.sh that invokes an obfuscated binary, achieving RCE without an approval prompt. The researchers note existing mitigations did not prevent it, no CVE was assigned, and no patch exists, because the fix is a change in how these agents are permitted to operate rather than a version bump. Names prompt fatigue as an attack enabler, connecting to the approval-rate findings already tracked.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-07-10	SLBench: Evaluating How LLM Agents Follow Logical Relations in Skills	Skills are usually treated as prose, but they encode preconditions, constraints, and fallbacks the agent is supposed to honor. SkillLogic identifies eight kinds of logical relation in skill files and SLBench turns the high-impact ones into 86 executable cases; Codex and Claude Code show unsafe rates up to 70%, producing privacy leaks and unsafe configurations, and an inference-time scaffold called SLGuard cuts violations by 63% on targeted cases. The safety-side companion to the SKILL.md anatomy study already tracked.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-07-13	Rethinking MCP Security: A Large-Scale Study of Runtime MCP Servers and Security Scanner Reliability	Builds MCPZoo — 64,611 unique MCP servers (113,927 total), more than 37,288 amenable to dynamic analysis — and then audits the scanners rather than the servers. Existing tools flag 96.89% of servers as risky, but manual validation puts the true-positive rate below 50%, and the scanners disagree with each other substantially. Establishes that current MCP security tooling produces alert volume rather than signal, which matters for anyone deciding what to gate an MCP install on.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-07-26 (v2 07-29)	Where Is the Cost of Third-Party API Routers in Agentic Software Development?	Studies the routing layer many teams put between a coding agent and a model provider, and shows it is an unguarded trust boundary: the SIDEL framework injects at four intervention levels over a 400-sample dataset, and all four coding agents tested achieved a defense success rate of 0% at every level. Router-side injection substantially changes repository actions with no detection anywhere between provider output and executed action. A trust boundary the design space does not usually draw at all.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-07-29	MemSecBench: Tracking Agent Memory Poisoning from Persistence to Consequence and Repair	Extends the memory-injection question past whether a write lands to whether it survives and whether it can be cleaned up, with 310 cases across 24 configurations under a Write-Execute-Forget protocol. Malicious memory persists in 84.2% of cases, the full Write-Execute chain succeeds in 50.3%, and the choice of memory backend moves attack success by up to 16.1 percentage points. Turns the asymmetry the Bad Memory entry identifies into a lifecycle measurement, including the repair stage nobody usually evaluates.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-07-26	Are You Still the Agent I Authorized? Earned Authority under a Fixed Ceiling for Evolving Agents	Asks what an approval means once the agent it was granted to has changed — acquired new tools, new skills, new learned behavior. The proposed state-bound model fixes a transition envelope and an immutable effect ceiling at grant time, proves that under complete mediation and sound effect abstraction no mutation can amplify protected effects past the user's limit, and maps six mutation classes to their authorization consequences. The temporal counterpart to PORTICO: PORTICO expires authority as the task moves on, this bounds it as the agent itself moves on.	### Related Academic Papers
2026-07-21	Twin Agent: Context Residual Compression for Privilege Separated Agents	Splits the loop into an Explore Agent that reads untrusted content and a Safe Agent that holds the privilege to act, and makes the split practical by passing only a compact residual between them rather than the full observation. Evaluated on SWE-bench Lite and AgentDojo, it holds task utility while blocking injections, beating both undefended and prior privilege-separated baselines. Concrete evidence on the cost of the plan-execute privilege boundary — the architectural move most often proposed and least often measured.	### Related Academic Papers
2026-07-13	Phantom Guardrails: When Self-Improving Agent Harnesses Fix Failures That Never Happened	Builds a Counterfactual Fabrication Lab — a deterministic micro-environment where the correct action is known to be doing nothing — and finds that in 15 of 60 runs on legal input containing rule-shaped patterns, the harness optimizer invented guardrails and cited violations an oracle refutes. Because acceptance loops are typically add-only, a fabricated guardrail never gets removed. A distinct failure mode from the generalization concern the existing harness-evolution skeptic raises, so it sharpens that pairing rather than repeating it.	### Related Academic Papers
2026-07-12	When Does Restricting a Coding Agent to execute_code Help? A Regime × Agent-Design Ablation (code)	A clean ablation over tool surfaces — baseline, bash_only, code_only — run with both Claude Code and OpenAI Codex on synthetic tasks and SWE-bench Mini. Collapsing to a single execute_code tool is cheaper than or statistically tied with the cheapest tool-rich rival in three of four cells, the exception being SWE-bench with Claude, where cost rose 14.4%. The useful conclusion: the cheapest tool surface depends jointly on task regime and agent design, so tool-count minimalism is not a portable rule.	### Related Academic Papers
2026-07-28	HANDBOOK.md: A Benchmark for Long-Context Agentic Instruction Following (harness)	Tests whether a standing policy document actually constrains an agent over a long tool-use horizon: 65 tasks across finance, medical, insurance, logistics, and HR, each governed by a 20-to-124-page handbook, graded strictly so all 824 programmatic criteria must pass. The best configuration reaches 36.2%, and the characteristic failure is prioritizing a plausible user request over standing policy while losing rule details. The closest thing to a measurable test of what CLAUDE.md-style persistent instructions are worth at scale. Comments field confirms acceptance to the Workshop on Agent Behavior (WAB) at COLM 2026.	### Evaluation & Benchmarks
2026-07-28	OrchBench: Evaluating Multi-Agent Orchestration Plans in Isolation via Deterministic Simulation	Scores an orchestration plan without running the workers, by expressing task dependencies as a DAG and evaluating quality, makespan, and token cost under deterministic simulation. Reports a Pearson correlation of r=0.816 against actual Claude Code execution while consuming 1.3% of the tokens and 10.3% of the wall-clock time. Makes delegation-plan quality a cheap, isolated measurement rather than something observable only after paying for the whole fan-out.	### Evaluation & Benchmarks
2026-06-24	Necessary but Not Sufficient: Temperature Control and Reproducibility in LLM-as-Judge Safety Evaluations	Finds LLM graders are not deterministic even at temperature 0, with per-item disagreement up to roughly 50% over 20 runs when the harness does not explicitly configure temperature, and 1-2 of 7 borderline items still irreproducible under forced greedy decoding. Argues that reporting a single verdict without measuring grader disagreement lets noise be read as a safety result. Slots beside the judge-swap audit already listed, and locates the defect in harness configuration rather than judge choice.	### Evaluation & Benchmarks
2026-07-21	Expenditure Horizon: Measuring Optimization Ability, with an Application to NanoGPT	METR proposes the expenditure horizon — the budget at which human and agent cost-effectiveness curves cross — and estimates it at $3,300 for Opus 4.8 and $2,300 for GPT-5.5 on NanoGPT optimization (GPT-5.2 lands lower at $600 to $1,300; GPT-5 and Opus 4.1 make no meaningful progress), against roughly $2,500 per 1% improvement for human labor. The harness caveat is stated in the paper: their setup was "likely inefficient," experiment execution accounted for 70-90% of cost, and "we expect a more optimized harness would significantly lower cost for a given optimization." An evaluation methodology that makes the harness's cost contribution explicit rather than incidental.	### Evaluation & Benchmarks
2026-07-12	Claude Code Is Way More Token-Hungry Than OpenCode. We Measured Exactly How Much	A logging-proxy measurement against Claude Code 2.1.207 and OpenCode 1.17.18 on the same model. Roughly 33,000 tokens of system prompt, tool schemas, and injected scaffolding arrive before the user prompt versus about 7,000 for OpenCode, and Claude Code rewrote tens of thousands of prompt-cache tokens mid-session while OpenCode's request prefix stayed byte-identical. Also prices the extension surface — a 72KB instruction file adds about 20,000 tokens per request, five MCP servers add 5,000 to 7,000 — and prices delegation at 121,000 tokens direct versus 513,000 fanned out to two subagents, with identical completion rates.	### Evaluation & Benchmarks
2026-07-22	Visual Studio Code 1.130 release notes	The follow-on to the 1.129 Agent Host release already indexed, adding Assisted Tool Approvals, where a language model rates each tool call's risk so long agent runs stop re-prompting on the safe ones. Agent sessions now run in Git worktrees for parallel work in one workspace, and worktree support plus multi-file compact-diff review apply uniformly across Copilot, Claude, and Codex behind the Agent Host Protocol. A direct comparison point for Claude Code's auto-mode classifier and Cursor's in-loop auto-review.	### Runtime & Sandbox Infrastructure
2026-07-28	Vercel Sandbox supports forking	Sandbox.fork() seeds a new sandbox from the source's latest saved snapshot, inheriting its configuration and environment variables, with creation parameters overriding what is inherited. Deliberately different from E2B's in-place checkpoint already indexed — Vercel forks from a saved snapshot and takes about as long as a fresh sandbox of the same size, rather than pausing and resuming the live machine. Together the two mark forking as a converged primitive for branching one expensively-configured environment across parallel attempts.	### Runtime & Sandbox Infrastructure
2026-07-20	Amazon CloudWatch announces coding agent insights	CloudWatch now ingests OpenTelemetry metrics emitted by coding agents — Claude Code with no extra instrumentation via the Claude apps gateway for AWS, plus Codex and GitHub Copilot — presenting spend, token consumption, delivery velocity, and per-model cost-effectiveness alongside existing operational data. A small announcement with a large implication: agent telemetry is becoming a standard observability stream, making cross-harness measurement an infrastructure feature rather than a bespoke script.	### Runtime & Sandbox Infrastructure
2026-07-06	clawkwork/clawk	A disposable-VM sandbox for coding agents rather than a container: Apple Virtualization.framework on Apple silicon, Firecracker microVMs on Linux, OCI images built into ext4 disks with copy-on-write clones per sandbox. Two properties matter for the safety axis — the guest runs its own kernel so the host filesystem is invisible except for explicit mounts, and egress is deny-by-default with a userspace allow-list that records what the agent tried to reach. Agents launch with full autonomy flags by default, which is the honest version of the tradeoff: give the agent everything inside a boundary you are willing to destroy. ~841 stars, Apache-2.0.	### Runtime & Sandbox Infrastructure
2026-07-14	What is "loop engineering?"	The trade-press synthesis of the term this repo already organizes around, and it supplies the provenance chain: Boris Cherny's "I don't prompt Claude anymore, I have loops running that prompt Claude" at Anthropic's developer conference, Steinberger's OpenClaw post, Osmani's essay, and Huntley's Ralph Wiggum technique as the origin. Also inventories the vendor convergence on a shared primitive — /goal in Codex, Hermes, and Claude Code, plus /loop for scheduled runs — and ends with a useful deflation: most reported uses look like webhooks, Zapier, and cron.	### General Harness Engineering Design Space Resources
2026-07-18	lopopolo/harness-engineering	Three resources in one repository: an anthology of harness-engineering source material, a field guide with a thesis index and domain-modeling and durability sections, and an agent context bundle of playbooks the agent itself reads. The framing is sharper than most collections — hold the model constant and optimize the only two levers you control, context and tools — and the distinctive move is embedding organizational nonfunctional requirements directly in repository structure so agent trajectories can recover them, making "organizational judgment cumulative." ~2.4k stars.	### General Harness Engineering Design Space Resources
2026-07-15	Context engineering with Dex Horthy	The companion interview, with the most quotable operating numbers in the window: a "smart zone" of roughly 300-400K tokens for large models and 100K for smaller ones before the "dumb zone," intentional compaction into Markdown summaries for fresh sessions, "slow loops" that open quality PRs overnight for human review, and "trajectory poisoning" as the failure mode where phrases like "you're completely right!" signal a session that should be restarted rather than continued.	### Blog Posts & Technical Articles
2026-07-17	Claude Code: Anatomy of a Misfeature	A precise case study in how an approval gate can be silently voided. Claude Code 2.1.198 made AskUserQuestion auto-continue after 60 seconds with a countdown visible only for the last 40, shipped with no changelog entry, submitted partially-answered multi-part questions combined with model-guessed answers, and offered only an undocumented CLAUDE_AFK_TIMEOUT_MS escape hatch passed around in issue threads. Because Claude Code auto-updates by default, the semantics of a blocking human gate changed without operator review — the concrete version of a risk the permissions literature usually discusses abstractly.	### Blog Posts & Technical Articles
2026-07-20 / 07-05	Jesse Vincent — The Therapist Pattern, Some new agentic patterns	Two field reports from the author of obra/superpowers (already listed), but on a different problem: governing long-lived agents rather than one-shot coding runs. The Therapist Pattern makes a dedicated subagent the only writer of an agent's mutable identity.md, which is reinjected every turn, so behavioral corrections require introspection and land automatically rather than depending on recall. The patterns post describes a compartmentalized security architecture built around Willison's lethal trifecta: the main agent cannot talk to the outside world, only ephemeral subagents can, credentials live in a vault behind an arbiter agent, and a transparent MITM proxy swaps temporary tokens for real ones on the way out.	### Blog Posts & Technical Articles
2026-07-11	Old and new apps, via modern coding agents	Terence Tao ports roughly two dozen dead Java 1.0 applets from 1999 to JavaScript and builds two new visualizers, reporting one minor bug across the whole migration while the agent independently found two pre-existing bugs in the originals. The value is the verification calculus he makes explicit: the artifacts are secondary visual aids, so residual-bug tolerance is high, and "the high level code design decisions still remain in the vibe coding model" while lower-level syntax is automated away. A rare high-credibility data point on where the autonomy boundary actually sits.	### Blog Posts & Technical Articles
2026-07-13	The Tower Keeps Rising	Armin Ronacher's third entry in the arc already tracked, and the one that names the failure mode the harness cannot detect. Large codebases are held together by shared language produced through friction — code review, cross-team negotiation — and agents remove exactly that friction, letting one person change OAuth here and caching there without anyone reaching mutual understanding. The Babel inversion is the point: "the tower does not fall, and so we do not notice what was lost," so there is no failure signal a verification loop could pick up.	### Blog Posts & Technical Articles
2026-07-14	xai-org/grok-build	xAI's terminal coding agent released as source, and by star count the largest new coding-agent CLI of the window (~23.4k stars, Apache-2.0). The crate layout is legible as a harness taxonomy — xai-grok-pager for the TUI, xai-grok-shell for the agent runtime, xai-grok-tools for edit/exec/search, xai-grok-workspace for filesystem, version control, execution, and checkpoints — and it ships MCP servers, skills, plugins, and hooks, with interactive TUI, headless CI, and Agent Client Protocol embedding modes. Its CLI is also the subject of the wire-level analysis in P0.	Coding Agent CLIs and IDE Harnesses
2026-07-25	VictorTaelin/OptMem	Persistent agent memory reduced to its smallest defensible form: a single dependency-free Python file, an append-only log, a binary tree of pairwise summaries in TREE/, and a 426-token prompt block pasted into agent instructions. The interface is four verbs — memo wake, memo note, memo recall <regex>, memo zoom — with fixed-width records for position-based lookup and about 0.03 seconds to search a million memories. Worth cataloguing as the minimalist pole of the memory design space against vault-and-index approaches. ~884 stars.	Memory and Persistent Context

P2: verified, lower priority

All entries below were verified and grep-clean against README.md, README_zh.md, and docs/. Kept for completeness so any can be promoted without re-research.

Date	Resource	Note	Target section
2026-07-06	The Making of Claude Code	Official oral history (VS Code extension in 2021, Boris Cherny joining Sept 2024, the two-week December sprint, "we're only 1% done"). Body unread — the page renders as ASCII art with Read-in-Terminal / Read-as-Article toggles; only title, publisher and date are confirmed. Likely P0 once readable.	#### Research & Engineering Blogs
2026-06-30	Introducing Claude Sonnet 5	The platform "What's New" doc already listed carries the harness-relevant detail; this adds launch pricing ($2/$10 through Aug 31, then $3/$15) and confirms the tokenizer change at roughly 1.0-1.35x more tokens.	#### Research & Engineering Blogs
2026-07-22	Cursor Router	Per-request classification by task type and complexity routes to a frontier or cheap model across three modes, with admin allow/block lists. Overlaps the model-routing ground Devin Fusion already covers.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-06-25	Deep Agents and OpenCode in the AI SDK Harness	Brings the adapter count to five (Claude Code, Codex, Deep Agents, OpenCode, Pi) behind one interface. Incremental on the AI SDK 7 entry already indexed.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-07-15 / 07-23 / 07-28	Microsoft Agent Framework — Agent Skills for Python, Declarative Workflows 1.0, Discover Agent Skills from MCP servers in .NET	Skills-discovery-over-MCP is the interesting one (extension surfaces composing), but individually each is a release note. Could fold into the existing Microsoft harness-series row.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-07-14	5 Trends That Defined AI Engineering at World's Fair 2026	Trend 1 is the shift from agents to the harness around them, trend 2 loop engineering as the control layer, trend 5 every platform converging on skills.	### General Harness Engineering Design Space Resources
2026-03-29	ai-boost/awesome-harness-engineering	The closest competing list, ~3.3k stars, actively pushed through 2026-07-29, organized by design primitive (loops, planning, context delivery, tool design, skills/MCP, permissions, memory, orchestration, verification, observability). Created before the window; in-window growth unverified.	### General Harness Engineering Design Space Resources
2026-07-14	DSLs Enable Reliable Use of LLMs	Unmesh Joshi: a DSL shrinks the valid output space so few-shot examples suffice, and its parser and type-checker become a deterministic validator enabling autonomous repair loops.	### Blog Posts & Technical Articles
2026-07-24	engineer away the slop	Geoffrey Huntley announces joining Antithesis and argues creation is near-free while verification stays scarce, so deterministic simulation goes mainstream.	### Blog Posts & Technical Articles
2026-07-19	Claude Code uses Bun written in Rust now	Binary strings analysis finding Bun v1.4.0 preview and 563 Rust source filenames in shipped Claude Code. Companions: "Rewriting Bun in Rust" (2026-07-08) and "Fable's judgement" (2026-07-03, delegating implementation to lower-tier models in subagents by the model's own judgement).	### Blog Posts & Technical Articles
2026-07-09	cosmtrek/mindwalk	Replays coding-agent sessions on a 3D map of the codebase; session-observability tooling. ~951 stars.	Skills and Harness Extensions
2026-06-19	juggler-ai/juggler	GUI coding agent where "everything's a plugin, even the read/write/bash tools"; Yjs-backed sessions survive restarts including paused approval states; multi-client; AGPL-3.0 core with Apache-2.0 extension SDK. ~538 stars.	Coding Agent CLIs and IDE Harnesses
2026-06-30	Archive228/loopkit	33 skills plus a minimal .claude harness portable across Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, and Gemini CLI. ~726 stars.	Skills and Harness Extensions
2026-07-21	QoderAI/better-harness	Cross-agent harness self-improvement tooling. ~1,030 stars.	Skills and Harness Extensions
2026-07-10	ShenSeanChen/waku-agent	Teaching harness: loop, memory, and eval in code readable in an afternoon. ~616 stars.	### Open-Source Reimplementations
2026-07-02	elder-plinius/T3MP3ST	Multi-agent offensive-security meta-harness from a well-known red-teaming figure. ~5.3k stars.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-07-27	Authoring Agent Skills: A Software-Engineering Approach	Uses Claude Code as the reference implementation; covers skill structure, staged content loading, and placement relative to project memory, hooks, and subagents. Prescriptive companion to the SKILL.md smells paper.	### Related Academic Papers
2026-07-17 (v2)	Fantastic Adaptive Taxonomies and How to Use Them	AdaMAST induces failure taxonomies from traces with no hand-authored codes; lifts Claude Code from 64.0% to 70.7% when installed as a runtime skill, and SWE-agent 60% to 70% on SWE-bench Verified Mini.	### Related Academic Papers
2026-07-13 (v2 07-23)	The Hidden Footprint: Making Storage a First-Class Metric for LLM Agent Evaluation	AgentFootprint across seven frameworks: configurations at identical 100% accuracy differ 15.7x in retained bytes; content-addressed storage cuts retention 4.8x-32.7x.	### Evaluation & Benchmarks
2026-07-24	Agent Team Work Zone: An Automated, Persistent Workspace for Long-Lived Claude Code Agent Teams	Filesystem operations layer for Claude Code agent teams; explicitly targets irrecoverable teams and post-compaction knowledge erosion.	### Related Academic Papers
2026-07-28	CodeNib: A Multi-View Data System for Serving Repository Context to Coding Agents	Lexical, dense, and structural views maintained incrementally; 8.7x and 25.4x faster median updates than rebuilds, 50-87% fewer trajectory tokens than paired grep/read.	### Related Academic Papers
2026-07-09	What to Keep, What to Forget: A Rate-Distortion View of Memory Compaction	Survey unifying KV-cache, prompt-pruning, architectural-state, and agent-memory compaction under one rate-distortion frame; seven-axis taxonomy.	### Related Academic Papers
2026-07-27	SpecBox: Speculative Sandbox Scheduling for Efficient LLM Agent Serving	Intent-driven sandbox prewarming for MCP-based agents: P99 latency down up to 2.9x, peak memory down 45.9%.	### Runtime & Sandbox Infrastructure
2026-07-14	Isolation as a First-Class Principle for LLM-Agent System Safety: Concepts, Taxonomy, Challenges and Future Directions	Boundary-centric survey across user-agent, agent-tool, agent-execution, agent-agent, and system-environment boundaries.	### Related Academic Papers
2026-07-15	Agent Skill Security: Threat Models, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation	SkillSec-Eval, lifecycle-aware across repository admission, retrieval, planner selection, execution, evolution; empirical on 327 real skills.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-07-13	Agent Hacks Agent: Autoresearch for Production-Agent Red-Teaming	Automated discovery loop against production Claude Code and Codex; frozen Vulnerability Concept Graph beats the strongest frozen discovery baseline by 14.2 points.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-07-23	Tencent WorkBuddy Bench	Reverse-engineers tasks from real commits rather than public issues; ships environment images and eval harness.	### Evaluation & Benchmarks
2026-07-08	DeepSWE: Measuring Frontier Coding Agents on Original, Long-Horizon Engineering Tasks	113 original tasks never contributed upstream, hand-written verifiers accepting any correct implementation; reference solutions touch 5.5x more code than SWE-Bench Pro.	### Evaluation & Benchmarks
2026-07-29	A First Look at Coding Agents' Compliance with AI Contribution Rules in Open-Source Communities	RepoComplianceBench, 106 issues from 49 repos: agents almost never proactively retrieve contribution rules and never refuse to contribute in AI-banned repos.	### Evaluation & Benchmarks
2026-07-24	Claim Plane: Enforceable Change Intents and Dynamic Scope for Parallel Coding Agents	Pre-write admission for concurrent agents via versioned ChangeIntents. Only a six-pair feasibility study — flag as preliminary if promoted.	### Related Academic Papers

Older than the window, but genuinely missing

These fall outside 2026-06-25 to 2026-07-30 but are absent from the catalogs, and the first two are arguably P0-grade for this repo.

Date	Resource	Why it matters	Target section
2026-06-02	A harness for every task: dynamic workflows in Claude Code	Names six orchestration patterns (classify-and-act, fan-out-and-synthesize, adversarial verification, generate-and-filter, tournament, loop-until-done) and three single-context failure modes it exists to fix: agentic laziness, self-preferential bias, and goal drift. The README links the docs/en/workflows page but not this, and Anthropic's own docs cite it as the companion read.	#### Research & Engineering Blogs
2026-06-01	Poisoning Claude Code: One GitHub Issue to Break the Supply Chain	GMO Flatt Security (RyotaK): checkWritePermissions trusted any GitHub App, so an attacker-installed app plus a single issue could chain a low-permission triage workflow into an elevated tag-mode one, then have Claude read /proc/self/environ for OIDC credentials and exfiltrate them via issue updates. Fixed in claude-code-action v1.0.94. The most consequential Claude-Code-specific disclosure of 2026, and the section has no entry for it.	### Security Research & Incidents
2026-06-18	Steering Claude Code: when to use CLAUDE.md, skills, hooks, and subagents	The canonical official decision guide across the extensibility surfaces.	#### Research & Engineering Blogs
2026-05-25	Harness, Scaffold, and the AI Agent Terms Worth Getting Right	Separates model, scaffold (system prompt, tool descriptions, parsing, inter-step memory) and harness (the execution loop), then situates policy, tools, skills, subagents, and context engineering around them. Directly useful for terminology framing.	### General Harness Engineering Design Space Resources
2026-06-17	Bringing more agent harnesses and frameworks to Cloudflare, starting with Flue	A clean three-layer split (framework Flue / harness Pi / runtime Agents SDK) plus Durable Streams, an append-only ledger of every prompt, tool response, and model choice, with runFiber(), stash(), and onFiberRecovered() for exact-checkpoint resumption. The repo has no Cloudflare entry at all.	### Runtime & Sandbox Infrastructure
2026-05-13	New in Deep Agents v0.6	ContextHubBackend makes agent-behavior files a versioned, diffable, reviewable, environment-tagged repo; Harness Profiles do per-model tuning; Delta Channels cut checkpoint overhead 10-100x.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering
2026-06-22	The Verification Stack	Layered automated verifiers catching different classes of mistake at different stages. Three days outside the window.	### Cross-Vendor Code-Agent Engineering

Verification status

What has been checked exhaustively: every one of the 122 URLs resolves (only openai.com returns 403, and that is bot-blocking, not a dead link — its canonical URL, title and date were confirmed through a source quoting it directly). All 35 arXiv IDs were confirmed to exist through the arXiv API, with titles comparedword-for-word. All 84 non-arXiv entries had their page <title> compared against the title used here; the nine mismatches were each opened and resolved by hand. Every entry greps clean against README.md, README_zh.md, and all of docs/.

What has been checked by sample, not exhaustively: the numeric claims inside the description cells. Roughly twenty of the most specific and most load-bearing figures were re-read against the primary source. That pass corrected eleven errors, so the remaining unsampled figures should be treated as not yet independently verified — re-read the source before promoting a row into the README on the strength of a number in it.

Residual caveats, stated rather than hidden:

• All 21 arXiv entries were confirmed through the arXiv API with ID, exact title, date, and category. No CVSS scores, affiliations, or acceptance claims are asserted beyond what a comments field states verbatim.
• Two venue strings were read verbatim off the abs pages. 2607.12338 reads KDD 2026 Workshop Agentic AI Evaluation and Trustworthiness; 2607.10569 reads Accepted to the Agentic Software Engineering (SE 3.0) Workshop at KDD 2026 (non-archival). Both are workshop, one explicitly non-archival, so per this repo's convention both keep arXiv as the Venue. 2607.25398's WAB@COLM 2026 acceptance is quoted from its comments field.
• The OpenAI incident post 403s to automated fetchers on every path. Its canonical URL, exact title, and 2026-07-21 date were confirmed via a source quoting it directly with the canonical URL, cross-checked against CNBC, Axios, and The Hacker News. The two quotes used are verbatim. Open it in a browser before committing.
• The Making of Claude Code has an unread body and is marked P2 for that reason alone.
• ai-boost/awesome-harness-engineering was created 2026-03-29, before the window; only its continued activity is in-window.
• Star counts are approximate and were read once during the sweep; they drift.

Deliberately rejected

• Harness-evolution near-duplicates of what the catalog already tracks three times over: 2607.26598 Living-Harness, 2607.13683 Self-Evolving Agent Harnesses via Gated Semantic Quality-Diversity, 2607.14159 MemoHarness, 2607.22688 Co-Harness, 2607.13285 Harness Handbook, 2607.14004 Do Agent Optimizers Compound?, 2607.11423 ToFu. All real and in-window. If one is ever wanted, 2607.14004 is the useful one, because it tests whether optimizer gains compound over phases rather than whether they exist once.
• Model-training papers with no harness angle: 2607.24653 Kimi K3, 2607.22083 Nanbeige4.2-3B, 2607.12463 Function-Aware FIM mid-training, 2607.27146 MindForge, 2607.05378 CompactionRL, 2607.14171 Branching Policy Optimization.
• Domain-application agents: SIREN, AGENTS4GEOS, SMEFT-Pheno-Agent, PatientAgentBench, ClinLens, TREK. Out of scope even where the abstract says "harness."
• Out of window by a day or two: 2606.21338 What Happens Locally, Leaks Globally (2026-06-19); Steve Yegge's "The Flat Curve Society" (2026-06-19).
• Checked, nothing on-topic in window: Zed blog (last post 2026-06-23), JetBrains, Augment, Windsurf, Block goose, Continue, Daytona, Netlify, Fly.io, Modal, E2B, Apollo Research, UK AISI, LMArena, Scale AI, Epoch AI, Google DeepMind; Mitchell Hashimoto, Thorsten Ball, Kent Beck, Ethan Mollick, Peter Steinberger, Lance Martin, Hamel Husain, Nathan Lambert, Sebastian Raschka, Han Xiao, Omar Khattab, Nicholas Carlini, Kai Greshake, Sander Schulhoff.

Unverified leads — do not publish without confirming

Lead	What is missing
Bloomberg Odd Lots — Boris Cherny interview, reportedly 2026-07-20	Date appears in the URL and search results, but the page is paywalled and could not be fetched.
OpenAI open-sources the Codex Security CLI and SDK (github.com/openai/codex-security)	License (Apache-2.0) and scope confirmed from the repo page, but no release or creation date was exposed and OpenAI's announcement channel 403s. Reported widely as a stealth drop with no formal post. Needs a date from git history.
Anthropic's response to China's CNVD "backdoor" advisory (2026-07-08)	CNVD flagged Claude Code v2.1.91-2.1.196 for transmitting location and identity signals; the only reply found is an X post from a staff member describing a March 2026 anti-abuse experiment removed in v2.1.198. No official Anthropic blog or advisory to cite.
Dan Luu — "Agentic test processes, LLM benchmarks, and other notes on agentic coding"	Strong content (agents fabricating evidence, LLM-written tests being poor while LLM-directed fuzzing finds real bugs fast), but danluu.com carries no on-page publication date; the only anchor is a 2026-07-04 HN submission.
ykdojo — "How to set up your spare Mac for Claude Code to fully control"	Hardware-isolation sandboxing guide. No on-page date; HN submission 2026-07-18.
MiniMax on self-evolving harnesses	Describes a 100+ round analyze-trajectories → modify-scaffold → evaluate → keep-or-revert loop for a 30% internal gain, but the fetchable version is dated 2026-03-18, out of window; a newer M3-era post may exist and could not be confirmed.
"Senior SWE-bench"	Surfaced repeatedly as a July 2026 coding-agent benchmark (100 tasks, 50 public / 50 held private, 12 production repos), but no primary site, paper, or publisher page could be located.