🎯 Black Trigram (흑괘) — Future Threat Model

🛡️ AWS Serverless Backend Security Through Structured Threat Analysis
🔍 STRIDE • MITRE ATT&CK • Cloud Security • AWS Serverless • Payment Security

📋 Document Owner: CEO | 📄 Version: 1.1 | 📅 Last Updated: 2026-03-19 (UTC)
🔄 Review Cycle: Semi-Annual | ⏰ Next Review: 2026-09-19
🏷️ Classification: Public (Open Source Educational Gaming Platform)

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🎯 Purpose & Scope

Establish a comprehensive threat model for Black Trigram's future AWS serverless backend architecture. This systematic threat analysis integrates STRIDE methodology and MITRE ATT&CK framework to ensure proactive security through structured analysis of cloud-based authentication, API, database, storage, and payment processing systems.

🌟 Transparency Commitment

This future threat model demonstrates 🛡️ cybersecurity consulting expertise through public documentation of advanced cloud security threat assessment methodologies, showcasing our 🏆 competitive advantage via systematic risk management for AWS serverless architectures and 🤝 customer trust through transparent security practices.

— Based on Hack23 AB's commitment to security through transparency and excellence

📚 Framework Integration

• 🎭 STRIDE per architecture element: Systematic threat categorization for AWS backend components
• 🎖️ MITRE ATT&CK Cloud Matrix: Cloud-specific attack technique mapping
• 🏗️ Asset-centric analysis: User data, game state, and payment information protection
• 🎯 Scenario-centric modeling: Real-world cloud gaming platform attack simulation
• ⚖️ Risk-centric assessment: Business impact on cloud infrastructure and user trust

🔍 Scope Definition

Included Systems:

• 🔐 AWS Cognito authentication (User Pools, Identity Pools, Social Login)
• 🚪 API Gateway (REST + WebSocket endpoints)
• ⚡ AWS Lambda serverless functions
• 📊 DynamoDB tables (player data, game states, achievements)
• 📦 S3 buckets (save games, replays, user-generated content)
• 💳 Stripe payment integration (PCI DSS compliance)
• ⚖️ CloudFront CDN + AWS WAF
• 🔄 AWS Backup and disaster recovery
• 🌐 OAuth 2.0 social login providers (Google, Facebook, Discord, GitHub, Twitter/X, Apple)

Out of Scope:

• Frontend client-side threats (covered in THREAT_MODEL.md)
• Static asset delivery security (covered in current threat model)
• End-user device security beyond authentication
• Third-party CDN infrastructure (external dependency)

🔗 Policy Alignment

Integrated with:

• 🎯 Hack23 AB Threat Modeling Policy - STRIDE methodology
• 🛠️ Secure Development Policy - Security architecture requirements
• 🔒 Cryptography Policy - Encryption standards
• 🌐 Network Security Policy - VPC and WAF configuration
• 🔑 Access Control Policy - IAM and RBAC

Cross-References:

• 🏗️ FUTURE_ARCHITECTURE.md - AWS backend architecture design
• 🛡️ FUTURE_SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md - Security controls implementation
• 🔐 THREAT_MODEL.md - Current frontend-only threat model

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📊 System Classification & Operating Profile

🏷️ Security Classification Matrix

Dimension	Level	Rationale	Business Impact
🔐 Confidentiality		User accounts, personal data, payment information
🔒 Integrity		Game state accuracy, payment transaction integrity critical
⚡ Availability		Real-time multiplayer and payment processing require high availability

⚖️ Regulatory & Compliance Profile

Compliance Area	Classification	Implementation Status
📋 Regulatory Exposure	High	Personal data collection, payment processing
💳 PCI DSS	Required	Stripe handles card data, webhook security critical
🇪🇺 GDPR	Required	EU user data protection, right to deletion
🇪🇺 CRA (EU Cyber Resilience Act)	Standard classification	Cloud-based commercial software
🔄 RPO / RTO	RPO: 1 hour / RTO: 4 hours	Multi-region backup, automated recovery

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💎 Critical Assets & Protection Goals

🏗️ Asset-Centric Threat Analysis

Following Hack23 AB Asset-Centric Threat Modeling methodology:

Asset Category	Why Valuable	Threat Goals	Key Controls	Business Value
👤 User Accounts	Authentication and identity	Account takeover, credential theft	MFA, JWT validation, password policies
📊 Player Data	Game progress and personal information	Data breach, unauthorized access	KMS encryption, IAM policies, row-level security
💳 Payment Data	Transaction history and financial information	Payment fraud, data exfiltration	PCI DSS compliance, webhook signature verification, Stripe.js tokenization
🎮 Game State	Save games and player progress	Progress manipulation, data loss	Encryption at rest, backup automation, version control
⚡ Lambda Functions	Business logic and API handlers	Code injection, privilege escalation	Least privilege IAM, input validation, secrets management
🚪 API Endpoints	Gateway to backend services	API abuse, DDoS attacks	WAF rules, rate limiting, JWT authentication
🔑 OAuth Credentials	Social login tokens and secrets	Token theft, session hijacking	Short-lived tokens, refresh rotation, state parameter validation
📦 AWS Infrastructure	Cloud resources and configuration	Resource compromise, lateral movement	VPC isolation, security groups, CloudTrail logging

🔐 Crown Jewel Analysis

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flowchart TB
    subgraph CROWN_JEWELS["💎 Crown Jewels"]
        USER_AUTH["🔐 User Authentication<br/>AWS Cognito Identity"]
        PLAYER_DATA["📊 Player Data<br/>Progress & Achievements"]
        PAYMENT_PROC["💳 Payment Processing<br/>Transaction Integrity"]
        GAME_STATE["🎮 Game State<br/>Save Data & Replays"]
    end

    subgraph ATTACK_VECTORS["⚔️ Primary Attack Vectors"]
        AUTH_BYPASS["🔓 Authentication Bypass"]
        DATA_BREACH["💉 Data Breach"]
        PAYMENT_FRAUD["💸 Payment Fraud"]
        API_ABUSE["🚪 API Abuse"]
        CREDENTIAL_THEFT["🔑 Credential Theft"]
        SERVERLESS_EXPLOIT["⚡ Serverless Exploitation"]
    end

    subgraph THREAT_AGENTS["👥 Key Threat Agents"]
        HACKERS["🎯 Cybercriminals<br/>Monetization via Fraud"]
        NATION_STATE["🏛️ Nation-State Actors<br/>Data Exfiltration"]
        INSIDER_THREAT["👤 Malicious Insiders<br/>AWS Access Abuse"]
        SCRIPT_KIDDIES["🐛 Script Kiddies<br/>API Exploitation"]
        COMPETITORS["🏢 Competitors<br/>Service Disruption"]
    end

    AUTH_BYPASS --> USER_AUTH
    CREDENTIAL_THEFT --> USER_AUTH
    DATA_BREACH --> PLAYER_DATA
    PAYMENT_FRAUD --> PAYMENT_PROC
    API_ABUSE --> GAME_STATE
    SERVERLESS_EXPLOIT --> PLAYER_DATA

    HACKERS --> PAYMENT_FRAUD
    NATION_STATE --> DATA_BREACH
    INSIDER_THREAT --> AUTH_BYPASS
    SCRIPT_KIDDIES --> API_ABUSE
    COMPETITORS --> API_ABUSE

    style CROWN_JEWELS fill:#e8f5e9,stroke:#4caf50,stroke-width:3px
    style ATTACK_VECTORS fill:#ffcdd2,stroke:#f44336,stroke-width:3px
    style THREAT_AGENTS fill:#fff3e0,stroke:#ff9800,stroke-width:3px

---

🏗️ AWS Backend Architecture Context

Backend System Architecture

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flowchart TD
    A["👤 Player"] -->|HTTPS| B["⚖️ CloudFront + WAF"]
    B --> C["⚛️ React Frontend"]
    C -->|OAuth 2.0<br/>Authorization Code + PKCE| D["🔐 AWS Cognito"]
    D -->|JWT Tokens<br/>ID, Access, Refresh| E["🚪 API Gateway + WAF"]
    E -->|Validated JWT| F["⚡ Lambda Functions"]
    F --> G["📊 DynamoDB<br/>Player Data"]
    F --> H["📦 S3<br/>Save Games"]
    C -->|Stripe.js<br/>Tokenized Payment| I["💳 Stripe"]
    I -->|Webhook<br/>HMAC-SHA256| F
    
    J["🌐 Social Providers<br/>Google, Facebook, Discord<br/>GitHub, Twitter/X, Apple"] -->|OAuth 2.0| D
    
    K["☁️ AWS Security Services"] --> L["🛡️ GuardDuty"]
    K --> M["📈 Security Hub"]
    K --> N["🔍 CloudTrail"]
    K --> O["📊 CloudWatch"]
    
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    style E fill:#9c27b0,stroke:#6a1b9a,color:white,stroke-width:3px
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    style G fill:#00c853,stroke:#007e33,color:white,stroke-width:3px
    style I fill:#ff5722,stroke:#d84315,color:white,stroke-width:3px

🔒 Trust Boundaries & Attack Surface

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graph TB
    subgraph TRUST_BOUNDARY_1["🌐 Internet Trust Boundary"]
        PLAYER["👤 Player"]
        ATTACKER["🎯 Attacker"]
    end
    
    subgraph TRUST_BOUNDARY_2["⚖️ CDN Trust Boundary"]
        CLOUDFRONT["⚖️ CloudFront"]
        WAF_CDN["🛡️ WAF - CDN Layer"]
    end
    
    subgraph TRUST_BOUNDARY_3["🔐 Authentication Trust Boundary"]
        COGNITO["🔐 AWS Cognito"]
        SOCIAL_PROVIDERS["🌐 Social Login Providers"]
        IDENTITY_POOL["🔑 Identity Pool"]
    end
    
    subgraph TRUST_BOUNDARY_4["🚪 API Trust Boundary"]
        API_GATEWAY["🚪 API Gateway"]
        WAF_API["🛡️ WAF - API Layer"]
        AUTHORIZER["🔓 JWT Authorizer"]
    end
    
    subgraph TRUST_BOUNDARY_5["⚡ Compute Trust Boundary - VPC"]
        LAMBDA["⚡ Lambda Functions"]
        VPC["🔒 VPC Private Subnets"]
        SECURITY_GROUPS["🛡️ Security Groups"]
    end
    
    subgraph TRUST_BOUNDARY_6["📊 Data Trust Boundary"]
        DYNAMODB["📊 DynamoDB"]
        S3["📦 S3"]
        KMS["🔐 AWS KMS"]
    end
    
    subgraph TRUST_BOUNDARY_7["💳 Payment Trust Boundary"]
        STRIPE["💳 Stripe"]
        WEBHOOK["⚡ Webhook Handler"]
    end

    PLAYER -->|T1: Malicious Request| CLOUDFRONT
    ATTACKER -->|T2: API Flooding| API_GATEWAY
    CLOUDFRONT -->|T3: JWT Theft| COGNITO
    SOCIAL_PROVIDERS -->|T4: OAuth Compromise| COGNITO
    API_GATEWAY -->|T5: NoSQL Injection| LAMBDA
    LAMBDA -->|T6: Data Exfiltration| DYNAMODB
    LAMBDA -->|T7: Unauthorized Access| S3
    STRIPE -->|T8: Webhook Forgery| WEBHOOK
    ATTACKER -->|T9: Credential Stuffing| COGNITO
    LAMBDA -->|T10: Privilege Escalation| VPC
    DYNAMODB -->|T11: Data Tampering| KMS

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    style TRUST_BOUNDARY_7 fill:#fce4ec,stroke:#c2185b,stroke-width:3px,stroke-dasharray: 5 5

---

🎭 STRIDE Threat Analysis by Component

🔐 AWS Cognito Authentication System

Threat Category	Threat Description	Attack Vector	Severity	Likelihood	Mitigation	MITRE ATT&CK
Spoofing	Attacker impersonates legitimate user	Stolen JWT tokens, session hijacking, replay attacks	Critical	Medium	Short-lived tokens (1hr), MFA required, refresh token rotation, Cognito security headers	T1078 - Valid Accounts
Spoofing	Social login account takeover	Compromised social provider account linked to game account	High	Medium	Email verification, account linking security, MFA enforcement	T1078.004 - Cloud Accounts
Tampering	JWT token manipulation	Modified claims, expired token reuse, signature bypass	High	Low	JWT signature verification with Cognito JWKS, token expiration checks, claims validation	T1550.001 - Application Access Token
Repudiation	User denies authentication action	No audit trail for login/logout events	Medium	Medium	CloudTrail logging, Cognito event logs with user context, immutable audit trail	T1562.008 - Disable Cloud Logs
Information Disclosure	Leaked user credentials	Phishing, credential stuffing, password spray attacks	Critical	High	Password policies (12+ chars, complexity), breach detection, MFA, rate limiting	T1110 - Brute Force
Information Disclosure	OAuth token leakage	Authorization code interception, redirect URI manipulation	High	Medium	PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange), state parameter validation, redirect URI whitelist	T1528 - Steal Application Access Token
Denial of Service	Authentication flood	Brute force login attempts, account enumeration	Medium	High	Rate limiting (10 attempts/5min), account lockout policies, CAPTCHA integration	T1498 - Network Denial of Service
Elevation of Privilege	Unauthorized admin access	Compromised admin account, privilege escalation via token manipulation	Critical	Low	Separate admin user pool, MFA required, admin action logging, least privilege	T1548 - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism

Security Controls:

• ✅ MFA optional (required for admin accounts)
• ✅ Password policy: 12+ characters, uppercase, lowercase, numbers, symbols
• ✅ Token lifetime: Access (1hr), ID (1hr), Refresh (30 days with rotation)
• ✅ Account recovery: Email-based with verification code
• ✅ Custom attributes: Player archetype, Korean martial arts rank
• ✅ CloudTrail integration: All authentication events logged

---

🚪 API Gateway Security (REST + WebSocket)

Threat Category	Threat Description	Attack Vector	Severity	Likelihood	Mitigation	MITRE ATT&CK
Spoofing	Unauthorized API access	Missing authentication, forged JWT tokens	Critical	Medium	JWT validation on every endpoint, Cognito authorizer, API keys for third-party	T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application
Spoofing	WebSocket connection hijacking	Stolen connection token, session fixation	High	Medium	JWT authentication via Sec-WebSocket-Protocol, connection timeout (30min)	T1557 - Man-in-the-Middle
Tampering	Request payload manipulation	Modified JSON, SQL injection, NoSQL injection, command injection	High	High	Input validation with JSON schema, parameterized queries, escape user input, content-type enforcement	T1565.002 - Transmitted Data Manipulation
Tampering	WebSocket message injection	Malicious combat input, state manipulation	High	Medium	Message signature verification, sequence ID validation, server-side state authority	T1565.001 - Stored Data Manipulation
Repudiation	API abuse denial	No request logging, missing transaction audit	Medium	Medium	CloudWatch Logs with X-Ray tracing, request ID tracking, immutable logs	T1070.002 - Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
Information Disclosure	Sensitive data leakage	Verbose error messages, stack traces, internal paths	High	High	Generic error responses, data masking, sanitized error messages, no stack traces in production	T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object
Information Disclosure	API endpoint enumeration	Unprotected endpoint discovery, swagger/openapi exposure	Medium	High	Disable public API docs, rate limiting on OPTIONS, authentication on all endpoints	T1046 - Network Service Discovery
Denial of Service	API flooding	DDoS attacks, rate limit bypass, resource exhaustion	High	High	WAF rate limiting (100 req/min per user), throttling (10k req/s), auto-scaling, burst capacity (200)	T1499 - Endpoint Denial of Service
Denial of Service	WebSocket connection exhaustion	Connection flood, ping flooding	Medium	Medium	Connection limits per user (5 concurrent), idle timeout (5min), CloudFront protection	T1499.002 - Service Exhaustion Flood
Elevation of Privilege	Broken access control	Unauthorized endpoint access, IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference)	Critical	Medium	IAM authorization, resource policies, user ID validation in Lambda, row-level security	T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Security Controls:

• ✅ JWT validation: Cognito authorizer with JWKS verification
• ✅ Rate limiting: 100 requests/minute per user (burst: 200)
• ✅ Request validation: JSON schema validation for all POST/PUT
• ✅ CORS: Configured for blacktrigram.com and *.blacktrigram.com
• ✅ API keys: Required for third-party integrations
• ✅ Usage plans: Free tier (1000 req/day), Premium tier (unlimited)
• ✅ CloudWatch Logs: Enabled with X-Ray distributed tracing

---

⚡ AWS Lambda Function Security

Threat Category	Threat Description	Attack Vector	Severity	Likelihood	Mitigation	MITRE ATT&CK
Spoofing	Lambda function impersonation	Stolen IAM credentials, assume role abuse	High	Low	Least privilege IAM roles, temporary credentials (15min), role session tagging	T1078.004 - Cloud Accounts
Tampering	Code injection	Unsanitized inputs, command injection, path traversal	Critical	Medium	Input validation, parameterized queries, escape user input, no eval(), content validation	T1059.006 - Python
Tampering	Lambda layer poisoning	Compromised dependency layer, malicious code injection	High	Low	Layer integrity verification, SHA-256 checksums, signed layers, SBOM validation	T1195.001 - Compromise Software Dependencies
Repudiation	Function execution denial	No execution logging, missing audit trail	Medium	Medium	CloudWatch Logs with structured logging, X-Ray distributed tracing, execution context	T1070.002 - Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
Information Disclosure	Environment variable leakage	Hardcoded secrets, exposed credentials in logs	Critical	Medium	AWS Secrets Manager, KMS encryption for environment variables, no secrets in code	T1552.001 - Credentials In Files
Information Disclosure	Data exfiltration via Lambda	Unauthorized data access, exfiltration to external endpoints	High	Medium	VPC isolation (no internet gateway), VPC endpoints only, outbound traffic monitoring	T1567 - Exfiltration Over Web Service
Denial of Service	Function timeout/exhaustion	Infinite loops, resource exhaustion, memory leaks	Medium	Medium	Timeout limits (30s), memory limits (512MB-1GB), concurrency limits, reserved capacity	T1499 - Endpoint Denial of Service
Denial of Service	Lambda cold start amplification	Forced cold starts, concurrent invocation flood	Low	Medium	Provisioned concurrency, connection pooling, Lambda warming strategies	T1498 - Network Denial of Service
Elevation of Privilege	Overprivileged function	Excessive IAM permissions, cross-account access	High	Medium	Least privilege (one role per function), IAM Access Analyzer, resource-based policies only	T1098 - Account Manipulation

Security Controls:

• ✅ IAM roles: Least privilege, one role per function
• ✅ VPC isolation: Private subnets, no internet gateway
• ✅ Environment encryption: KMS for environment variables
• ✅ Secrets management: AWS Secrets Manager for API keys
• ✅ Timeout: 30 seconds maximum
• ✅ Memory: 512MB-1GB based on function needs
• ✅ Concurrency: Reserved capacity and limits per function
• ✅ X-Ray tracing: Enabled for all functions

---

📊 DynamoDB Security

Threat Category	Threat Description	Attack Vector	Severity	Likelihood	Mitigation	MITRE ATT&CK
Spoofing	Unauthorized table access	Stolen AWS credentials, IAM policy bypass	Critical	Low	IAM policies with least privilege, VPC endpoints, encryption in transit (TLS 1.3)	T1078.004 - Cloud Accounts
Tampering	Data modification	NoSQL injection, unauthorized writes, item manipulation	High	Medium	Input validation, IAM write restrictions, condition expressions, attribute-level permissions	T1565.001 - Stored Data Manipulation
Tampering	Cross-player data access	Broken access control, IDOR in partition keys	Critical	Low	Row-level security via IAM conditions, user ID validation in application layer	T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object
Repudiation	Data changes denied	No audit trail for table operations	Medium	Medium	CloudTrail logging for all API calls, DynamoDB Streams for change tracking, point-in-time recovery	T1485 - Data Destruction
Information Disclosure	Data breach	Unencrypted data at rest, backup exposure	Critical	Low	KMS encryption at rest (AES-256), access logging, encrypted backups, VPC endpoints	T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object
Information Disclosure	Query pattern analysis	Side-channel attacks via timing, capacity monitoring	Low	Low	Consistent query patterns, on-demand capacity mode, traffic obfuscation	T1565 - Data Manipulation
Denial of Service	Table capacity exhaustion	Write/read capacity flood, hot partition attack	Medium	Medium	Auto-scaling, throttling, reserved capacity, DynamoDB Accelerator (DAX) caching	T1499.002 - Service Exhaustion Flood
Denial of Service	DDoS on database	Distributed query flood, table scan attacks	Medium	Low	WAF protection, rate limiting in application layer, CloudFront caching	T1498 - Network Denial of Service
Elevation of Privilege	IAM policy exploitation	Overly permissive table policies, role assumption abuse	High	Low	Least privilege IAM, condition keys for user context, deny policies for sensitive operations	T1098 - Account Manipulation

Security Controls:

• ✅ Encryption at rest: AWS KMS with customer-managed keys
• ✅ Encryption in transit: TLS 1.3 for all connections
• ✅ IAM policies: Least privilege with condition expressions
• ✅ VPC endpoints: Private connectivity without internet gateway
• ✅ CloudTrail: All API operations logged
• ✅ DynamoDB Streams: Change data capture for audit
• ✅ Point-in-time recovery: Enabled for all tables (35-day window)
• ✅ Automated backups: Daily backups with 35-day retention

---

📦 S3 Security (Save Games & User Content)

Threat Category	Threat Description	Attack Vector	Severity	Likelihood	Mitigation	MITRE ATT&CK
Spoofing	Bucket policy bypass	Misconfigured bucket policies, public access	Critical	Low	Block public access (enabled), VPC endpoints only, pre-signed URLs with expiration	T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object
Tampering	Object modification	Unauthorized file replacement, version manipulation	High	Low	Object versioning enabled, MFA delete required, S3 Object Lock (compliance mode)	T1565.001 - Stored Data Manipulation
Tampering	Malicious file upload	Virus/malware upload, XXE attacks via file upload	High	Medium	Content-type validation, file size limits, malware scanning (GuardDuty for S3), no executable files	T1204.002 - Malicious File
Repudiation	Object access denied	No access logging, missing audit trail	Medium	Medium	S3 access logging enabled, CloudTrail data events, log immutability with Object Lock	T1070 - Indicator Removal
Information Disclosure	Data exfiltration	Unauthorized object reads, bulk downloads	Critical	Medium	IAM user-specific prefixes, condition keys for cognito-identity-id, access logging, CloudFront signed URLs	T1567 - Exfiltration Over Web Service
Information Disclosure	Unencrypted backups	Backup exposure, snapshot leakage	High	Low	Server-side encryption (SSE-KMS), encrypted replicas, lifecycle policies with encryption enforcement	T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object
Denial of Service	Storage exhaustion	Excessive uploads, quota abuse	Medium	Medium	User storage quotas (1GB per user), object count limits, lifecycle policies for cleanup	T1499.002 - Service Exhaustion Flood
Denial of Service	Request flood	GET/PUT flood, bandwidth exhaustion	Low	Medium	CloudFront caching, rate limiting, request throttling, auto-scaling	T1498 - Network Denial of Service
Elevation of Privilege	Cross-user access	Broken access control, path traversal	Critical	Low	IAM condition keys for user context, user-specific prefixes enforced, no wildcard permissions	T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Security Controls:

• ✅ Encryption: SSE-KMS with customer-managed keys (AES-256)
• ✅ Block public access: Enabled at account and bucket level
• ✅ Versioning: Enabled for all user content buckets
• ✅ MFA delete: Required for object deletion
• ✅ S3 Object Lock: Compliance mode for audit logs
• ✅ Access logging: Enabled with separate log bucket
• ✅ IAM policies: User-specific prefixes (cognito-identity-id)
• ✅ Lifecycle policies: Automatic transition to cold storage (7 days)
• ✅ Cross-region replication: US-East-1 → US-West-2

---

💳 Stripe Payment Integration Security

Threat Category	Threat Description	Attack Vector	Severity	Likelihood	Mitigation	MITRE ATT&CK
Spoofing	Fake payment notification	Forged webhook, spoofed payment confirmation	Critical	Medium	Webhook signature verification (HMAC-SHA256), Stripe webhook secrets, endpoint IP whitelist	T1566.002 - Spearphishing Link
Tampering	Price manipulation	Modified checkout amounts, currency manipulation	Critical	Medium	Server-side price validation, Stripe Checkout hosted UI, no client-side price setting	T1565.002 - Transmitted Data Manipulation
Tampering	Webhook replay attack	Reused webhook events, duplicate processing	High	Medium	Idempotency keys, event ID tracking, timestamp validation (5min tolerance)	T1557 - Man-in-the-Middle
Repudiation	Payment dispute	No transaction logging, missing payment evidence	High	High	Stripe Dashboard logs, CloudWatch integration, immutable audit trail, email receipts	T1070 - Indicator Removal
Information Disclosure	Payment data leak	Unencrypted card data, PII exposure	Critical	Low	PCI DSS compliance (Stripe handles card data), Stripe.js tokenization, no card storage	T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object
Information Disclosure	Customer data exposure	Verbose error messages, metadata leakage	Medium	Medium	Sanitized error responses, minimal customer metadata, no sensitive data in logs	T1213 - Data from Information Repositories
Denial of Service	Webhook flood	DDoS on webhook endpoint, event storm	Medium	Medium	Rate limiting (100 events/minute), WAF protection, queue-based processing	T1499 - Endpoint Denial of Service
Denial of Service	Payment processing abuse	Fraudulent payment attempts, card testing	Medium	High	Stripe Radar (fraud detection), rate limiting per user, CAPTCHA for checkout	T1498 - Network Denial of Service
Elevation of Privilege	Unauthorized refund	Compromised API key, admin access abuse	High	Low	Restricted API keys (no refund capability), secret rotation (90 days), admin MFA required	T1098 - Account Manipulation

Security Controls:

• ✅ PCI DSS: Stripe handles all card data (Level 1 PCI compliant)
• ✅ Stripe.js: Client-side tokenization, no card data touches backend
• ✅ Webhook signatures: HMAC-SHA256 verification required
• ✅ Checkout Session: Stripe-hosted UI for payment collection
• ✅ API keys: Restricted permissions, test vs. live keys separated
• ✅ Stripe Radar: Machine learning fraud detection
• ✅ 3D Secure: Enabled for European customers (SCA compliance)
• ✅ Webhook events: checkout.session.completed, payment_intent.succeeded, charge.refunded
• ✅ Idempotency: Event ID tracking to prevent duplicate processing

---

🌐 OAuth 2.0 Social Login Security

Supported Providers: Google, Facebook, Discord, GitHub, Twitter/X, Apple

Threat Category	Threat Description	Attack Vector	Severity	Likelihood	Mitigation	MITRE ATT&CK
Spoofing	Fake OAuth provider	Phishing attack, DNS hijacking, homograph attack	High	Low	HTTPS only, certificate pinning, validate provider certificates, user education	T1566.002 - Spearphishing Link
Spoofing	Account linking attack	Attacker links their social account to victim's game account	Critical	Low	Email verification required, existing account detection, user consent for linking	T1556 - Modify Authentication Process
Tampering	Authorization code interception	CSRF attack, redirect URI manipulation, code theft	High	Medium	State parameter validation, redirect URI whitelist in Cognito, PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange)	T1539 - Steal Web Session Cookie
Tampering	Token manipulation	Modified OAuth tokens, scope escalation	High	Low	Token signature verification, scope validation, minimal scopes (email, profile only)	T1550.001 - Application Access Token
Repudiation	Social login abuse	No consent logging, missing audit trail	Medium	Medium	Cognito audit logs, user consent tracking with timestamps, CloudTrail integration	T1070.002 - Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
Information Disclosure	Excessive scope access	Over-permissioned OAuth scopes, data collection beyond needs	Medium	Medium	Minimal scopes (openid, email, profile only), no write permissions, scope review process	T1213 - Data from Information Repositories
Information Disclosure	Social account data leakage	Exposed social profile data, email addresses	Low	Medium	Data minimization, no storage of social tokens, refresh token rotation	T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object
Denial of Service	OAuth authorization flood	Repeated authorization requests, consent spam	Low	Low	Rate limiting on OAuth callbacks (10 attempts/minute), CAPTCHA for repeated attempts	T1498 - Network Denial of Service
Elevation of Privilege	Account takeover via compromised social account	Attacker gains access to victim's social account	High	Medium	Email verification, account linking security, MFA enforcement, activity monitoring	T1078 - Valid Accounts
Elevation of Privilege	Session fixation	Attacker forces victim to use attacker-controlled session	Medium	Low	Session ID regeneration after login, PKCE validation, short-lived authorization codes (10min)	T1539 - Steal Web Session Cookie

OAuth 2.0 Security Best Practices:

• ✅ Authorization Code Flow with PKCE: Protection against authorization code interception
• ✅ State parameter: CSRF protection, validated on callback
• ✅ Redirect URI whitelist: Only whitelisted URIs in Cognito configuration
• ✅ Minimal scopes: openid, email, profile (no write permissions)
• ✅ Short-lived codes: Authorization codes expire in 10 minutes
• ✅ Email verification: Required for account linking security
• ✅ Account linking: Secure detection of existing accounts by email
• ✅ Token rotation: Refresh tokens rotated on use (30-day lifetime)
• ✅ No token storage: Social provider tokens not stored in database
• ✅ User consent: Explicit consent UI for account linking

Provider-Specific Security:

Provider	Integration Method	Security Notes
Google	Native Cognito Social IdP	Google Sign-In best practices, scope: openid, profile, email
Facebook	Native Cognito Social IdP	Facebook Login Security Checklist, minimal data access
Apple	Native Cognito Social IdP	Sign in with Apple guidelines, privacy-focused
Discord	Custom OIDC IdP	OAuth 2.0 bot security, scope: openid, email, identify
GitHub	Custom OAuth 2.0 IdP	GitHub OAuth App security, scope: read:user, user:email
Twitter/X	Custom OIDC IdP	OAuth 2.0 with PKCE, scope: openid, tweet.read, users.read

---

🎖️ MITRE ATT&CK Framework Integration

🔍 Cloud-Specific Attack Techniques

Following MITRE ATT&CK-Driven Analysis methodology for cloud environments:

Phase	Technique	ID	Black Trigram Context	Control	Detection
🔍 Initial Access	Valid Accounts (Cloud)	T1078.004	Compromised AWS Cognito accounts or IAM credentials	MFA required, password policies, breach detection	CloudTrail monitoring, GuardDuty alerts
🔍 Initial Access	Exploit Public-Facing App	T1190	API Gateway vulnerability exploitation	WAF rules, input validation, rate limiting	Security Hub findings, API logs
🔍 Initial Access	Phishing for Information	T1598	Social engineering for OAuth credentials or JWT tokens	User education, phishing-resistant MFA	Cognito anomaly detection
⚡ Execution	Command & Scripting Interpreter	T1059.006	Malicious code in Lambda (Python/Node.js injection)	Input validation, no eval(), sandboxing	X-Ray tracing, CloudWatch anomalies
⚡ Execution	Serverless Execution	T1648	Lambda function invocation for malicious purposes	IAM least privilege, VPC isolation	Lambda execution logs, unusual invocations
🔄 Persistence	Create Account	T1136.003	Rogue Cognito user accounts created	Email verification, CAPTCHA, rate limiting	Cognito user pool monitoring, GuardDuty
🔄 Persistence	Account Manipulation	T1098	Adding MFA device or changing account attributes	MFA challenges, admin review for privilege changes	CloudTrail Cognito API calls
⬆️ Privilege Escalation	Valid Accounts	T1078	Escalation via compromised admin accounts	Separate admin user pool, MFA required	CloudTrail policy changes, IAM Access Analyzer
⬆️ Privilege Escalation	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	T1068	IAM policy exploitation or Lambda privilege abuse	Least privilege, IAM Access Analyzer, deny policies	Security Hub policy findings
🎭 Defense Evasion	Impair Defenses	T1562.008	Disabling CloudTrail, CloudWatch, or GuardDuty	SCPs to prevent logging deletion, immutable logs	CloudTrail monitoring, Config rules
🎭 Defense Evasion	Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure	T1578	Lambda environment variable manipulation	KMS encryption, Lambda versioning, code signing	Lambda version tracking
🔑 Credential Access	Steal Application Access Token	T1528	JWT token theft from browser or network interception	Short-lived tokens, HTTPS only, refresh rotation	Unusual token usage patterns
🔑 Credential Access	Brute Force	T1110	Cognito password brute force or credential stuffing	Account lockout, rate limiting, CAPTCHA	Failed authentication monitoring, GuardDuty
🔑 Credential Access	Unsecured Credentials	T1552.001	Hardcoded secrets in Lambda code or environment variables	Secrets Manager, KMS encryption, code scanning	Static code analysis, secret detection tools
🔍 Discovery	Cloud Service Discovery	T1526	Enumeration of AWS services and resources	IAM deny policies for enumeration, VPC isolation	CloudTrail API call patterns
🔍 Discovery	Account Discovery	T1087.004	Cognito user enumeration	Generic error messages, rate limiting	Cognito AdminListUsers API monitoring
🏛️ Collection	Data from Cloud Storage Object	T1530	Unauthorized S3 or DynamoDB data access	IAM conditions, VPC endpoints, encryption	CloudTrail data access logs
🏛️ Collection	Data from Information Repositories	T1213	Exfiltration of player data or payment history	Row-level security, data classification, DLP	Unusual query patterns, data access monitoring
📤 Exfiltration	Transfer Data to Cloud Account	T1537	Data copied to attacker-controlled S3 bucket or external service	VPC endpoints only, no internet gateway, outbound traffic monitoring	VPC flow logs, GuardDuty findings
📤 Exfiltration	Exfiltration Over Web Service	T1567	Data exfiltration via Lambda to external endpoints	Private subnets, outbound restrictions, monitoring	X-Ray external calls, unusual network activity
💥 Impact	Data Destruction	T1485	Malicious deletion of DynamoDB items or S3 objects	MFA delete, backups, versioning	CloudTrail delete operations, anomaly detection
💥 Impact	Data Manipulation	T1565	Modification of game states or payment records	Input validation, audit logging, immutability	DynamoDB Streams, change detection
💥 Impact	Resource Hijacking	T1496	Lambda compute resources used for cryptocurrency mining	Timeout limits, memory limits, cost alerts	CloudWatch cost anomalies, unusual execution patterns
💥 Impact	Endpoint Denial of Service	T1499	API Gateway or Lambda flooding	WAF rate limiting, auto-scaling, throttling	CloudWatch metrics, GuardDuty

🌳 Attack Tree Analysis

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flowchart TD
    GOAL["🎯 Compromise Black Trigram<br/>AWS Serverless Backend"]

    GOAL --> PATH1["🔐 Authentication Attack"]
    GOAL --> PATH2["🚪 API Gateway Attack"]
    GOAL --> PATH3["⚡ Serverless Exploitation"]
    GOAL --> PATH4["📊 Data Layer Attack"]
    GOAL --> PATH5["💳 Payment System Attack"]

    PATH1 --> AUTH1["🔓 Credential Compromise"]
    PATH1 --> AUTH2["👥 Social Login Attack"]
    PATH1 --> AUTH3["🎭 Session Hijacking"]

    AUTH1 --> AUTH1A["🎯 Brute Force Cognito"]
    AUTH1 --> AUTH1B["💉 Credential Stuffing"]
    AUTH1A --> AUTH1A1["🔑 Account Takeover"]
    AUTH1B --> AUTH1B1["📊 Data Breach"]

    AUTH2 --> AUTH2A["🌐 OAuth Token Theft"]
    AUTH2 --> AUTH2B["🔗 Account Linking Attack"]
    AUTH2A --> AUTH2A1["🎭 Impersonation"]
    AUTH2B --> AUTH2B1["👤 Identity Confusion"]

    PATH2 --> API1["🚪 API Abuse"]
    PATH2 --> API2["💥 DDoS Attack"]
    API1 --> API1A["💉 Injection Attack"]
    API1 --> API1B["🔓 Broken Access Control"]
    API2 --> API2A["🌊 Request Flood"]
    API2 --> API2B["📡 WebSocket Exhaustion"]

    PATH3 --> LAMBDA1["⚡ Lambda Function Exploit"]
    PATH3 --> LAMBDA2["🔑 IAM Privilege Escalation"]
    LAMBDA1 --> LAMBDA1A["💉 Code Injection"]
    LAMBDA1 --> LAMBDA1B["📦 Dependency Poisoning"]
    LAMBDA2 --> LAMBDA2A["🎯 Overprivileged Function"]
    LAMBDA2 --> LAMBDA2B["🔓 Role Assumption Abuse"]

    PATH4 --> DATA1["📊 Database Attack"]
    PATH4 --> DATA2["📦 Storage Attack"]
    DATA1 --> DATA1A["💉 NoSQL Injection"]
    DATA1 --> DATA1B["🔓 Unauthorized Access"]
    DATA2 --> DATA2A["📤 Data Exfiltration"]
    DATA2 --> DATA2B["🗑️ Malicious File Upload"]

    PATH5 --> PAY1["💳 Payment Fraud"]
    PATH5 --> PAY2["🎣 Webhook Attack"]
    PAY1 --> PAY1A["💸 Price Manipulation"]
    PAY1 --> PAY1B["🔁 Transaction Replay"]
    PAY2 --> PAY2A["🎭 Webhook Forgery"]
    PAY2 --> PAY2B["💉 Webhook Injection"]

    style GOAL fill:#d32f2f,color:#fff,stroke-width:3px
    style PATH1 fill:#ff5722,color:#fff,stroke-width:2px
    style PATH2 fill:#ff9800,color:#fff,stroke-width:2px
    style PATH3 fill:#ffc107,color:#000,stroke-width:2px
    style PATH4 fill:#9c27b0,color:#fff,stroke-width:2px
    style PATH5 fill:#e91e63,color:#fff,stroke-width:2px

---

🎯 Priority Threat Scenarios

🔴 Critical Threat Scenarios

Following Risk-Centric Threat Modeling methodology:

#	Scenario	MITRE Tactic	Impact Focus	Likelihood	Risk	Key Mitigations	Residual Action
1	🔐 Cognito Account Takeover	Initial Access	User data breach, unauthorized access	High		MFA enforcement, password policies, breach detection, rate limiting	Implement behavioral biometrics, continuous authentication
2	💳 Stripe Webhook Forgery	Impact	Payment fraud, revenue loss	Medium		HMAC-SHA256 signature verification, idempotency keys, webhook IP whitelist	Add webhook event replay detection, fraud scoring
3	📊 DynamoDB Data Breach	Collection	Player data exfiltration, PII exposure	Medium		KMS encryption, VPC endpoints, IAM row-level security, GuardDuty monitoring	Implement data loss prevention, query monitoring
4	⚡ Lambda Code Injection	Execution	Remote code execution, privilege escalation	Medium		Input validation, parameterized queries, no eval(), VPC isolation	Add runtime application self-protection (RASP)
5	🚪 API Gateway DDoS	Impact	Service unavailability, revenue loss	High		WAF rate limiting, auto-scaling, CloudFront protection, throttling	Implement advanced bot protection, traffic shaping
6	🌐 OAuth Account Linking Attack	Initial Access	Identity confusion, account takeover	Medium		Email verification, account detection, PKCE, state parameter	Add biometric verification for account linking
7	📦 S3 Data Exfiltration	Exfiltration	Save game theft, replay exposure	Low		IAM user-specific prefixes, VPC endpoints, access logging, GuardDuty S3 protection	Implement data watermarking, access patterns ML
8	🔑 IAM Privilege Escalation	Privilege Escalation	Lateral movement, resource compromise	Low		Least privilege IAM, IAM Access Analyzer, deny policies, SCPs	Implement just-in-time access, privilege telemetry

⚖️ Risk Heat Matrix

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quadrantChart
    title 🎯 AWS Backend Risk Heat Matrix
    x-axis Low Likelihood --> High Likelihood
    y-axis Low Impact --> High Impact
    quadrant-1 Monitor & Prepare
    quadrant-2 Immediate Action Required
    quadrant-3 Accept Risk
    quadrant-4 Mitigate & Control

    "🔐 Cognito Account Takeover": [0.7, 0.95]
    "💳 Stripe Webhook Forgery": [0.5, 0.9]
    "📊 DynamoDB Data Breach": [0.5, 0.85]
    "⚡ Lambda Code Injection": [0.5, 0.75]
    "🚪 API Gateway DDoS": [0.75, 0.7]
    "🌐 OAuth Account Linking": [0.5, 0.7]
    "📦 S3 Data Exfiltration": [0.3, 0.6]
    "🔑 IAM Privilege Escalation": [0.3, 0.65]

---

🚨 Incident Response Procedures

Backend Security Event Response

Following Incident Response Plan procedures:

1. Unauthorized Cognito Access

• Detection: CloudWatch alarms on failed authentication (>10 attempts/5min), GuardDuty credential compromise finding
• Response:
  1. Revoke all JWT tokens for affected user via Cognito AdminUserGlobalSignOut
  2. Force password reset with email verification
  3. Enable MFA requirement
  4. Investigate source IP via CloudTrail and VPC Flow Logs
  5. Block malicious IPs in WAF
  6. Notify user via email with security advisory
• Recovery: User re-authenticates with new credentials and MFA

2. DynamoDB Data Breach

• Detection: GuardDuty alerts on unusual data access patterns, CloudTrail unauthorized API calls, anomalous query volume
• Response:
  1. Immediately disable compromised IAM credentials via AWS STS
  2. Rotate all KMS keys used for DynamoDB encryption
  3. Review CloudTrail logs for data accessed (PK/SK patterns)
  4. Enable DynamoDB point-in-time recovery if not already enabled
  5. Assess data exposure scope (affected users, data types)
  6. Notify affected users per GDPR requirements (72-hour window)
  7. Conduct forensic analysis of access patterns
• Recovery: Restore from last known good backup if data modified, implement enhanced monitoring

3. Stripe Webhook Forgery

• Detection: Webhook signature verification failure, duplicate event IDs, unusual webhook frequency
• Response:
  1. Block source IP in API Gateway and WAF
  2. Review recent webhook events in Stripe Dashboard
  3. Validate all pending purchase records in DynamoDB
  4. Identify fraudulent transactions and mark for refund
  5. Rotate Stripe webhook signing secrets
  6. Update Lambda webhook handler with new secret
  7. Contact Stripe support for fraud investigation
• Recovery: Process legitimate webhooks from queue, monitor for 24 hours

4. Lambda Function Compromise

• Detection: X-Ray unusual execution patterns, CloudWatch anomalous invocations, high error rates, external network calls
• Response:
  1. Immediately disable Lambda function via UpdateFunctionConfiguration (set reserved concurrency to 0)
  2. Review Lambda execution logs for malicious activity
  3. Analyze X-Ray traces for external service calls
  4. Rotate all IAM role credentials used by function
  5. Review environment variables for secrets exposure
  6. Redeploy function from clean source in version control
  7. Enable VPC isolation if not already enabled
• Recovery: Deploy new function version after security review, gradually restore traffic

5. API Gateway DDoS Attack

• Detection: CloudWatch metrics spike (4xx/5xx errors, latency), WAF rate limit triggers, GuardDuty DDoS finding
• Response:
  1. Enable AWS Shield Advanced if not already active
  2. Activate WAF emergency rate limiting rules (stricter thresholds)
  3. Implement CAPTCHA challenges for suspicious traffic
  4. Geo-block non-essential regions in CloudFront
  5. Scale Lambda reserved concurrency and API Gateway throttling
  6. Contact AWS Support for DDoS mitigation assistance
• Recovery: Gradually relax rate limits while monitoring traffic patterns

6. OAuth Account Linking Attack

• Detection: Multiple account linking attempts from same IP, unusual social provider login patterns, email verification failures
• Response:
  1. Disable account linking for affected social providers temporarily
  2. Review Cognito audit logs for suspicious linking events
  3. Identify affected user accounts and force re-verification
  4. Implement additional verification step (SMS or email code)
  5. Enhance account linking detection with behavioral analysis
  6. Notify users with linked accounts to verify legitimacy
• Recovery: Re-enable account linking with enhanced controls

7. S3 Data Exfiltration

• Detection: GuardDuty S3 protection finding, unusual data transfer patterns, CloudTrail bulk GetObject calls
• Response:
  1. Immediately disable compromised IAM credentials
  2. Review CloudTrail for data accessed (S3 object keys)
  3. Enable MFA delete on bucket if not already enabled
  4. Restrict bucket access to VPC endpoints only
  5. Analyze VPC Flow Logs for exfiltration destination
  6. Assess data sensitivity and exposure scope
  7. Notify affected users per GDPR/data breach laws
• Recovery: Rotate S3 bucket encryption keys, implement data loss prevention

Security Event Escalation Matrix

Severity	Response Time	Notification	Action
Critical	< 15 minutes	CEO, CISO, Security Team, Affected Users	Immediate containment, executive briefing
High	< 1 hour	Security Team, DevOps, Product Manager	Rapid response, incident investigation
Medium	< 4 hours	Security Team, DevOps	Standard response, root cause analysis
Low	< 24 hours	DevOps	Monitoring, trend analysis

Automated Response Actions

• ✅ GuardDuty Finding: Auto-block malicious IPs in WAF via EventBridge + Lambda
• ✅ Failed Auth Spike: Auto-enable CAPTCHA via Cognito triggers
• ✅ Cost Anomaly: Auto-alert + throttle via CloudWatch alarms
• ✅ IAM Policy Change: Auto-notify security team via SNS
• ✅ S3 Public Access: Auto-revert to private via Config remediation

---

📋 ISMS Compliance Mapping

ISO 27001:2022 Control Alignment

ISO 27001 Control	Threat Model Coverage	Implementation Status	Evidence
A.5.1 - Policies for information security	Overall threat modeling methodology	✅ Designed	This document, ISMS policy references
A.8.1 - User endpoint devices	Authentication threats, device security	✅ Designed	Cognito MFA, password policies
A.8.2 - Privileged access rights	IAM privilege escalation threats	✅ Designed	Least privilege IAM, Access Analyzer
A.8.3 - Information access restriction	Row-level security, broken access control	✅ Designed	IAM conditions, DynamoDB policies
A.8.4 - Access to source code	Lambda code injection, tampering	✅ Designed	VPC isolation, code signing
A.8.5 - Secure authentication	Cognito threats, OAuth security	✅ Designed	MFA, PKCE, JWT validation
A.8.6 - Capacity management	DoS threats, resource exhaustion	✅ Designed	Auto-scaling, rate limiting, throttling
A.8.10 - Information deletion	Data retention, secure deletion	📋 Planned	S3 lifecycle, DynamoDB TTL
A.8.11 - Data masking	Information disclosure prevention	✅ Designed	Generic errors, data sanitization
A.8.12 - Data leakage prevention	Data exfiltration threats	✅ Designed	VPC endpoints, outbound monitoring
A.8.13 - Information backup	Data destruction threats, DR	✅ Designed	AWS Backup, cross-region replication
A.8.14 - Redundancy of information processing facilities	High availability, resilience	✅ Designed	Multi-AZ, multi-region architecture
A.8.16 - Monitoring activities	Security event detection	✅ Designed	CloudWatch, GuardDuty, Security Hub
A.8.17 - Clock synchronization	Audit trail integrity	✅ Automatic	AWS NTP services
A.8.18 - Use of privileged utility programs	Lambda privilege escalation	✅ Designed	Least privilege, execution monitoring
A.8.23 - Web filtering	Malicious content prevention	✅ Designed	WAF rules, CloudFront protection
A.8.24 - Use of cryptography	Encryption threats, key management	✅ Designed	KMS, TLS 1.3, encryption at rest
A.8.25 - Secure development lifecycle	Supply chain, code injection	✅ Designed	SBOM, dependency scanning, code review
A.8.27 - Secure system architecture and engineering principles	Defense in depth, trust boundaries	✅ Designed	VPC isolation, security groups, WAF layers
A.8.28 - Secure coding	Injection attacks, tampering	✅ Designed	Input validation, parameterized queries

NIST CSF 2.0 Framework Alignment

NIST CSF Function	Category	Black Trigram Implementation	Evidence
GOVERN (GV)	GV.OC - Organizational Context	Threat model documents risk appetite and tolerance	This document, risk matrix
GOVERN (GV)	GV.RM - Risk Management Strategy	STRIDE and MITRE ATT&CK risk identification	Threat scenarios, risk assessment
GOVERN (GV)	GV.RR - Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities	Incident response escalation matrix defined	Incident response procedures
IDENTIFY (ID)	ID.AM - Asset Management	Critical assets and crown jewels identified	Asset-centric analysis section
IDENTIFY (ID)	ID.RA - Risk Assessment	Risk heat matrix with likelihood/impact ratings	Priority threat scenarios
IDENTIFY (ID)	ID.IM - Improvement	Residual actions defined for each threat	Threat mitigation tables
PROTECT (PR)	PR.AA - Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control	Cognito MFA, IAM least privilege, OAuth 2.0 security	Authentication threat analysis
PROTECT (PR)	PR.AT - Awareness and Training	User security education for phishing, social engineering	Security controls documentation
PROTECT (PR)	PR.DS - Data Security	KMS encryption, DynamoDB/S3 protection	Data layer threat analysis
PROTECT (PR)	PR.IP - Information Protection Processes and Procedures	Secure development, input validation, secrets management	Lambda security controls
PROTECT (PR)	PR.PT - Platform Security	VPC isolation, security groups, WAF protection	Network security architecture
DETECT (DE)	DE.AE - Anomalies and Events	GuardDuty, CloudWatch anomaly detection	Security monitoring controls
DETECT (DE)	DE.CM - Security Continuous Monitoring	CloudTrail, X-Ray tracing, access logging	Incident detection methods
RESPOND (RS)	RS.MA - Management	Incident response procedures for all threat types	Incident response section
RESPOND (RS)	RS.AN - Analysis	Forensic analysis procedures for security events	Incident investigation steps
RESPOND (RS)	RS.MI - Mitigation	Automated response actions via EventBridge + Lambda	Automated response section
RECOVER (RC)	RC.RP - Recovery Planning	Point-in-time recovery, multi-region backups	Recovery procedures
RECOVER (RC)	RC.IM - Improvements	Post-incident improvements and lessons learned	Residual actions

CIS Controls v8.1 Alignment

CIS Control	Black Trigram Implementation	Evidence
1 - Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets	AWS resource tagging, Config inventory	Infrastructure as Code
2 - Inventory and Control of Software Assets	SBOM for Lambda dependencies, ECR scanning	Dependency management
3 - Data Protection	KMS encryption at rest, TLS 1.3 in transit	Encryption controls
4 - Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software	Hardened Lambda, API Gateway, VPC config	Security architecture
5 - Account Management	Cognito user management, IAM least privilege	Authentication controls
6 - Access Control Management	Row-level security, IAM conditions	Authorization controls
7 - Continuous Vulnerability Management	GuardDuty, Security Hub, dependency scanning	Vulnerability monitoring
8 - Audit Log Management	CloudTrail, CloudWatch Logs, immutable logging	Audit logging
9 - Email and Web Browser Protections	WAF rules, phishing-resistant MFA	Web security
10 - Malware Defenses	GuardDuty malware detection for S3	Malware protection
11 - Data Recovery	AWS Backup, point-in-time recovery, multi-region	Backup controls
12 - Network Infrastructure Management	VPC, security groups, NACLs, VPC Flow Logs	Network security
13 - Network Monitoring and Defense	GuardDuty, VPC Flow Logs, WAF	Network monitoring
14 - Security Awareness and Skills Training	Secure coding guidelines, security documentation	Developer training
16 - Application Software Security	Input validation, OWASP Top 10 mitigations	Application security
17 - Incident Response Management	Documented incident response procedures	Incident response section
18 - Penetration Testing	Planned security testing of API Gateway, Lambda	Testing strategy

---

📚 Related Documents

🔐 ISMS Threat Modeling & Risk Management

• 🎯 Threat Modeling Policy - STRIDE methodology and standards
• 📉 Risk Assessment Methodology - Risk quantification framework
• 📊 Risk Register - Enterprise risk tracking
• 🏷️ Classification Framework - Business impact analysis

🔐 ISMS Security Policies

• 🔐 Information Security Policy - Overall security governance
• 🛠️ Secure Development Policy - Security-integrated SDLC
• 🔍 Vulnerability Management - Security testing procedures
• 🚨 Incident Response Plan - Security incident handling
• 🔒 Cryptography Policy - Encryption standards
• 🌐 Network Security Policy - VPC and WAF configuration
• 🔑 Access Control Policy - IAM and RBAC
• 💾 Backup Recovery Policy - Data protection and DR
• 🤝 Third Party Management - AWS and Stripe security assessment

🛡️ Black Trigram Security Documentation

• 🛡️ Security Architecture - Current frontend security implementation
• 🔮 Future Security Architecture - AWS backend security controls
• 🔐 Current Threat Model - Frontend-only threat analysis
• 🏗️ Future Architecture - AWS backend design specifications
• 📊 Future Data Model - DynamoDB table schemas
• 🔄 Future Workflows - CI/CD security for backend
• 🔒 Security Policy - Vulnerability reporting and disclosure
• 🗺️ ISMS Reference Mapping - Complete ISMS policy mapping
• 📋 CRA Assessment - EU Cyber Resilience Act compliance

🔄 Development & Operations

• 🔄 Workflows - Security-hardened CI/CD pipelines
• 🔧 Development Guide - Security features and testing
• 📐 Architecture - Overall system design
• 🎮 Combat Architecture - Game security integration

📚 External References

• MITRE ATT&CK Cloud Matrix - Cloud attack techniques
• AWS Security Best Practices - AWS security guidance
• OWASP Serverless Top 10 - Serverless security risks
• PCI DSS Requirements - Payment card security standards
• OAuth 2.0 Security Best Practices - OAuth security

---

🏆 Future Threat Modeling Maturity

📈 Cloud Security Maturity Framework

Following Hack23 AB Maturity Levels adapted for cloud environments:

🟢 Level 1: Cloud Security Foundation

• 🔐 Basic Authentication: AWS Cognito with password policies
• ⚠️ Basic Monitoring: CloudWatch metrics and alarms
• 🛡️ Basic Protection: WAF with OWASP rule set
• 📚 Documentation: STRIDE analysis for AWS services
• 🔑 IAM Basics: Least privilege policies documented

🟡 Level 2: Cloud Process Integration

• 📅 Regular Security Review: Quarterly threat model updates
• 📝 GuardDuty Integration: Automated threat detection enabled
• 🔧 Security Automation: EventBridge + Lambda auto-remediation
• 🔄 Incident Response: Documented procedures with runbooks

🟠 Level 3: Cloud Security Excellence

• 🔍 Comprehensive Cloud STRIDE: All AWS services analyzed
• ⚖️ Risk Quantification: Impact × likelihood for all threats
• 🛡️ Defense in Depth: Multiple security layers (WAF, VPC, IAM, KMS)
• 🎓 Security Culture: Team training on cloud security

🔴 Level 4: Advanced Cloud Intelligence

• 🌐 Proactive Threat Hunting: Security Hub custom insights
• 📊 Threat Intelligence: Integration with external feeds
• 📈 Security Metrics: KPIs tracked (MTTD, MTTR, mean time to detect/respond)
• 🔄 Continuous Improvement: Post-incident reviews with action items

🟣 Level 5: Cloud Innovation Leadership

• 🔮 Predictive Security: ML-based anomaly detection (GuardDuty ML)
• 🤖 AI-Enhanced Threat Modeling: Automated threat identification
• 📊 Industry Leadership: Public sharing of cloud security practices
• 🔬 Research & Development: Contributing to MITRE ATT&CK cloud techniques

Current Status: 🟡 Level 2 (Process Integration) - Targeting Level 3 for v2.0 release

---

🌟 Cloud Security Best Practices

🔐 AWS Security Principles

🔑 Identity-Centric Security

• 🔍 Cognito User Pools: Central identity provider with MFA enforcement
• ⚖️ IAM Least Privilege: One role per Lambda function, resource-based policies
• 📊 Identity Pool: Temporary credentials via AWS STS (15-minute expiration)
• 🛡️ Row-Level Security: IAM conditions for user-specific data access

👥 Defense in Depth

• 🤝 Multiple Security Layers: CloudFront WAF → API Gateway WAF → Lambda IAM → VPC isolation → KMS encryption
• 📢 Fail Secure: Default deny policies, explicit allow required
• 🔍 Immutable Infrastructure: Infrastructure as Code, no manual changes
• 📈 Security Automation: EventBridge + Lambda for automated response

🔄 Continuous Monitoring

• ⚡ Real-time Detection: GuardDuty, Security Hub, CloudWatch
• 📊 Audit Trail: CloudTrail all API calls, immutable logging to S3
• 🤝 Anomaly Detection: Machine learning baselines for user behavior
• �� Security Dashboards: Centralized visibility via Security Hub

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📋 Document Control:
✅ Approved by: James Pether Sörling, CEO
📤 Distribution: Public
🏷️ Classification:
📅 Effective Date: 2026-03-19
⏰ Next Review: 2026-09-19
🎯 Framework Compliance: