Security Policy

Audit & CVE history

Item	Status
Third-party security audit	None to date (July 2026)
Published CVEs against FluctlightDB	None
GitHub Security Advisories	View advisories — none published yet
Supply-chain CI	cargo audit + cargo-deny on every main push (see deny.toml)

Known dependency advisories (tracked, not ignored)

CI cargo audit currently reports (as of July 2026):

Crate	Issue	Mitigation
bincode 1.3	Unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2025-0141)	Accepted — on-disk wire format; explicit deny.toml ignore + migration tracked
memmap2 0.9.10	Unsound (RUSTSEC-2026-0186)	Accepted — transitive via fast-hnsw; explicit deny.toml ignore until upstream bump

Resolved: pyo3 upgraded to 0.29 in fluctlight-py (RUSTSEC-2025-0020, RUSTSEC-2026-0177).

The supply-chain job runs cargo deny check with documented deny.toml ignores for the two advisories above (not silent suppression).

FluctlightDB has not undergone a professional penetration test or formal security audit. Production multi-tenant HTTP serve and governance APIs exist but are documented as not production-hardened — see docs/STABILITY.md.

unsafe inventory (July 2026)

Location	Scope	Miri / CI
serve.rs — libc::signal (SIGTERM/SIGINT)	Unix HTTP serve shutdown only	Not exercised by cargo miri test --lib miri_*
chaos_jepsen.rs — libc::kill	Integration test (subprocess crash)	Not in --lib Miri suite

All other production paths are safe Rust. Miri CI runs miri_* tests only (pure serde/router); brain I/O tests that call sqlite3 FFI are #[cfg_attr(miri, ignore)].

Researchers & auditors: We welcome coordinated review. Report findings via the process below; for audit sponsorship or extended disclosure windows, contact the maintainer through GitHub.

Supported versions

Security fixes are applied to the latest release on the main branch. We recommend running the current main or the latest tagged release.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

Report privately by opening a GitHub Security Advisory or emailing the maintainers through GitHub (repository owner contact).

Include:

• Description of the issue and potential impact
• Steps to reproduce
• Affected versions or commits
• Suggested fix (if any)

We aim to acknowledge reports within 72 hours and will coordinate disclosure once a fix is available.

Capability-Addressed Brains (CAB) — serve auth model (July 2026)

See docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-20-cab-security-design.md.

Rule	Behavior
Tenant locus	Disk path = tenants/<sha256(brain_id)[:32]>/… (legacy safe ids dual-resolved)
Roles	read / write / admin (govern bound brain only) / platform (provision/revoke/list)
Open mode	No keys → Admin on BrainId default only (ignores attacker tenant_id)
Unknown roles	Rejected (never fail-open to Write/Admin)
API secrets	Stored hashed in auth.db; plaintext shown once at issue
Non-localhost bind	Requires FLUCTLIGHT_API_KEYS

Adversarial suite: cargo test -p fluctlightdb --test zz_security_review -- --test-threads=1

Secrets and deployment hygiene

• Never commit API keys, brain snapshots, or auth.env files.
• Use /etc/fluctlight/auth.env (mode 600) or environment variables in production.
• Rotate credentials if they were ever exposed in logs, chat, or version control.
• The example files systemd/auth.env.example and systemd/environment.example contain placeholders only.
• Control-plane HTTP: FLUCTLIGHT_API_KEYS=platform:<secret>:platform (not admin).

Scope

In scope: FluctlightDB core (crates/), CLI, HTTP serve, Python SDK, and documented deployment paths.

Out of scope: Third-party agent applications that embed FluctlightDB unless the vulnerability is in FluctlightDB itself.