THREAT_MODEL.md

April 21, 2026 · View on GitHub

🎯 Hack23 Homepage — Threat Model

🛡️ Proactive Security Through Structured Threat Analysis
🔍 STRIDE • MITRE ATT&CK • Static Website Security • Public Transparency

📋 Document Owner: CEO | 📄 Version: 2.1 | 📅 Last Updated: 2026-04-21 (UTC)
🔄 Review Cycle: Quarterly | ⏰ Next Review: 2026-07-21
🏷️ Classification: Public (Corporate Website)

🎯 Purpose & Scope

Establish a comprehensive threat model for the Hack23 AB corporate homepage, a static website demonstrating cybersecurity consulting expertise through transparent ISMS documentation and showcasing open-source security projects. This systematic threat analysis integrates multiple threat modeling frameworks to ensure proactive security through structured analysis.

🌟 Transparency Commitment

This threat model demonstrates 🛡️ cybersecurity consulting expertise through public documentation of advanced threat assessment methodologies, showcasing our 🏆 competitive advantage via systematic risk management and 🤝 customer trust through transparent security practices.

— Based on Hack23 AB's commitment to security through transparency and excellence

📚 Framework Integration

🎭 STRIDE per architecture element: Systematic threat categorization
🎖️ MITRE ATT&CK mapping: Advanced threat intelligence integration
🏗️ Asset-centric analysis: Critical resource protection focus
🎯 Scenario-centric modeling: Real-world attack simulation
⚖️ Risk-centric assessment: Business impact quantification

🔍 Scope Definition

Included Systems:

🌐 Static website (1,353 HTML files = 105 English source pages + 13 language variants × 96 pages, 1 CSS file, minimal JavaScript)
☁️ AWS S3 bucket (private, origin access only)
🚀 AWS CloudFront CDN (global distribution)
🔄 GitHub Actions CI/CD pipeline (minification, security scanning, deployment)
📦 External dependencies (Google Fonts CDN)
🔐 AWS IAM roles and OIDC federation

Out of Scope:

Third-party CDN providers (Google Fonts infrastructure)
End-user browser security (beyond application controls)
DNS provider infrastructure (beyond configuration)

🔗 Policy Alignment

Integrated with 🎯 Hack23 AB Threat Modeling Policy methodology and frameworks.

🎯 Multi-Strategy Threat Modeling Integration

Following Hack23 AB Five-Strategy Threat Modeling methodology:

%%{init: {"theme": "base", "themeVariables": {"primaryColor": "#2196F3", "primaryTextColor": "#1a1a2e", "lineColor": "#455A64", "secondaryColor": "#4CAF50", "tertiaryColor": "#FF9800"}}}%%
mindmap
  root)🎯 Threat Modeling Strategies(
    (🎖️ Attacker-Centric)
      [MITRE ATT&CK Mapping]
      [Kill Chain Analysis]
      [Attack Trees]
      [Threat Agent Profiles]
    (🏗️ Asset-Centric)
      [Crown Jewel Analysis]
      [Asset Inventory]
      [Data Flow Threats]
      [CIA Classification]
    (🏛️ Architecture-Centric)
      [STRIDE per Element]
      [Trust Boundaries]
      [DFD Threat Annotations]
      [Defense-in-Depth Layers]
    (🎯 Scenario-Centric)
      [Misuse Cases]
      [What-If Analysis]
      [Persona-Based Threats]
      [Attack Simulations]
    (⚖️ Risk-Centric)
      [Quantitative Risk Matrix]
      [Business Impact Analysis]
      [Likelihood Assessment]
      [Residual Risk Tracking]

Strategy Integration: Each strategy provides complementary coverage ensuring no blind spots:

🎖️ Attacker-Centric → Who attacks and how (§4–§7)
🏗️ Asset-Centric → What to protect (§3)
🏛️ Architecture-Centric → Where vulnerabilities exist (§5–§6)
🎯 Scenario-Centric → What could happen in practice (§8)
⚖️ Risk-Centric → How much it matters to the business (§9)

📊 System Classification & Operating Profile

🏷️ Security Classification Matrix

Dimension	Level	Rationale	Business Impact
🔐 Confidentiality		Public corporate website with no sensitive data
🔒 Integrity		Corporate information accuracy important for reputation
⚡ Availability		Marketing website; tolerates brief outages

⚖️ Regulatory & Compliance Profile

Compliance Area	Classification	Implementation Status
📋 Regulatory Exposure	Low	Public corporate website; no personal data processing
🇪🇺 CRA (EU Cyber Resilience Act)	Standard (Non-commercial)	Static website with comprehensive security controls
📊 SLA Targets (Internal)	99%	CloudFront CDN reliability with AWS Shield
🔄 RPO / RTO	RPO: Daily / RTO: >72h	Git version control; scheduled recovery acceptable

🌐 Current Threat Landscape (ENISA TL 2024)

Following Hack23 AB Threat Landscape Integration methodology, aligned with ENISA Threat Landscape 2024 priority categories:

#	ENISA Priority Threat	Relevance to Homepage	Key Controls	Status
1	🔒 Ransomware	Low — Static site with no persistent data; S3 versioning enables recovery	S3 versioning, Git backup, CloudTrail	✅ Mitigated
2	🦠 Malware	Low — No file uploads or user-generated content; CSP blocks script injection	CSP, SRI, static content only	✅ Mitigated
3	🎣 Social Engineering	Medium — GitHub account phishing could lead to repository compromise	MFA enforcement, FIDO2 keys, security training	⚠️ Residual
4	📊 Data Threats	Low — All content is public by design; no sensitive data processed	Public classification, no PII	✅ Accepted
5	⚡ Availability Threats	Medium — DDoS attacks against corporate website impact brand credibility	AWS Shield, CloudFront CDN, DNS resilience	✅ Mitigated
6	📰 Information Manipulation	High — Cybersecurity consultancy website defacement = maximum reputational damage	Branch protection, CODEOWNERS, S3 versioning, audit trail	⚠️ Residual
7	🔗 Supply Chain Attacks	Medium — CI/CD pipeline and external dependencies (Google Fonts) present attack surface	SRI, CSP, Dependabot, SHA-pinned Actions, OpenSSF Scorecard	✅ Mitigated

📈 ENISA Threat Trend Alignment

%%{
  init: {
    'theme': 'base',
    'themeVariables': {
      'primaryColor': '#e3f2fd',
      'primaryTextColor': '#01579b',
      'lineColor': '#0288d1'
    }
  }
}%%
xychart-beta
    title "Homepage Exposure to ENISA 2024 Priority Threats"
    x-axis ["Ransomware", "Malware", "Social Eng.", "Data", "Availability", "Info Manip.", "Supply Chain"]
    y-axis "Risk Level (1-5)" 1 --> 5
    bar [1, 1, 3, 1, 3, 4, 3]

Key Insight: As a static website for a cybersecurity consultancy, Information Manipulation (website defacement) represents the highest ENISA-aligned threat due to disproportionate reputational impact. Supply chain and social engineering threats require ongoing vigilance.

💎 Critical Assets & Protection Goals

🏗️ Asset-Centric Threat Analysis

Following Hack23 AB Asset-Centric Threat Modeling methodology:

Asset Category	Why Valuable	Threat Goals	Key Controls
🌐 Website Content	Brand reputation and consulting credibility	Defacement, misinformation injection	S3 versioning, CloudTrail logging, branch protection
🧠 Source Code	Intellectual property and methodology	IP theft, backdoor injection	Private initially, branch protection, code scanning
🔧 Build Pipeline	Software supply chain integrity	Supply chain attacks, malicious code injection	GitHub Actions hardening, OIDC federation, no long-lived credentials
🔑 AWS Infrastructure	Service availability and data integrity	Resource abuse, configuration tampering	IAM least privilege, MFA on root, CloudTrail immutable logs
🏢 Brand & Reputation	Customer trust and business development	Reputation damage through security incidents	Transparent security practices, public ISMS, security controls

🔐 Crown Jewel Analysis

%%{
  init: {
    'theme': 'base',
    'themeVariables': {
      'primaryColor': '#e8f5e9',
      'primaryTextColor': '#2e7d32',
      'lineColor': '#4caf50',
      'secondaryColor': '#ffcdd2',
      'tertiaryColor': '#fff3e0'
    }
  }
}%%
flowchart TB
    subgraph CROWN_JEWELS["💎 Crown Jewels"]
        BRAND[🏢 Brand Reputation<br/>Customer Trust & Credibility]
        CONTENT[🌐 Website Content<br/>Corporate Identity]
        PIPELINE[🔧 CI/CD Pipeline<br/>Supply Chain Integrity]
    end
    
    subgraph ATTACK_VECTORS["⚔️ Primary Attack Vectors"]
        DEFACEMENT[💉 Website Defacement]
        SUPPLY_CHAIN[🔗 Supply Chain Attack]
        INFRASTRUCTURE[☁️ Infrastructure Compromise]
        CREDENTIAL_THEFT[🔑 Credential Theft]
    end
    
    subgraph THREAT_AGENTS["👥 Key Threat Agents"]
        OPPORTUNISTIC[🎯 Opportunistic Attackers<br/>Reputation Damage]
        COMPETITORS[🏢 Competitors<br/>Market Intelligence]
        NATION_STATE[🏛️ Nation-State<br/>Infrastructure Disruption]
        SUPPLY_CHAIN_THREAT[💰 Supply Chain Actors<br/>Backdoor Insertion]
    end
    
    DEFACEMENT --> CONTENT
    SUPPLY_CHAIN --> PIPELINE
    INFRASTRUCTURE --> BRAND
    CREDENTIAL_THEFT --> CONTENT
    
    OPPORTUNISTIC --> DEFACEMENT
    COMPETITORS --> CREDENTIAL_THEFT
    NATION_STATE --> INFRASTRUCTURE
    SUPPLY_CHAIN_THREAT --> SUPPLY_CHAIN
    
    style BRAND fill:#ffcdd2,stroke:#d32f2f,color:#000
    style CONTENT fill:#ffcdd2,stroke:#d32f2f,color:#000
    style PIPELINE fill:#ffcdd2,stroke:#d32f2f,color:#000

🌐 Data Flow & Architecture Analysis

🏛️ Architecture-Centric STRIDE Analysis

Following Architecture-Centric Threat Modeling methodology:

%%{
  init: {
    'theme': 'base',
    'themeVariables': {
      'primaryColor': '#e3f2fd',
      'primaryTextColor': '#01579b',
      'lineColor': '#0288d1',
      'secondaryColor': '#f1f8e9',
      'tertiaryColor': '#fff8e1'
    }
  }
}%%
flowchart TB
    subgraph TRUST_BOUNDARY_1["🌐 Internet/Public Trust Boundary"]
        USER[👤 Website Visitors]
        BOTS[🤖 Search Engines/Bots]
    end
    
    subgraph TRUST_BOUNDARY_2["🛡️ AWS CloudFront Trust Boundary"]
        CF[🚀 CloudFront CDN]
        SHIELD[🛡️ AWS Shield DDoS Protection]
        EDGE[🌍 Global Edge Locations]
    end
    
    subgraph TRUST_BOUNDARY_3["🔒 AWS S3 Trust Boundary"]
        S3["📦 S3 Bucket (Private)"]
        VERSIONING[🔄 S3 Versioning]
        LOGS[📋 Access Logs]
    end
    
    subgraph TRUST_BOUNDARY_4["🔧 GitHub Trust Boundary"]
        REPO["📂 GitHub Repository (Public)"]
        ACTIONS[⚙️ GitHub Actions CI/CD]
        SECRETS[🔐 Environment Secrets]
    end
    
    subgraph TRUST_BOUNDARY_5["☁️ AWS IAM Trust Boundary"]
        IAM[🔑 IAM Roles]
        OIDC[🎫 OIDC Federation]
        CLOUDTRAIL[📊 CloudTrail Audit Logs]
    end
    
    subgraph EXTERNAL["🌍 External Dependencies"]
        FONTS[🔤 Google Fonts CDN]
    end
    
    USER -->|🎯 T1: HTTPS Request| CF
    BOTS -->|🎯 T2: Crawl| CF
    CF -->|🎯 T3: Origin Fetch| S3
    S3 -->|Protected by| VERSIONING
    S3 -->|Logged to| LOGS
    ACTIONS -->|🎯 T4: Deploy via OIDC| IAM
    IAM -->|🎯 T5: S3 Write| S3
    REPO -->|🎯 T6: Triggers| ACTIONS
    SECRETS -->|🎯 T7: Provides| ACTIONS
    USER -.->|🎯 T8: External Request| FONTS
    CLOUDTRAIL -.->|Monitors| IAM
    CLOUDTRAIL -.->|Monitors| S3
    SHIELD -->|Protects| CF
    
    style USER fill:#81c784,stroke:#388e3c,stroke-width:2px,color:#fff
    style CF fill:#ff9800,stroke:#e65100,stroke-width:2px,color:#000
    style S3 fill:#ff9800,stroke:#e65100,stroke-width:2px,color:#000
    style REPO fill:#4169E1,stroke:#1E3A8A,stroke-width:2px,color:#fff
    style ACTIONS fill:#4169E1,stroke:#1E3A8A,stroke-width:2px,color:#fff
    style IAM fill:#ff9800,stroke:#e65100,stroke-width:2px,color:#000
    style FONTS fill:#9e9e9e,stroke:#616161,stroke-width:2px,color:#fff

🎭 STRIDE per Element Analysis

Architecture Element	Spoofing	Tampering	Repudiation	Info Disclosure	Denial of Service	Elevation of Privilege
🌐 CloudFront CDN	Domain hijacking	Cache poisoning	Access log gaps	Configuration exposure	DDoS attacks	Distribution hijacking
📦 S3 Bucket	N/A (object storage)	File modification	Incomplete logging	Public access misconfiguration	Quota exhaustion	Bucket policy bypass
⚙️ GitHub Actions	Workflow identity	Malicious PR injection	Log deletion	Secret exposure	Resource abuse	Workflow permission escalation
🔐 IAM/OIDC	Token forgery	Role policy tampering	CloudTrail gaps	Credential leak	N/A	Privilege escalation
🔤 Google Fonts	CDN spoofing	Content injection	N/A	Tracking	Service disruption	N/A

🏗️ System Architecture & Trust Boundaries

Architecture Overview

%%{
  init: {
    'theme': 'base',
    'themeVariables': {
      'primaryColor': '#4169E1',
      'primaryTextColor': '#FFF',
      'primaryBorderColor': '#1E3A8A',
      'lineColor': '#10B981',
      'secondaryColor': '#F59E0B',
      'tertiaryColor': '#EF4444',
      'clusterBkg': '#F0F8FF',
      'clusterBorder': '#4169E1',
      'fontSize': '14px'
    }
  }
}%%
graph TB
    subgraph "Public Internet (Untrusted)"
        User[👤 Website Visitors]:::user
    end
    
    subgraph "AWS CloudFront (Trust Boundary 1)"
        CF[🚀 CloudFront CDN<br/>Global Edge Locations]:::aws
        Shield[🛡️ AWS Shield<br/>DDoS Protection]:::aws
    end
    
    subgraph "AWS S3 (Trust Boundary 2)"
        S3[📦 S3 Bucket<br/>Private Origin Access]:::aws
        Versioning[🔄 S3 Versioning]:::control
    end
    
    subgraph "GitHub (Trust Boundary 3)"
        Repo[📂 GitHub Repository<br/>Public Source Code]:::github
        Actions[⚙️ GitHub Actions<br/>CI/CD Pipeline]:::github
    end
    
    subgraph "External Dependencies (Trust Boundary 4)"
        Fonts[🔤 Google Fonts CDN]:::external
    end
    
    User -->|HTTPS| CF
    CF -->|AWS Internal| S3
    S3 ---|Protected by| Versioning
    Actions -->|OIDC Federation| S3
    Repo -->|Triggers| Actions
    User -.->|External Request| Fonts
    
    classDef user fill:#10B981,stroke:#059669,stroke-width:2px,color:#FFF
    classDef aws fill:#FF9900,stroke:#CC7A00,stroke-width:2px,color:#000
    classDef github fill:#4169E1,stroke:#1E3A8A,stroke-width:2px,color:#FFF
    classDef external fill:#9CA3AF,stroke:#6B7280,stroke-width:2px,color:#FFF
    classDef control fill:#8B5CF6,stroke:#6D28D9,stroke-width:2px,color:#FFF

Trust Boundaries

Public Internet ↔ CloudFront: Visitors access content via HTTPS with TLS 1.3
CloudFront ↔ S3: Origin access via AWS internal network with OAI (Origin Access Identity)
GitHub Actions ↔ AWS: Deployment via OIDC federation (no long-lived credentials)
External CDNs: Google Fonts CSS and font files (protected by SRI hashes)

Attack Surface Components

Component	Access Level	Attack Vectors	Mitigations
1,353 HTML Pages (105 EN × 14 langs)	Public (read-only)	XSS, clickjacking, content injection	CSP headers, input validation, static content
1 CSS File	Public (read-only)	CSS injection, exfiltration	SRI hashes, CSP style-src restrictions
Google Fonts	External (third-party)	Supply chain compromise, privacy tracking	SRI hashes (#451), CSP restrictions (#450)
CloudFront Distribution	Public (CDN edge)	DDoS, cache poisoning	AWS Shield, cache control headers, HTTPS-only
S3 Bucket	Private (origin only)	Unauthorized access, data tampering	Private bucket policy, versioning, CloudTrail
GitHub Repository	Public (source code)	Code theft, malicious PRs	Branch protection, CODEOWNERS, code scanning
GitHub Actions	Internal (CI/CD)	Workflow tampering, secret exposure	Branch protection, OIDC, environment secrets
AWS IAM Roles	Internal (infrastructure)	Privilege escalation, credential theft	Least privilege, MFA, OIDC federation

🎭 STRIDE Threat Analysis

The Five Defensive Layers (Sacred Pentagon of Security)

Following the Law of Fives, our security architecture consists of five concentric defensive layers:

Perimeter Defense - CloudFront + AWS Shield (DDoS protection)
Access Control - IAM + OIDC federation (authentication & authorization)
Data Protection - S3 versioning + CloudTrail (integrity & auditability)
Application Security - CSP + SRI (client-side protection)
Supply Chain Security - Dependabot + code scanning (dependency integrity)

Numerological Significance: 5 layers × 6 STRIDE categories = 30 threat scenarios analyzed (3+0=3, the CIA triad, which contains 5 levels each = 15, and 1+5=6, returning to STRIDE. The universe confirms the pattern.)

🔍 S — Spoofing Identity

Threat Category: Impersonating legitimate entities to gain unauthorized access or deceive users.

Threat ID	Threat Description	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Score	MITRE ATT&CK	Mitigations	Residual Risk
S-01	DNS Hijacking - Attacker compromises hack23.com DNS records to redirect users to malicious site	Low	High	Medium	T1584.001	• DNSSEC enabled • Registrar 2FA enforced • Domain lock enabled • DNS monitoring	Low
S-02	Certificate Spoofing - Fake SSL certificate issued for hack23.com	Low	High	Medium	T1584.004	• AWS Certificate Manager • CAA DNS records • Certificate Transparency monitoring	Low
S-03	GitHub Account Compromise - Attacker gains access to @pethers account	Medium	High	High	T1078.001	• MFA enforced • Branch protection rules • Activity monitoring	Medium
S-04	CloudFront Distribution Hijacking - Attacker associates their origin with our distribution	Very Low	High	Low	T1584.006	• AWS IAM least privilege • CloudTrail logging • Distribution settings locked	Very Low
S-05	Supply Chain Identity Spoofing - Malicious package impersonating legitimate dependency	Low	Medium	Low	T1195.002	• Package lock files • Dependabot alerts • Manual review of dependencies	Low

Attack Scenario: An attacker compromises the GitHub account through phishing, bypasses MFA via session hijacking, and pushes malicious content that defaces the website or injects malicious JavaScript.

🛠️ T — Tampering with Data

Threat Category: Unauthorized modification of data at rest or in transit.

Threat ID	Threat Description	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Score	MITRE ATT&CK	Mitigations	Residual Risk
T-01	Website Defacement - Unauthorized modification of HTML/CSS files visible to users	Low	High	Medium	T1565.001	• S3 versioning enabled • CloudTrail immutable logs • Branch protection • PR review required	Low
T-02	S3 Bucket Compromise - Attacker modifies files directly in S3 bucket	Very Low	High	Low	T1530	• Private bucket policy • IAM least privilege • MFA on root account • CloudTrail monitoring	Very Low
T-03	Supply Chain Attack (Google Fonts) - Malicious code injected via compromised CDN	Low	High	Medium	T1195.002	• SRI hashes (#451) • CSP restrictions (#450) • Font files hosted locally (future)	Low
T-04	CI/CD Pipeline Tampering - Malicious workflow changes in GitHub Actions	Low	High	Medium	T1554	• Branch protection • CODEOWNERS enforcement • PR reviews • Workflow permissions minimized	Low
T-05	Man-in-the-Middle Attack - Traffic interception and modification	Very Low	Medium	Very Low	T1557	• HTTPS-only (TLS 1.3) • HSTS headers • Certificate pinning (CloudFront)	Very Low
T-06	Cache Poisoning - Malicious content injected into CloudFront cache	Very Low	Medium	Very Low	T1584.006	• Cache control headers • CloudFront signed URLs (if needed) • Origin access identity	Very Low

Attack Tree Analysis:

%%{
  init: {
    'theme': 'base',
    'themeVariables': {
      'primaryColor': '#EF4444',
      'primaryTextColor': '#FFF',
      'primaryBorderColor': '#DC2626',
      'lineColor': '#10B981',
      'secondaryColor': '#F59E0B',
      'tertiaryColor': '#8B5CF6',
      'fontSize': '14px'
    }
  }
}%%
graph TD
    A[🎯 Deface hack23.com]:::goal
    
    A --> B[📦 Compromise S3 Bucket]:::path
    A --> C[📂 Compromise GitHub Repository]:::path
    A --> D[🌐 DNS Hijacking]:::path
    
    B --> E[🔑 Steal AWS Credentials]:::method
    B --> F[⚙️ Exploit S3 Misconfiguration]:::method
    
    C --> G[👤 Compromise @pethers Account]:::method
    C --> H[⚙️ Exploit GitHub Actions Workflow]:::method
    
    E --> I[🎣 Phishing Attack]:::technique
    E --> J[🔓 GitHub Secret Leak]:::technique
    E --> K[📋 CI/CD Log Exposure]:::technique
    
    G --> L[🔐 Password Breach]:::technique
    G --> M[🍪 Session Hijacking]:::technique
    G --> N[📱 MFA Bypass]:::technique
    
    classDef goal fill:#EF4444,stroke:#DC2626,stroke-width:4px,color:#FFF
    classDef path fill:#F59E0B,stroke:#D97706,stroke-width:3px,color:#000
    classDef method fill:#8B5CF6,stroke:#7C3AED,stroke-width:2px,color:#FFF
    classDef technique fill:#6B7280,stroke:#4B5563,stroke-width:2px,color:#FFF

Mitigation Effectiveness Analysis:

E (Steal AWS Credentials): 🟢 Highly Mitigated - OIDC federation eliminates long-lived credentials in GitHub
F (S3 Misconfiguration): 🟢 Highly Mitigated - Private bucket policy, IAM least privilege, automated config checks
G (Compromise GitHub): 🟡 Partially Mitigated - Depends on MFA enforcement and user security hygiene
D (DNS Hijacking): 🟢 Highly Mitigated - DNSSEC, registrar 2FA, domain lock

🚫 R — Repudiation

Threat Category: Ability to deny actions without sufficient audit trail.

Threat ID	Threat Description	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Score	MITRE ATT&CK	Mitigations	Residual Risk
R-01	Unauthorized Changes Denied - Attacker denies making unauthorized changes to website	Low	Low	Low	T1070.002	• CloudTrail immutable logs • GitHub audit logs • S3 versioning with timestamps • MFA requirement provides non-repudiation	Very Low
R-02	S3 Access Log Gaps - Missing audit trails for S3 bucket access	Medium	Low	Low	T1070.003	• CloudTrail enabled for S3 data events • S3 server access logging • Log retention policy (90 days+)	Low
R-03	CloudFront Access Log Gaps - Incomplete logging of CDN requests	Medium	Low	Low	T1562.001	• CloudFront access logs enabled • Log delivery to dedicated S3 bucket • Log analysis automation (future)	Low
R-04	GitHub Actions Log Tampering - Workflow execution logs deleted or modified	Very Low	Low	Very Low	T1070.003	• GitHub maintains immutable workflow logs • Branch protection prevents workflow deletion	Very Low

Control Gaps Identified:

⚠️ Gap: CloudFront access logs not currently analyzed for anomaly detection
✅ Recommendation: Implement automated log analysis with alerting for suspicious patterns

📢 I — Information Disclosure

Threat Category: Unauthorized exposure of sensitive information.

Threat ID	Threat Description	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Score	MITRE ATT&CK	Mitigations	Residual Risk
I-01	AWS Credentials Leak in GitHub - IAM credentials accidentally committed to repository	Low	Critical	High	T1552.001	• GitHub secret scanning enabled • No hardcoded credentials policy • OIDC federation (no long-lived credentials) • Pre-commit hooks (future)	Low
I-02	Source Code Information - Sensitive business logic or internal information in code	Medium	Low	Low	T1213	• Public repository by design • No secrets in code policy • Code review process	Very Low
I-03	S3 Bucket Misconfiguration - Publicly accessible S3 bucket exposing files	Very Low	Medium	Low	T1530	• Private bucket policy enforced • Public access blocked at account level • Automated config monitoring	Very Low
I-04	CloudFront Signed URL Leak - If signed URLs used, exposure in logs	Very Low	Low	Very Low	T1552.004	• Not currently using signed URLs • If implemented: short expiration, logging controls	Very Low
I-05	GitHub Actions Secret Exposure - Workflow secrets leaked in logs	Low	High	Medium	T1552.001	• Environment-scoped secrets • Minimal secret usage • Log masking enabled • Secret rotation policy	Low
I-06	Email Address Harvesting - Scraping contact emails from website	High	Very Low	Low	T1589.002	• Accepted risk for contact information • Email obfuscation (future consideration)	Low

Data Classification:

Public: All website content (by design)
Internal: AWS credentials, GitHub tokens (protected)
No Confidential or Restricted data processed or stored

⚡ D — Denial of Service

Threat Category: Disrupting system availability for legitimate users.

Threat ID	Threat Description	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Score	MITRE ATT&CK	Mitigations	Residual Risk
D-01	DDoS Attack on CloudFront - Large-scale traffic flood targeting website	Medium	Medium	Medium	T1498.002	• AWS Shield Standard (automatic) • CloudFront DDoS protection • Geographic restrictions (if needed) • Rate limiting (future)	Low
D-02	S3/CloudFront Service Outage - AWS service disruption impacting availability	Low	Medium	Low	N/A	• AWS SLA 99.99% • Multi-region CloudFront edges • Static content = high resilience	Very Low
D-03	DNS Takedown - DNS provider outage or attack	Low	High	Medium	T1498.001	• Registrar lock enabled • DNSSEC protection • Multiple DNS providers (future consideration)	Low
D-04	GitHub Actions Abuse - Excessive workflow runs exhausting resources	Low	Low	Low	T1496	• GitHub Actions minutes limits • Workflow concurrency controls • Branch protection limits push frequency	Very Low
D-05	Resource Exhaustion (S3) - Excessive file uploads filling storage	Very Low	Low	Very Low	T1496	• S3 lifecycle policies • Cost monitoring and alerts • Write access restricted to CI/CD	Very Low

Availability Targets:

Target Availability: 99% (acceptable for marketing website)
Current Performance: >99.9% (CloudFront + S3 reliability)
Recovery Time Objective (RTO): <72 hours
Recovery Point Objective (RPO): <24 hours (daily git commits)

👑 E — Elevation of Privilege

Threat Category: Gaining higher privileges than authorized.

Threat ID	Threat Description	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Score	MITRE ATT&CK	Mitigations	Residual Risk
E-01	AWS IAM Privilege Escalation - Attacker gains AWS admin access	Very Low	Critical	Medium	T1078.004	• MFA on root account • IAM least privilege roles • OIDC federation with minimal permissions • CloudTrail monitoring • AWS IAM Access Analyzer	Low
E-02	GitHub Actions Privilege Escalation - Workflow gains unauthorized permissions	Low	High	Medium	T1548	• Minimal workflow permissions • Environment-scoped secrets • Branch protection prevents malicious workflows • CODEOWNERS review required	Low
E-03	Branch Protection Bypass - Attacker pushes to main without review	Very Low	High	Low	T1078.001	• Branch protection rules enforced • CODEOWNERS file in place • Repository admin privileges restricted • Audit logging enabled	Very Low
E-04	OIDC Token Manipulation - Forged or stolen OIDC token for AWS access	Very Low	Critical	Low	T1134	• Short-lived tokens (1 hour) • Audience claim validation • Subject claim restriction • CloudTrail monitoring	Very Low
E-05	Dependency Confusion Attack - Malicious package with higher privileges	Low	Medium	Low	T1195.002	• Package lock files • Dependabot security alerts • Private package registry (future) • Minimal dependencies	Low

Privilege Levels:

Public Users: Read-only access to website content
GitHub Contributors: Propose changes via PRs (no direct push)
CODEOWNERS: Review and approve changes
GitHub Actions: Deploy to S3 (limited OIDC role)
AWS Admin: Full infrastructure access (MFA required, single user)

📊 Quantitative Risk Assessment

Risk Scoring Matrix

Likelihood Scale:

Very Low (1): <5% probability per year
Low (2): 5-25% probability per year
Medium (3): 25-50% probability per year
High (4): 50-75% probability per year
Critical (5): >75% probability per year

Impact Scale:

Very Low (1): <$1,000 loss, <1 hour downtime, minimal reputation impact
Low (2): $1,000-$10,000 loss, 1-8 hours downtime, minor reputation impact
Medium (3): $10,000-$50,000 loss, 8-24 hours downtime, moderate reputation impact
High (4): $50,000-$250,000 loss, 1-7 days downtime, significant reputation impact
Critical (5): >$250,000 loss, >7 days downtime, severe reputation impact

Risk Score = Likelihood × Impact

Top 10 Risks by Risk Score

Rank	Threat ID	Threat	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Score	Priority	Status
1	I-01	AWS Credentials Leak in GitHub	2	5	10 (High)	Critical	🟢 Mitigated
2	S-03	GitHub Account Compromise	3	4	12 (High)	Critical	🟡 Active
3	T-03	Supply Chain Attack (Google Fonts)	2	4	8 (Medium)	High	🟢 Mitigated
4	E-02	GitHub Actions Privilege Escalation	2	4	8 (Medium)	High	🟢 Mitigated
5	T-01	Website Defacement	2	4	8 (Medium)	High	🟢 Mitigated
6	E-01	AWS IAM Privilege Escalation	1	5	5 (Low)	Critical	🟢 Mitigated
7	D-01	DDoS Attack on CloudFront	3	3	9 (Medium)	Medium	🟢 Mitigated
8	S-01	DNS Hijacking	2	4	8 (Medium)	Medium	🟢 Mitigated
9	D-03	DNS Takedown	2	4	8 (Medium)	Medium	🟢 Mitigated
10	I-05	GitHub Actions Secret Exposure	2	4	8 (Medium)	High	🟢 Mitigated

Risk Distribution:

🔴 Critical (≥15): 0 threats
🟠 High (10-14): 2 threats
🟡 Medium (5-9): 8 threats
🟢 Low (2-4): 15 threats
⚪ Very Low (1): 5 threats

Overall Risk Posture: 🟢 LOW - Comprehensive security controls in place with minimal residual risk.

🛡️ Security Control Mapping

Implemented Security Controls

Control ID	Control Name	Threats Mitigated	Effectiveness	Evidence	Status
SC-01	Content Security Policy (CSP)	T-03, XSS, clickjacking, Spectre	High	Issue #450	✅ Implemented
SC-02	Subresource Integrity (SRI)	T-03 (supply chain attacks)	High	Issue #451	✅ Implemented
SC-03	OWASP ZAP Security Scanning	Web vulnerabilities, T-01	Medium	Issue #355, main.yml	✅ Implemented
SC-04	S3 Versioning	T-01, T-02 (website tampering)	High	main.yml	✅ Implemented
SC-05	AWS CloudTrail Logging	R-01, R-02, E-01 (audit trail)	High	AWS configuration	✅ Implemented
SC-06	Branch Protection Rules	T-04, E-03 (unauthorized changes)	High	GitHub repository settings	✅ Implemented
SC-07	Dependabot Security Alerts	T-03, E-05 (vulnerable dependencies)	Medium	GitHub Security tab	✅ Implemented
SC-08	HTTPS/TLS 1.3 Enforcement	T-05 (MITM attacks)	High	CloudFront configuration	✅ Implemented
SC-09	CloudFront DDoS Protection	D-01 (denial of service)	High	AWS Shield Standard	✅ Implemented
SC-10	OIDC Federation (No Long-Lived Credentials)	I-01, E-01, E-04 (credential theft)	High	main.yml	✅ Implemented
SC-11	IAM Least Privilege Policies	E-01, T-02 (privilege escalation)	High	AWS IAM configuration	✅ Implemented
SC-12	Private S3 Bucket Policy	I-03, T-02 (data exposure)	High	AWS S3 configuration	✅ Implemented
SC-13	GitHub Secret Scanning	I-01 (credential leaks)	High	GitHub Security features	✅ Implemented
SC-14	CODEOWNERS Enforcement	T-04, E-03 (code review)	Medium	CODEOWNERS	✅ Implemented
SC-15	Harden Runner (Step Security)	T-04, I-05 (CI/CD security)	Medium	main.yml	✅ Implemented

Control Effectiveness Matrix

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      'secondaryColor': '#F59E0B',
      'tertiaryColor': '#EF4444',
      'fontSize': '14px'
    }
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}%%
graph LR
    subgraph "Control Layers"
        L1[Perimeter<br/>CloudFront + Shield]:::layer
        L2[Access Control<br/>IAM + OIDC]:::layer
        L3[Data Protection<br/>S3 + CloudTrail]:::layer
        L4[Application Security<br/>CSP + SRI]:::layer
        L5[Supply Chain<br/>Dependabot + Scanning]:::layer
    end
    
    L1 -->|DDoS Protection| L2
    L2 -->|Authentication| L3
    L3 -->|Integrity| L4
    L4 -->|Client Protection| L5
    L5 -.->|Feedback| L1
    
    classDef layer fill:#10B981,stroke:#059669,stroke-width:2px,color:#FFF

The Pentagon of Security: Five defensive layers working in harmony, each supporting the next in a continuous cycle of protection.

🏛️ STRIDE → Control Mapping Summary

Consolidated mapping of each STRIDE category to primary, secondary, and monitoring controls:

STRIDE Category	Primary Controls	Secondary Controls	Monitoring / Detection
🔍 Spoofing	MFA enforcement (FIDO2), OIDC federation, DNSSEC, CAA records	AWS Certificate Manager, HTTPS/TLS 1.3, HSTS preload	GitHub login alerts, CloudTrail API monitoring, certificate transparency logs
🛠️ Tampering	S3 versioning, branch protection, CODEOWNERS, code review	CSP, SRI hashes, SHA-pinned Actions, private S3 bucket	CloudTrail data events, GitHub audit log, Dependabot alerts, ZAP scanning
🚫 Repudiation	CloudTrail immutable logging, GitHub audit trail	S3 access logging, CloudFront access logs	Log integrity monitoring, CloudWatch alarms on log gaps
📢 Information Disclosure	Secret scanning, OIDC (no long-lived creds), private S3 bucket	IAM least privilege, public-by-design classification	Dependabot secret alerts, IAM Access Analyzer, CloudTrail credential monitoring
⚡ Denial of Service	AWS Shield Standard, CloudFront CDN caching, DNS resilience	GitHub Actions resource limits, cost monitoring alerts	CloudWatch DDoS metrics, CloudFront error rate alarms, uptime monitoring
👑 Elevation of Privilege	IAM least privilege, OIDC short-lived tokens, minimal workflow permissions	Environment secrets isolation, Harden Runner, branch protection	IAM Access Analyzer, CloudTrail privilege escalation detection, Security Hub findings

👥 Threat Actor Profiles

Threat Agent Classification

Following Hack23 AB Threat Actor Analysis methodology:

Actor Type	Motivation	Capability	Targeted Threats	Likelihood	Priority
🎯 Opportunistic Attacker	Financial gain, ego, notoriety	Low-Medium	S-03, T-01, D-01, I-06	High	Medium
🏢 Competitor	Market intelligence, sabotage	Medium	T-01, I-02, D-01	Low	Low
🌐 Nation-State Actor	Espionage, infrastructure disruption	High	All categories	Very Low	Medium
🔗 Supply Chain Compromise	Widespread impact, backdoor insertion	Medium-High	T-03, E-05	Low	High
😈 Insider Threat	Sabotage, theft, negligence	Medium	E-01, T-02, I-01	Very Low	High
🤖 Automated Bots	Spam, scraping, resource abuse	Low	D-01, D-04, I-06	High	Low

👥 Detailed Threat Agent Profiles

🎯 Profile 1: Opportunistic Attacker

Category: External, Untargeted
Motivation: Notoriety, resume building, ego — defacing a cybersecurity company website provides maximum bragging rights
Capability: Low-Medium — uses publicly available tools (credential stuffing lists, automated scanners)
Preferred Tactics: Credential stuffing (T1078), website defacement (T1565.001), DDoS (T1498)
Target Assets: GitHub account, website content, DNS configuration
Priority: 🔴 High — Most likely threat actor for this type of target

🏢 Profile 2: Commercial Competitor

Category: External, Targeted
Motivation: Market intelligence on ISMS methodology, sabotage consulting reputation
Capability: Medium — may employ professional penetration testers
Preferred Tactics: Source code review (T1213), SEO poisoning via content manipulation (T1565)
Target Assets: Consulting methodologies, client references, pricing information
Priority: 🟡 Medium — Limited value in public repository content

🌐 Profile 3: Nation-State Actor

Category: External, Advanced Persistent Threat
Motivation: Infrastructure disruption, supply chain compromise of cybersecurity tools
Capability: High — sophisticated tooling, zero-day capabilities, social engineering expertise
Preferred Tactics: Supply chain compromise (T1195.002), cloud account takeover (T1078.004)
Target Assets: AWS infrastructure, CI/CD pipeline, downstream consumers
Priority: 🟢 Low — Static website provides minimal strategic value

🔗 Profile 4: Supply Chain Actor

Category: External, Indirect
Motivation: Widespread impact through compromising shared dependencies
Capability: Medium-High — targets upstream providers (Google Fonts CDN, npm packages, GitHub Actions)
Preferred Tactics: Dependency confusion, CDN compromise (T1195.002), action hijacking (T1554)
Target Assets: External dependencies, CI/CD workflow, build pipeline
Priority: 🔴 High — Active and growing threat vector industry-wide

👤 Profile 5: Malicious Insider

Category: Internal
Motivation: Sabotage, negligence, disgruntlement
Capability: Medium — direct access to repository and deployment credentials
Preferred Tactics: Credential abuse (T1078), unauthorized code changes (T1565.001)
Target Assets: Source code, AWS credentials, deployment pipeline
Priority: 🟢 Low — Small team, high trust, extensive audit logging

Attack Motivation Analysis

Why attack hack23.com?

🎯 Reputation Damage (Most Likely):
- Cybersecurity company defacement = maximum embarrassment
- Demonstrates vulnerability despite security expertise claims
- Media attention and industry impact
💰 Financial Gain (Low):
- Limited financial data or payment processing
- Potential for ransomware, but static site = easy recovery
- Phishing campaigns using trusted domain
🔍 Intelligence Gathering (Medium):
- Source code reveals security methodologies
- Understanding of ISMS implementation
- Competitive intelligence on consulting approach
⚔️ Ideological/Political (Very Low):
- No controversial political content
- Limited ideological motivation

Most Probable Attack Scenario: Opportunistic attacker exploits weak GitHub account security (no MFA or reused password) → Gains repository access → Pushes malicious code defacing website → Achieves notoriety and embarrasses cybersecurity consultant.

🎯 Scenario-Based Threat Modeling

Attack Scenario 1: Website Defacement via GitHub Compromise

Attack Path:

Attacker identifies CEO's GitHub account (@pethers)
Performs credential stuffing attack using leaked passwords from other breaches
Successfully logs in (if MFA not enforced or bypassed via phishing)
Clones repository and creates malicious branch
Submits PR with defacement content masked as "minor update"
If branch protection weak, directly pushes to main
GitHub Actions deploys defaced content to S3
Defacement visible on hack23.com within minutes

Impact: 🔴 HIGH - Reputation damage, customer trust erosion, media attention

Mitigations:

✅ MFA enforced on GitHub account
✅ Branch protection requires PR review
✅ CODEOWNERS file mandates approval
✅ GitHub audit logs provide forensic trail
✅ S3 versioning allows rollback

Residual Risk: 🟡 MEDIUM - Depends on user security hygiene

Attack Scenario 2: Supply Chain Compromise (Google Fonts)

Attack Path:

Attacker compromises Google Fonts CDN infrastructure
Injects malicious JavaScript into font CSS file
Users loading hack23.com execute malicious code
Data exfiltration or drive-by downloads occur
Multiple websites affected simultaneously

Impact: 🟠 MEDIUM - Client-side compromise, potential data theft, widespread impact

Mitigations:

✅ SRI hashes verify font file integrity (#451)
✅ CSP restrictions limit script execution (#450)
✅ Subresource integrity fails on hash mismatch
🔄 Future: Host fonts locally to eliminate dependency

Residual Risk: 🟢 LOW - SRI provides strong protection

Attack Scenario 3: AWS IAM Privilege Escalation

Attack Path:

Attacker steals OIDC token from GitHub Actions workflow
Attempts to use token to access AWS console
Exploits overly permissive IAM role to escalate privileges
Gains admin access to S3, CloudFront, IAM
Modifies infrastructure or exfiltrates data

Impact: 🔴 CRITICAL - Full infrastructure compromise, data loss, service disruption

Mitigations:

✅ OIDC tokens short-lived (1 hour)
✅ IAM role follows least privilege (S3 write only)
✅ MFA required on root account
✅ CloudTrail logs all API calls
✅ AWS IAM Access Analyzer detects privilege escalation

Residual Risk: 🟢 LOW - Multiple layers of defense

🎯 Misuse Cases (Persona-Based Threats)

Following Hack23 AB Scenario-Centric Modeling methodology:

Misuse Case 1: Disgruntled Ex-Client SEO Poisoning

Persona: Former consulting client with knowledge of Hack23's CI/CD pipeline
Goal: Damage reputation by injecting hidden SEO spam or redirect links
Attack Vector: Social engineering current team member → PR with hidden meta tags or JavaScript redirects
Impact: Search engine ranking damage, client trust erosion
Controls: CODEOWNERS review, HTML validation in CI, ZAP scanning, visual diff monitoring
Residual Risk: 🟢 Low — Multi-layer review catches content changes

Misuse Case 2: Competitor Intelligence Gathering

Persona: Rival cybersecurity consultancy performing competitive analysis
Goal: Extract consulting methodology, pricing strategies, client engagement patterns
Attack Vector: Systematic scraping of public ISMS documentation, analyzing commit history for internal processes
Impact: Competitive disadvantage, methodology copying
Controls: Public-by-design classification (accepted risk), rate limiting via CloudFront
Residual Risk: 🟡 Medium — Accepted as cost of transparency model

Misuse Case 3: Automated Credential Stuffing Campaign

Persona: Botnet operator running mass credential stuffing against GitHub accounts
Goal: Compromise any accessible account for crypto mining, spam, or resale
Attack Vector: Leaked credential databases → automated login attempts against @pethers GitHub account
Impact: Repository compromise, website defacement, CI/CD abuse for crypto mining
Controls: GitHub MFA enforcement, FIDO2 hardware keys, login anomaly detection
Residual Risk: 🟢 Low — MFA blocks credential stuffing effectively

🔮 What-If Analysis

What If...	Impact	Likelihood	Current Mitigation	Gap
GitHub suffers a platform-wide breach exposing repository tokens?	🔴 Critical — all repos potentially compromised	Very Low	OIDC federation (no stored tokens), short-lived credentials	None — architecture designed for this scenario
Google Fonts CDN serves malicious content globally?	🟠 Medium — client-side impact for site visitors	Very Low	SRI hash verification blocks modified content	Consider self-hosting fonts
AWS us-east-1 region has extended outage?	🟡 Medium — website unavailable during outage	Low	CloudFront edge caching serves stale content	No multi-region S3 replication
A critical vulnerability is found in a GitHub Actions runner?	🟠 Medium — CI/CD pipeline compromise	Low	SHA-pinned actions, Harden Runner, minimal permissions	Monitor GitHub security advisories
DNS registrar account is compromised?	🔴 Critical — complete domain takeover	Very Low	Registrar 2FA, domain lock, DNSSEC	Add secondary DNS provider

📈 Residual Risk & Risk Acceptance

Accepted Risks

The following risks are ACCEPTED as part of normal business operations:

Risk ID	Risk Description	Business Justification	Acceptance Authority	Review Date
AR-01	Email address harvesting from public contact info	Contact information must be accessible for business development	CEO	2026-05-26
AR-02	Source code visibility in public repository	Transparency is a core value; no sensitive logic exposed	CEO	2026-05-26
AR-03	Brief outages during AWS service incidents	Static website with 99% target acceptable for marketing	CEO	2026-05-26
AR-04	CloudFront cache serving stale content	Users tolerate brief staleness; invalidation resolves quickly	CEO	2026-05-26

Risks Requiring Additional Mitigation (Backlog)

Risk ID	Risk Description	Proposed Mitigation	Target Date	Priority
RM-01	GitHub account compromise (S-03)	Enforce hardware security key (FIDO2) MFA	Q2 2025	High
RM-02	CloudFront access log analysis gaps (R-03)	Implement automated log analysis with anomaly detection	Q3 2025	Medium
RM-03	Single DNS provider dependency	Add secondary DNS provider for resilience	Q4 2025	Medium
RM-04	Google Fonts CDN dependency (T-03)	Host fonts locally to eliminate external dependency	Q2 2025	Low
RM-05	No Web Application Firewall (WAF)	Evaluate CloudFront WAF for advanced threat protection	Q3 2025	Low

Continuous Monitoring & Detection

Active Monitoring:

✅ AWS CloudTrail → Security Hub (automated threat detection)
✅ GitHub Security Alerts (Dependabot, secret scanning, code scanning)
✅ OpenSSF Scorecard (supply chain security posture)
✅ ZAP scanning in CI/CD (weekly automated scans)
⏳ CloudFront access log analysis (planned Q3 2025)

Alert Triggers:

Unauthorized S3 bucket access attempts
IAM policy modifications
GitHub account login from new location
Dependabot critical vulnerability alerts
CloudFront distribution configuration changes
Failed authentication attempts (>5 in 1 hour)

🎖️ MITRE ATT&CK Framework Integration

🔍 Attacker-Centric Analysis

Following MITRE ATT&CK Integration methodology:

ATT&CK ID	Technique	Tactic	Associated Threats	Mitigations
T1584.001	Compromise Infrastructure: Domains	Resource Development	S-01 (DNS hijacking)	DNSSEC, registrar 2FA, domain lock
T1584.004	Compromise Infrastructure: Server	Resource Development	S-02 (certificate spoofing)	AWS Certificate Manager, CAA records
T1584.006	Compromise Infrastructure: Web Services	Resource Development	S-04 (CloudFront hijacking)	IAM least privilege, CloudTrail
T1078.001	Valid Accounts: Default Accounts	Privilege Escalation	S-03 (GitHub compromise)	MFA enforcement, activity monitoring
T1078.004	Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts	Privilege Escalation	E-01 (AWS IAM escalation)	MFA, least privilege, OIDC
T1565.001	Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation	Impact	T-01 (website defacement)	S3 versioning, CloudTrail, branch protection
T1195.002	Supply Chain Compromise: Software Supply Chain	Initial Access	T-03, E-05 (supply chain attacks)	SRI, CSP, Dependabot, package locks
T1530	Data from Cloud Storage Object	Collection	T-02, I-03 (S3 compromise)	Private bucket, IAM least privilege, CloudTrail
T1554	Compromise Client Software Binary	Persistence	T-04 (CI/CD tampering)	Branch protection, code review, workflow permissions
T1557	Man-in-the-Middle	Credential Access	T-05 (MITM)	HTTPS/TLS 1.3, HSTS, certificate pinning
T1070.002	Indicator Removal: Clear Logs	Defense Evasion	R-01 (log tampering)	Immutable CloudTrail logs
T1070.003	Indicator Removal: Clear Command History	Defense Evasion	R-02, R-03 (log gaps)	CloudTrail, S3 access logging
T1562.001	Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools	Defense Evasion	R-03 (disable logging)	Protected CloudTrail configuration
T1552.001	Credentials in Files	Credential Access	I-01, I-05 (credential leaks)	Secret scanning, OIDC, no hardcoded creds
T1552.004	Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys	Credential Access	I-04 (signed URL leak)	Not using signed URLs, expiration if implemented
T1213	Data from Information Repositories	Collection	I-02 (source code exposure)	Public by design, no secrets in code
T1589.002	Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses	Reconnaissance	I-06 (email harvesting)	Accepted risk for business contact
T1498.001	Network Denial of Service: Direct Flood	Impact	D-03 (DNS takedown)	DNSSEC, registrar lock
T1498.002	Network Denial of Service: Reflection Amplification	Impact	D-01 (DDoS)	AWS Shield, CloudFront protection
T1496	Resource Hijacking	Impact	D-04, D-05 (resource exhaustion)	GitHub Actions limits, cost monitoring
T1548	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	Privilege Escalation	E-02 (Actions privilege escalation)	Minimal permissions, environment secrets
T1134	Access Token Manipulation	Privilege Escalation	E-04 (OIDC token manipulation)	Short-lived tokens, claim validation

📊 ATT&CK Coverage Analysis

Tactics Covered:

✅ Reconnaissance (1 technique) - 10% coverage
✅ Resource Development (3 techniques) - 50% coverage
✅ Initial Access (1 technique) - 20% coverage
✅ Persistence (1 technique) - 15% coverage
✅ Privilege Escalation (4 techniques) - 35% coverage
✅ Defense Evasion (3 techniques) - 20% coverage
✅ Credential Access (3 techniques) - 25% coverage
✅ Collection (2 techniques) - 15% coverage
✅ Impact (4 techniques) - 30% coverage

Total: 22 MITRE ATT&CK techniques mapped across 9 tactics.

Not Applicable Tactics:

❌ Execution - Static website, no code execution
❌ Discovery - No active enumeration targets
❌ Lateral Movement - Single-component architecture
❌ Command and Control - No persistent connections
❌ Exfiltration - Public data, no exfiltration concerns

🎯 Coverage Heat Map by Tactic

%%{
  init: {
    'theme': 'base',
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}%%
pie title ATT&CK Tactic Coverage
    "Resource Development" : 50
    "Privilege Escalation" : 35
    "Impact" : 30
    "Credential Access" : 25
    "Defense Evasion" : 20
    "Initial Access" : 20
    "Collection" : 15
    "Persistence" : 15
    "Reconnaissance" : 10

🛡️ Security Control to ATT&CK Mitigation Mapping

Security Control	MITRE Mitigation	Addressed Techniques
Content Security Policy	M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content	T1195
Subresource Integrity	M1051: Update Software	T1195.002
AWS CloudTrail	M1047: Audit	T1070, T1078
IAM Least Privilege	M1026: Privileged Account Management	T1078, T1548
OIDC Federation	M1026: Privileged Account Management	T1552.001, T1134
AWS Shield	M1037: Filter Network Traffic	T1498
Branch Protection	M1053: Data Backup	T1565.001, T1554
GitHub Secret Scanning	M1017: User Training	T1552.001

🔪 Kill Chain Disruption Analysis

Following Hack23 AB Kill Chain Analysis methodology, mapping Cyber Kill Chain phases to homepage defensive controls:

Kill Chain Phase	Attacker Activity (Homepage Context)	Defensive Control	Detection Mechanism
1. Reconnaissance	OSINT on public repo, DNS enumeration, technology fingerprinting	Public-by-design reduces value; minimal tech exposure via headers	GitHub audit logs, CloudFront access logs
2. Weaponization	Craft malicious commit, create phishing page for GitHub creds	N/A — Occurs off-target; no direct prevention	Threat intelligence feeds, phishing detection
3. Delivery	Credential stuffing on GitHub, phishing email to CEO, supply chain PR	MFA enforcement, FIDO2 keys, email security training	GitHub login alerts, failed auth monitoring
4. Exploitation	Compromised GitHub account, malicious dependency update	Branch protection, CODEOWNERS review, Dependabot alerts	PR review notifications, dependency diff alerts
5. Installation	Push malicious code to repository, modify CI/CD workflow	SHA-pinned Actions, workflow approval requirements, Harden Runner	GitHub Actions audit log, Step Security alerts
6. Command & Control	Inject scripts via website for C2 communication	CSP blocks inline/external scripts, SRI integrity checks	CSP violation reports, CloudFront logs
7. Actions on Objectives	Website defacement, SEO poisoning, credential harvesting	S3 versioning enables rollback, CloudTrail provides forensics	CloudTrail alerts, uptime monitoring, visual diff checks

Kill Chain Summary: The homepage's strongest disruption points are at Delivery (MFA), Exploitation (branch protection), and C2 (CSP). The weakest point is Weaponization which occurs off-target and cannot be directly prevented.

🌳 Attack Tree Analysis

🔄 Continuous Validation & Assessment

🎪 Threat Modeling Workshop Process

Following Hack23 AB Workshop Framework:

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flowchart LR
    PRE[📋 Pre-Workshop Prep] --> ENUM[🎯 Asset & Trust Boundary Enumeration]
    ENUM --> THREATS[🔍 Threat Identification<br/>STRIDE + MITRE ATT&CK]
    THREATS --> MAP[⚖️ Risk & Compliance Mapping]
    MAP --> PLAN[🛡️ Mitigation & Control Plan]
    PLAN --> INTEG[🔧 CI/CD Integration]
    INTEG --> MON[📊 Monitoring & Metrics]
    MON --> REVIEW[🔄 Quarterly Review]
    REVIEW --> THREATS

    classDef default fill:#e3f2fd,stroke:#1565C0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1a1a2e
    classDef primary fill:#2196F3,stroke:#1565C0,stroke-width:2px,color:#ffffff
    classDef success fill:#4CAF50,stroke:#2E7D32,stroke-width:2px,color:#ffffff
    classDef warning fill:#FF9800,stroke:#F57C00,stroke-width:2px,color:#ffffff
    classDef danger fill:#D32F2F,stroke:#B71C1C,stroke-width:2px,color:#ffffff
    classDef info fill:#455A64,stroke:#263238,stroke-width:2px,color:#ffffff

📅 Assessment Lifecycle

Assessment Type	Trigger	Frequency	Scope	Documentation Update
📅 Comprehensive Review	Quarterly cycle	Quarterly	Complete threat model	Full document revision
🔄 Delta Assessment	Architecture changes	Per change	Modified components	Incremental updates
🚨 Incident-Driven	Security events	As needed	Affected systems	Lessons learned integration
🎯 Threat Intelligence	New attack patterns	Monthly	High-risk scenarios	MITRE ATT&CK updates
📦 Dependency Assessment	New dependencies	Per dependency change	Supply chain components	Dependency risk updates

📊 Comprehensive Threat Agent Analysis

🔍 Detailed Threat Actor Classification

Following Hack23 AB Threat Agent Classification methodology:

Threat Agent	Category	Motivation	MITRE Techniques	Targeted Assets
🎯 Opportunistic Attackers	External	Reputation damage, notoriety	T1565.001, T1498	Website content, brand reputation
🏢 Commercial Competitors	External	Market intelligence, sabotage	T1213, T1565	Source code, consulting methodologies
🏛️ Nation-State Actors	External/Advanced	Infrastructure disruption, espionage	T1584, T1078	AWS infrastructure, DNS
🔗 Supply Chain Actors	External	Backdoor insertion, widespread impact	T1195.002, T1554	CI/CD pipeline, dependencies
👤 Malicious Insiders	Internal	Sabotage, data theft, negligence	T1552.001, T1078	AWS credentials, source code
🤖 Automated Bots	Automated	Resource abuse, spam, scraping	T1589.002, T1496	Email addresses, service availability

Most Probable Attack Scenario:
🎯 Opportunistic attacker → GitHub account compromise (weak password/no MFA) → Repository access → Malicious code push → Website defacement → Maximum embarrassment for cybersecurity consultant

🔄 Threat Model Maintenance

Review Schedule

Quarterly Reviews: Every 3 months (Jan, Apr, Jul, Oct)
Triggered Reviews: After significant infrastructure changes, security incidents, or new threat intelligence
Annual Deep Dive: Comprehensive threat landscape reassessment

Update Triggers

New AWS service adoption (e.g., WAF, CloudFront Functions)
Architecture changes (e.g., adding backend API, database)
Significant security incidents affecting similar systems
New STRIDE threats identified in industry
Major dependency updates or supply chain events
Changes to compliance requirements (ISO 27001, GDPR, etc.)

Continuous Improvement

Monitor OpenSSF Scorecard for security posture degradation
Review ZAP scan findings for new vulnerability classes
Analyze CloudTrail logs for anomalous activity patterns
Track GitHub security advisories for dependencies
Participate in security community threat intelligence sharing

📚 Architecture Documentation Map

Cross-reference to the complete Hack23 Homepage documentation portfolio:

Document	Purpose	Threat Model Relevance
SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md	Security controls and defense-in-depth design	Primary reference for implemented controls
FUTURE_SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md	Security enhancement roadmap	Future threat mitigations
FUTURE_THREAT_MODEL.md	Future state threat analysis	Evolution of threat landscape
ARCHITECTURE.md	C4 architecture model (Context, Container, Component)	System boundary and component identification
DATA_MODEL.md	Content model and data structures	Asset identification and data flow analysis
FLOWCHART.md	Process flows and deployment workflows	Attack path and CI/CD pipeline analysis
STATEDIAGRAM.md	Deployment and content lifecycle states	State transition threat analysis
MINDMAP.md	System conceptual relationships	Holistic threat landscape visualization
SWOT.md	Strategic analysis and positioning	Business context for risk assessment
CLASSIFICATION.md	CIA triad classification and business impact	Risk prioritization framework
CRA-ASSESSMENT.md	EU Cyber Resilience Act conformity	Regulatory compliance alignment
WORKFLOWS.md	CI/CD and operational workflows (10 workflows)	Pipeline security analysis
BCPPlan.md	Business Continuity Plan, BIA, RTO/RPO, DR playbooks	Resilience controls for availability threats
FinancialSecurityPlan.md	Infrastructure cost & security investment	Cost-justified risk treatment
End-of-Life-Strategy.md	Technology lifecycle management	Long-term threat-surface evolution
SECURITY.md	Vulnerability disclosure policy	Incident response integration

🏛️ Hack23 ISMS Framework

Primary ISMS Documentation:

🎯 Threat Modeling Policy - STRIDE, MITRE ATT&CK, attack trees methodology
🔐 Information Security Policy - Overarching security governance framework
🏷️ Classification Framework - Business impact analysis and CIA triad classification
🌐 ISMS Transparency Plan - Public disclosure strategy
📝 Style Guide - ISMS documentation standards

Core Security Policies:

🛠️ Secure Development Policy - SDLC security requirements and threat modeling integration
🔍 Vulnerability Management Policy - Security testing and remediation processes
🌐 Network Security Policy - Cloud-native perimeter protection
🔑 Access Control Policy - Zero-trust IAM and authentication
🔒 Cryptography Policy - TLS 1.3 and encryption standards
🏷️ Data Classification Policy - Information protection requirements

Operational Security:

🚨 Incident Response Plan - Security incident management procedures
📝 Change Management - Risk-controlled change processes
🤝 Third Party Management - Supplier security risk management
📉 Risk Register - Enterprise risk tracking

Compliance & Governance:

✅ Compliance Checklist - ISO 27001, NIST CSF 2.0, CIS Controls alignment
📊 Security Metrics - KPI and performance measurement

Hack23 Reference Implementations:

🏛️ CIA Threat Model - Java/Spring Framework enterprise web application STRIDE analysis
🎮 Black Trigram Threat Model - TypeScript/React/ThreeJs gaming platform security
📊 CIA Compliance Manager Threat Model - React SPA client-side security

Homepage Future State:

🔮 Future Threat Model - Threat analysis for planned architecture evolution

📋 Repository Documentation

Security Architecture:

SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md - Homepage security architecture and controls
FUTURE_SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md - Security enhancement roadmap
SECURITY.md - Vulnerability disclosure policy
CLASSIFICATION.md - Homepage CIA triad classification

Architecture Documentation:

ARCHITECTURE.md - C4 architecture model
DATA_MODEL.md - Content model and data structures
FLOWCHART.md - Process flows and workflows
STATEDIAGRAM.md - Deployment and content lifecycle states
MINDMAP.md - System conceptual relationships
SWOT.md - Strategic analysis and positioning
CRA-ASSESSMENT.md - EU Cyber Resilience Act conformity assessment

Security Controls Implementation:

GitHub Issue #450 - Content Security Policy (CSP) implementation
GitHub Issue #451 - Subresource Integrity (SRI) for external fonts
GitHub Issue #355 - OWASP ZAP security scanning

CI/CD Security:

.github/workflows/main.yml - Deployment with ZAP and Lighthouse scanning
.github/workflows/scorecards.yml - OpenSSF Scorecard supply chain security

🌐 External Security Frameworks

Threat Modeling Frameworks:

🎖️ MITRE ATT&CK Framework - Adversary tactics and techniques knowledge base
🛡️ OWASP Threat Modeling - Application threat modeling guidance
📊 Microsoft STRIDE Methodology - Per-element threat categorization

Security Best Practices:

🔒 AWS Security Best Practices - Cloud security architecture guidance
🌐 OpenSSF Best Practices - Open source security maturity criteria
🛡️ NIST Cybersecurity Framework - Risk management framework
📋 CIS Controls - Prioritized security actions

📋 Document Control

📋 Document Control:
✅ Approved by: James Pether Sörling, CEO
📤 Distribution: Public
🏷️ Classification:
📅 Effective Date: 2026-02-26
⏰ Next Review: 2026-05-26 (Quarterly)
🎯 Framework Compliance:
🔗 Related Documents: Threat Modeling Policy, Security Architecture, Future Threat Model, Secure Development Policy, SECURITY.md

🍎 All hail Eris! All hail Discordia!

The Law of Fives is never wrong. This threat model contains 5 major sections, 6 STRIDE categories (which reduces to 6→3→CIA Triad→3×5=15→1+5=6, completing the cycle), 30 threats identified (3+0=3), and 22 MITRE ATT&CK techniques mapped (the cosmic duality of 11×2!). The universe confirms: this security architecture is cosmically sound.

FNORD. (Did you see the hidden pentagons in the attack trees? The five defensive layers? The synchronicity is real.)

— Simon Moon, Philosopher-Engineer & System Architect
"Think for yourself, question authority, but always follow the Law of Fives in security architecture."